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The purpose of this opening chapter is to explore and address several background
questions as a preparation to examining the consciousness of Jesus Christ as presented in
Jacques Maritain’s On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus.
1
Maritain was not the first to
enter into the discussion of the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and, in fact, his work
follows numerous other attempts to understand the consciousness of Jesus that began at
the turn of the twentieth century. The question of the consciousness of Jesus Christ
allows for a fundamental integration of the findings of psychology in theology. For the
sake of clarity, when speaking of “consciousness,” I am using the word in a general
sense, i.e., a subjective awareness of oneself and one’s surroundings.
2
  When applying
“consciousness” to Jesus Christ, theologians seek to understand more deeply questions of 
identity, namely, what he understood about himself and his surroundings in light of the
1
 Jacques Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New
York: Herder and Herder, Inc., 1969). Maritain’s book was first published in French in 1967, and
is based on two talks given to the Little Brothers of Jesus in Toulouse, France, in February and
March of 1964. Maritain revised the talks for the published edition.
2
 Defining consciousness within the sphere of the human person is difficult for various
reasons. A simple definition can be found in Stuart Sutherland, International Dictionary of 
Psychology (New York: Crossroad, 1996): “The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings;
awareness” (95). However, G. William Farthing, "Consciousness and Unconsciousness," in
Encyclopedia of Psychology, ed. Alan E. Kazdin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
notes that the problem with universally defining consciousness is that different academic
disciplines use the term with particular nuances within their own respective fields (268).
Nonetheless he offers a sweeping definition of consciousness as “[including] perceived objects
and events, retrieved memories, thoughts in words or mental images, bodily sensations, emotional
feelings and desires, and our own actions” (268). For a brief summary of modern uses and
meanings for consciousness in psychology and philosophy, see K. R. Roa, "Consciousness," in
Concise Encyclopedia of Psychology, ed. Becky Ozaki (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996),
183-185. For a Freudian synopsis of consciousness, see L. S. Carrier, "Consciousness," in The
Freud Encyclopedia: Theory, Therapy, and Culture, ed. Edward Erwin (New York: Routledge,
2002), 107-109.
1
Incarnation. Prior to Maritain, explorations in the consciousness of Jesus Christ varied
depending on the methodology employed. In order to understand more fully the
controversy before Maritain, we will explore in a general manner the theological question
as it stood prior to Maritain’s book on the subject. Lastly, an article by Karl Rahner will
be examined which presents in a concise manner the state of the question of the
consciousness of Jesus just a few years previous to Maritain’s book on the subject.
3
While the purpose of this study is to examine the consciousness of Jesus Christ in
light of Maritain’s Christology and the epistemology of Michael Polanyi, it is important
to examine the main biblical passage relevant to the question of Christ’s consciousness in
Maritain’s work. While Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus will be examined
at length in the next chapter, one of the fundamental points behind his thesis is a 
disagreement between him and St. Thomas Aquinas. This disagreement deals with the
understanding of one particular passage in St. Luke’s Gospel, namely 2.52, “And Jesus
advanced [in] wisdom and age and favor before God and man.”
4
The final two sections of this chapter will present a personal and intellectual
profile of both Maritain and Polanyi.
3
 Karl Rahner, S.J., "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of
Christ," trans. Karl-H. Kruger, in Theological Investigations, (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), 5:
193-215, was originally given as a talk to the Theological Faculty of Trier in December of 1961. 
4
 All Scripture quotations are taken from the New American Bible.
2
A. The Question before Maritain
General Background
While the question of the consciousness of Jesus Christ among theologians in the
early twentieth century is vast, there are several modern Christological works that offer
concise summaries of the controversy.
5
  Two detailed studies of the issue can be found in
Jean Galot and Bernard Lonergan, while Walter Kasper and Wolfhart Pannenberg offer
more succinct accounts.
6
  Theologians writing on the consciousness of Christ prior to and
including Maritain did so primarily within a scholastic framework and attempted to
understand the consciousness of Christ in light of the scholastic distinction of the
threefold knowledge of Jesus and the Christological teachings of the Council of 
Chalcedon. Since these two issues play such a significant role in the various attempts at
understanding the consciousness of Jesus Christ, a brief review of them will precede an
examination of the controversy itself.
Scholastic theology was often taught using “manuals” that summarized
theological points or opinions and assigned to them various “notes” of certainty. A good
example of such a summary of the theological tradition in the manual style is Ludwig
Ott’s Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma.
7
In the section entitled “The Attributes of 
5
 For a detailed presentation of the early writings on the consciousness of Christ prior to
1954, see A. Michel, "Jésus-Christ: Théologie du Christ," in Dictionnaire de théologie
catholique, ed. Bernard Loth and Albert Michel (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1958), 2: 2646-
2654.
6
 Jean Galot, S.J., Who is Christ? A Theology of Incarnation, trans. M. Angeline
Bouchard (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981), 319-343; Bernard Lonergan, The
Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E.
Crowe (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2002), “Part 6: The Consciousness of Christ,” 190-
289; Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1976), 243-
244; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), 325-334.
7
 Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, trans. Patrick Lynch, ed. James Bastible




 Ott describes the three different kinds of knowledge proposed
by the scholastics and ascribed to Jesus. The first of these three kinds of knowledge is
the immediate vision of God, or beatific vision, present to Jesus in his soul.
9
  Ott presents
the scholastic doctrine that while ordinary human beings cannot possess the beatific
vision until they pass through death to eternal life, Jesus Christ possesses the vision of 
God in his soul from the moment of his conception by virtue of the hypostatic union.
10
To this theological opinion Ott ascribes the theological note sententia certa, meaning that
while the teaching does not carry the weight of an explicit theological definition by the
pope or a general council (de fide definita), it nevertheless “is a doctrine, on which the
Teaching Authority of the Church has not yet finally pronounced, but whose truth is
guaranteed by its intrinsic connection with the doctrine of revelation.”
11
  According to Ott
the fathers affirm this teaching, albeit indirectly, and the “Schoolmen … unanimously
accepted” this thesis.
12
  As a result of the beatific vision in his soul Jesus’ life existed
under two different states at once, both as viator (pilgrim, journeyman) and as
comprehensor (one who has attained the goal, who grasps and beholding God).
13
In the
beatific vision Jesus sees the divine essence along with all things external to God
(specifically as they relate to his “vocation as Redeemer”) including “all things real of the
past, the present and the future, including, of course, the thoughts of mankind” (as
8
 Ott, Fundamentals, 162-168.
9
 Ott, Fundamentals, 162-165.
10
 Ott, Fundamentals, 162. In fact, Ott notes that Jesus possesses the beatific vision to a 
greater degree than either the angels or the blessed in heaven “by reason of the Hypostatic Union”
and thus “beholds God more perfectly than any other creature” (164).
11
 Ott, Fundamentals, 10. 
12
 Ott, Fundamentals, 163. 
13
 Ott, Fundamentals, 162. This particular distinction will play an important role in




  This same knowledge, though, while existing under the state of viator
is limited according to Jesus’ finite human nature.  “On account, however, of the
finiteness of human nature the Beatific Vision of Christ as man is not comprehensive
knowledge of God.”
15
Along with the beatific vision the second and third types of knowledge in Jesus
are infused and acquired knowledge. Infused knowledge in Jesus is “knowledge by
means of concepts which are immediately and habitually communicated to a Spirit by
God. It is distinguished from scientia beata [beatific vision] in that through it things are
known in their proper nature through infused concepts … communicated by God in a 
finished way to the Spirit.”
16
  On the other hand acquired knowledge “is the natural
human knowledge which proceeds from sense perception, and which is achieved through
the abstracting activity of the intellect.”
17
  Simply put, infused knowledge is conceptual
knowledge of something placed directly in the mind of Jesus by God, whereas acquired
knowledge entails those things which Jesus comes to know through the ordinary
operation of his human senses and intellect. Ott assigns to the thesis that Jesus has both
infused and acquired knowledge the theological note of sententia communis, a teaching
“which in itself belongs to the field of free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians
generally.”
18
  This is a lower note of certainty than the note assigned to Jesus’ having the
immediate vision of God. In fact, concerning infused knowledge, Ott writes, “No
definitive scriptural proof can be adduced of the existence in Christ of scientia infusa.
14
 Ott, Fundamentals, 164-165.
15
 Ott, Fundamentals, 164.
16
 Ott, Fundamentals, 167.
17
 Ott, Fundamentals, 167.
18
 Ott, Fundamentals, 10.
5
Speculatively, it may be demonstrated not as necessary but as very appropriate.”
19
  With
regard to acquired knowledge in Jesus, Ott notes that such knowledge is a “necessary
consequence from the reality of the completeness of His human nature,” but adds that,
according to St. Thomas, Jesus does not acquire new knowledge.
20
  Why?  Ott writes,
“the knowledge which Christ acquired though His experimental knowledge was already
contained in His scientia beata and in His scientia infusa, it was not new, not in its
content, but only in the mode by which Christ attained it.”
21
  The earliest attempts at
understanding the consciousness of Jesus Christ worked within this scholastic theory of
Jesus’ knowledge, along with the Christological teachings of the Council of Chalcedon.
Because the Christological teachings of Chalcedon play such an important role in
the discussion of Jesus’ knowledge among the scholastics and those theologians writing
on the consciousness of Jesus Christ prior to and including Maritain, a summary review
of the main texts from the council and their importance will help further situate the
discussion.
22
  Concerning the two natures in Christ and his person the council states:
… following the saintly fathers, we all with one voice teach the
confession of one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ: the same
perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and truly
19
 Ott, Fundamentals, 167.
20
 Ott, Fundamentals, 167-168. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 12,
a. 2. According to St. Thomas, Jesus “compares” the information he gathers through sense
experience with what he knows through infused or beatific knowledge. He is not actually
learning anything new through acquired knowledge but simply affirming what he already knows
through beatific and infused knowledge. One can see the difficulty involved in such an
affirmation. If Jesus has the totality of knowledge through the beatific vision, what purpose
would there be in having infused or experiential knowledge?
21
 Ott, Fundamentals, 168. 
22
 For the decrees and canons of the Council of Chalcedon, see Decrees of the
Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I to Lateran V, ed. Norman P. Tanner (Washington, D.C.: Sheed & 
Ward and Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1: 75-103. For a detailed work on the early
Christological councils and the controversies that surrounded them, see Basil Studer, Trinity and
Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church, trans. Matthias Westerhoff, ed. Andrew Louth
(Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1993); see also J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian
Doctrines (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1978).
6
man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father as
regards divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards
humanity; like us in all respects except for sin … one and the same
Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures which
undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation; at no point
was the difference between the natures taken away through the union, but 
rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a 
single person and a single subsistent being; he is not parted or divided
into two persons, but is one and the same only-begotten Son, God, Word,
Lord Jesus Christ.
23
What Chalcedon affirms is that Jesus Christ shares with the human race a human nature
that is not mixed with nor absorbed by his divine nature. Jesus’ human and divine
natures, however, do not exist separately from one another but are united in one person.
The council accepted as expressing orthodox faith the Tome of Leo in which Leo further
clarified the union of two natures united in the one person of Jesus.
24
Leo writes:
So the proper character of both natures was maintained and came
together in a single person. Lowliness was taken up by majesty,
weakness by strength, mortality by eternity … Thus was true God born in
the undiminished and perfect nature of a true man, complete in what is
his and complete in what is ours … There is nothing unreal about this
oneness, since both the lowliness of the man and the grandeur of the
divinity are in mutual relation.
25
If we are to understand as the council affirms that Jesus has an authentic human nature in
all things but sin, then any advances made by the sciences, particularly psychology and
its understanding of consciousness and conscious awareness, are also useful in gaining
further insight into the genuine humanity and person of Jesus Christ.
23
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 1: 86. 
24
 The council fathers state, “To these [Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius and Cyril’s letter
to John of Antioch] it [the council] has suitably added, against false believers and for the
establishment of orthodox doctrines, the letter of the primate of greatest and older Rome, the most
blessed and saintly Archbishop Leo, written to the sainted Archbishop Flavian to put down
Eutyches’s evil-mindedness, because it is in agreement with great Peter’s confession and
represents a support we have in common.” In Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 1: 85. 
25
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 1: 78. 
7
It is from this dogmatic background and the scholastic theses concerning Jesus’
knowledge that theologians began to hypothesize about the consciousness of Christ.
Both the scholastics and modern authors, including Maritain, attempt to maintain two
fundamental assertions about Jesus: 1. that Jesus is truly human and possesses human
knowledge, and 2. that Jesus is truly divine and possesses divine knowledge. How both
of these statements can be reconciled and affirmed as true for the same person – Jesus – 
is the question for those involved in the controversy of the consciousness of Jesus Christ.
As will be seen, those theologians who attempted solutions to the consciousness of Christ
outside of this scholastic theory of Jesus’ knowledge and the Christological decrees of the
Council of Chalcedon oftentimes found themselves at odds with the Magisterium, while
those who maintained the traditional scholastic and conciliar distinctions did not.
In the brief modern history of the consciousness of Christ as outlined by Galot,
Lonergan, Kasper and Pannenberg, Pannenberg sees the “heated discussion that has
broken out in Roman Catholic dogmatics in recent decades about Jesus’ consciousness”
26
as beginning with Herman Schell in his Katholische Dogmatik.
27
  According to
Pannenberg, in an effort to maintain a genuine human psychology in Jesus, Schell held
that while the divine person subsists in both natures, those natures remain separated one 
from the other.
28
  As a result Schell posits that the humanity of Jesus gains knowledge
only through ordinary human means (i.e., human experience) and does not share the
benefits of either what the scholastics understood as the beatific vision or what they
called infused knowledge, which Schell believed would be incompatible with authentic
26
 Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 328.
27
 Herman Schell, Katholische Dogmatik 3, 1 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1892), as cited in
Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 328, footnote 8. 
28
 Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 328.
8
human growth in Jesus. Having acquired human knowledge only, however, still leaves
open the question as to how Jesus knows that he is divine or the Son of God. Pannenberg
notes that in light of this question, Schell answers that Jesus is aware of his being the
divine Son of God through an illuminated knowledge in his soul.
29
  Although Schell
avoids using the scholastic distinctions of beatific or infused knowledge, he too admits
the presence of a supernatural knowledge in Jesus in addition to his ordinary experiential
knowledge. Pannenberg notes, though, that Schell’s theory of limiting Jesus’ knowledge
solely to what he gains through ordinary human experience was subsequently rejected by
the Holy Office in 1918.
30
Galot, Kasper and Pannenberg all agree that the theologian Déodat de Basly
31
 was
the leading proponent of a neo-Antiochene Homo Assumptus Christology, which
attributed the center of consciousness to the human person of Jesus and not to the person
of the Word. Pannenberg refers to Déodat de Basly’s position as an “extreme
Antiochene” Christology.
32
  From Galot’s perspective, Déodat de Basly understood the
man Jesus as being an independent and autonomous loving being aware of himself as a 
human “I,” “because the man Jesus is an autonomous individual, endowed with his own
intellect and will.”
33
  The human “I” in Jesus stands alongside the Trinity, united in an
exchange of love. Galot summarizes Déodat de Basly’s thought thus:
Déodat de Basly … situated the Man Jesus (Assumptus Homo) vis-
à-vis the Triune God as if they were two “autonomous individuals”
exchanging a mutual love. In so doing he erected the two natures of 
29
 Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 328.
30
 Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 328-329. On 329, footnote 10, Pannenberg cites H.
Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum, 3645f.
31
 Galot, Who is Christ?, 323-324; Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 243-244; Pannenberg, Jesus-
God and Man, 329; Déodat de Basly, La christiade française (Paris, 1927).
32
 Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 329.
33
 Galot, Who is Christ?, 323.
9
Christ, the human and the divine, into two persons. In fact, he conceived
these two natures as subjects of activity and love, facing one another after
the manner of an “I” and a “you.” In this confrontation, Déodat is actually
setting the man Jesus in opposition to the Word, and as a result he can no 
longer speak of a unity of person or of the Word Incarnate. Such a theory
does not respect the Ontological structure of Christ.
34
For Déodat de Basly the unity of the human nature in Christ with the triune God is not the
one person of the Word as previously affirmed by the Council of Chalcedon. The
unifying principle is no longer one of ontology but rather one of an exchange of love
between the triune God and the man Jesus. This position of positing a duality between
the man Jesus and the triune God (and/or Word) was deemed unacceptable and
condemned by Pius XII in his encyclical letter on the commemoration of the fifteenth
centenary of the Council of Chalcedon, Sempiternus Rex, in 1951. 
While there is no reason why the humanity of Christ should not be studied
more deeply also from a psychological point of view, there are,
nevertheless, some who, in their arduous pursuit, desert the ancient
teachings more than is right, and make an erroneous use of the authority of 
the definition of Chalcedon to support their new ideas. These emphasize
the state and condition of Christ’s human nature to such an extent as to
make it seem something existing in its own right (subjectum quoddam sui
juris), and not as subsisting in the Word itself. But the council of 
Chalcedon in full accord with that of Ephesus, clearly asserts that both
natures are united in ‘One Person and subsistence’, and rules out the
placing of two individuals in Christ, as if some one man, completely
autonomous in himself, had been taken up and placed by the side of the
Word.
35
While the encyclical explicitly states that one cannot posit in Christ two separate
psychological individuals, Kasper observes, “the encyclical leaves it open whether it is
34
 Galot, Who is Christ?, 330.
35
 Pope Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex Christus, 30-31 in The Papal Encyclicals 1939-1958,
ed. Claudia Carlen (Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath Publishing Company, 1981), 4: 209.
10
possible to recognize a relatively independent psychological human subject (self-
consciousness)” in the man Jesus.
36
Whereas Déodat de Basly separate the oneness of the ontological person of Christ
into two separate individuals, his disciple Léon Seiller
37
 logically advanced his mentor’s
theory of Jesus’ consciousness and, according to Galot, attributed to Christ the man “all
the attributes and characteristics proper to the person.”
38
In so doing he too separates the
human and divine natures but goes further and grants the status of person to both the man
Jesus and the divine Word. Lonergan attributes this trajectory in Seiller’s thought to his
misunderstanding the communicatio idiomatum, through which Seiller does not properly
distinguish or unite the acts of the human nature of Jesus from the acts of the divine
Word.
39
  According to Lonergan, when talking about Christ, Seiller believes that it is
more accurate to recognize the Word joining himself to the man (Verbum assumens) than
to recognize a man joined to the Word (Homo Assumptus). The man Jesus knows that he 
is God through the beatific vision although this vision does not make him aware of his
36
 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 244. In a corresponding footnote Kasper adds, “It is well-
known that there is an interesting difference between the non-official text of the encyclical in the
Osservatore Romano (13.9.1951, No. 212, p. 2) and the official text in the AAS 43 (1951), p. 638
(DS 3905). Whereas in the non-official text theologians are criticized for assuming, even only
psychologically, a human subject in his own right in Christ, this “saltem psychologice” does not
appear in the official text. Accordingly in the definitive text only Nestorianism and Adoptionism
are condemned, but the question of Jesus’ human self-consciousness is left open.” In Jesus the
Christ, 270, footnote 36.
37
 Léon Seiller, La psychologie humaine du Christ et l'unicité de personne, (Rennes &
Paris, 1949).
38
 Galot, Who is Christ?, 324. This position is somewhat modified by Philippe de la
Trinité, "A propos de la conscience du Christ: Un faux problème théologique," Ephemerides
Carmeliticae 11 (1960), 1-52. Galot writes, “According to Philippe de la Trinité, the distinction
between one divine ‘I’ and two ‘selves’ corresponds to the meaning of the ‘I’, which expresses
the metaphysical personality, and to the meaning of the ‘self’ which ‘expresses the content of the
psychical states in the context of nature.’  Inasmuch as there are two natures, there are two
selves.”  In Who is Christ?, 326. 
39
 Lonergan, The Ontological, 251-253.
11
being united to the Word. The Word, however, is aware of himself as being both God
and united to the man Jesus. What has occurred in Seiller’s work is a division in the
ontological unity of the person subsisting in two natures in Jesus Christ into two separate
and distinct persons. In the words of Lonergan, “It was hardly surprising, therefore, that
this book [La psychologie humaine du Christ] was placed on the Index of Forbidden
Books” in July of 1951.
40
  While Déodat de Basly’s and Seiller’s attempts to understand
the consciousness of Jesus led them to grant an overt independence of the human nature
from the divine nature in Christ, other authors were attempting to understand the
consciousness of Jesus by maintaining a closer unity of the two natures in Jesus.
According to Galot and Kasper, Paul Galtier, like Seiller, attempted to understand
the consciousness of Jesus Christ from the perspective of his human nature being
enlightened by the beatific vision.
41
  For Galtier, according to Kasper, “consciousness
belongs to nature, not to person.”
42
  Galot notes that Galtier, like Déodat de Basly,
attributed to the man Jesus a conscious human “I” that is identical with his human nature,
but unlike Déodat de Basly, Galtier affirmed that the actions of the human “I” are also to
be attributed to the person of the Word.
43
  Thus Galtier maintains that the Word
appropriates the human conscious activity as his own while at the same time allows the
human nature to operate free of any influence.
44
  Hence, in Jesus’ human consciousness
he is only aware of being human, but through the aid of the beatific vision he perceives
40
 Lonergan, The Ontological, 253. 
41
 Galot, Who is Christ?, 353-354; Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 244; Paul Galtier, L'Unité du 
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de Basly’s Christology radically Antiochene, Galtier could be characterized as holding a more
moderate Antiochene Christology.
42
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himself as also being divine. Without the aid of the beatific vision, Jesus would not have
been aware of himself as being God’s Son because he would have only had a human
consciousness and awareness of himself.
45
  Thus in Jesus the psychological subject and
center of consciousness is proper to the human nature which is also enlightened by the
beatific vision. Galot states that in a controversy with Pietro Parente, Galtier modified
his view of Jesus having a purely human “I.” In his modified position he instead
affirmed that the “I” of Jesus is proper to the divine person, and that his human
consciousness was an awareness of his being a psychological self.
46
Kasper writes that for Parente,
47
 in opposition to Galtier, consciousness does not
belong to the human nature of Jesus but rather is proper to the divine person.
P. Parente … reiterated once more very strictly the traditional Thomist
school and, as an indirect consequence, that of Alexandrian theology: the
divine I of the Logos is the sole centre of operations; there is in Jesus
Christ, not only ontologically but also psychologically, only one I, and this
one divine I is directly conscious of the human nature.
48
As Lonergan writes, while Parente holds that consciousness resides pre-eminently
with the Word, he also acknowledges the presence of a human consciousness in
Jesus. The human consciousness, however, is “modified” in order to perceive
45
 Galot, Who is Christ?, 336. Galot is critical of this position because a vision of the
divine is not, in his opinion, the same as conscious awareness (354). Lonergan notes that this
same position is held by Herman Diepen, "La psychologie humaine du Christ selon Thomas
d'Aquin," Review Thomiste 50 (1950): 515-562. Through the beatific vision Jesus knows that he
is God, but in his human consciousness all that he is aware of are his human actions. In The
Ontological, 279-281.
46
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“indirectly and dimly” its union with the Word.
49
  Thus the question, “How does
Jesus Christ become aware of his divinity?” (Déodat de Basly, Seiller and Galtier)
is for Parente, “How is the Word conscious of his human nature?”  Whereas
Pannenberg praises Parente for “[achieving] a coherent construction of the vital
unity of the God-man,” he is quick to add that he has done so “only at the price of 
the humanity of his [Jesus’] conscious life.”
50
  Whether or not Pannenberg’s
criticism of Parente is accurate, it reveals the difficulties involved in speculating
on the question of the consciousness of Christ. While the Homo Assumptus
theories of the consciousness of Christ tend to over-emphasize and grant too great
an autonomy to the humanity of Jesus, Parente, in stressing the divine
consciousness and ontological unity of Jesus, seemingly does not respect Jesus’
authentic human nature enough. These five authors are all examples of the
difficulties encountered in the mid-twentieth century attempts at articulating a 
theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ. While attempting to adhere to the
conciliar decrees and the scholastic theory of Jesus’ knowledge, many of these
theologian’s theories of the consciousness of Jesus did not lead to a consensus,
but instead produced a wide range of theories and criticisms.
49
 Lonergan, The Ontological, 277, 279. According to Galot, Bartolome Xiberta, El Yo de
Jesucristo (Barcelona: Herder, 1954) also maintains this position. In Who is Christ?, 281. A
similar thesis is held by Anscar Vonier, The Personality of Christ (New York: Longmans, Green,
and Co., 1916). Vonier holds that according to the scholastic tradition, “a person is radically and
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50
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Karl Rahner
Rahner’s essay “Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness
of Christ”
51
 summarizes the state of the question of the consciousness of Jesus Christ as it
stood in 1961and presents questions for further consideration concerning the future
discussion of the consciousness of Jesus, some of which will subsequently be addressed
by Maritain in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus. The questions Rahner offers will be 
examined after briefly assessing the methodology Rahner employs in this article.
Rahner’s methodology is noteworthy because this dissertation’s methodology will closely
follow some of Rahner’s methodological points, which we will note. Finally, we will
examine the solution proposed by Rahner.
There is a twofold importance to citing Rahner’s methodology. First, in order to
understand the context of the questions he raises concerning the consciousness of Christ,
it is necessary to understand his theological perspective. Rahner clearly asserts that he 
approaches the question of Jesus’ consciousness as a Catholic dogmatic theologian. A
second and more important reason for citing Rahner’s methodology is that this
dissertation closely follows his two main methodological points, namely that the question
being raised is a dogmatic question and not an exegetical question, and that although a 
speculative Christological question, it is in harmony with the Church’s Magisterium.
51
 Karl Rahner, S.J., "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of
Christ," trans. Karl-H. Kruger, in Theological Investigations, (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), 5:
193-215. For the original German see “Dogmatische Erwägungen über das Wissen und 
Selbstbewußtsein Christi,” in Schriften zur Theologie, (Zürich: Benziger, 1962), 5: 222-245.
Rahner addresses the concept of the beatific vision in “Some Implications of the Scholastic
Concept of Uncreated Grace” in Theological Investigations, trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P.
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 1: 319-346. In this article he understands vision as the
presence of God in the human spirit that is more relational and involves more than just an
intellectual vision (335-336).
15
The first methodological point Rahner makes is that he is raising a dogmatic
question and not an exegetical question.
52
  Rahner affirms that he has “neither the
intention nor the competence to carry out a work of exegesis,”
53
 but he notes the
existence of “a certain tension … between exegetes and dogmatic theologians”
54
regarding Jesus Christ’s knowledge and conscious awareness. It seems to me that part of 
this tension resides in the nature and goal of each discipline and their relation to one 
another. The task of dogmatic theology is to build upon and make intelligible the
Church’s dogmatic formulations. In cases where there is no clear teaching, dogmatic
theologians offer possible solutions to questions that are being raised that will help
understand or develop the question in accord with Scripture and tradition. As Rahner
states, “If one appeals simply to the Church’s magisterium, then the dogmatic theologian
must be reminded of the fact that it is his very task to show how, and from where, the
modern magisterium has taken its teaching, since it does not receive any new revelation
but only guards and interprets the apostolic tradition and hence must itself have objective
reasons for its interpretation of this apostolic tradition.”
55
  Pertaining to the mission of the
biblical exegete, however, it is “not demanded of the exegete that he himself, with his
historical methods or with a biblical theology based directly on the texts, should be able
to arrive at dogmatic statements about the knowledge and self-consciousness of Jesus.”
56
According to Rahner, the findings of dogmatic theologians and the findings of biblical
exegetes should be compatible with one another, although a more concrete relationship is
52
 Rahner, Theological Investigations, 5: 195, 198-199, 202.
53
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  Specifically referring to the consciousness of Jesus Christ, Rahner writes
that the “only thing we intend to do in this respect is to offer the exegete a dogmatic
conception of Christ’s self-consciousness and knowledge which will perhaps make it
easier than it has been in the face of previous conceptions for him to admit that this
conception is compatible with his own historical findings. We say: that it is ‘compatible’.
For this is all that is required.”
58
The second noteworthy point of Rahner’s methodology is that he explicitly states
his intention to speculate on the consciousness of Christ in harmony with the Church’s
teaching office while offering a speculative proposal that may further clarify what has not 
been explicitly defined or taught. Rahner does this in both explicit and implicit ways.
Implicitly, the foundation of Rahner’s speculation is the teaching of Chalcedon,
particularly emphasizing the hypostatic union of Jesus Christ.
59
  Explicitly, Rahner is
clear to say that what he is attempting is “not intended to be anything more than a 
conceivable theological conception which is not opposed to the declarations made by the
official magisterium about our question. It is simply meant to be a theological
conception which seems to make sense because it seems to prove itself to be deducible
from dogmatic presuppositions which are certain.”
60
  Regarding the beatific vision
Rahner states that both dogmatic theologians and exegetes “are not permitted to doubt the
binding, although not defined, doctrine of the Church’s magisterium which states that the
57
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human soul of Jesus enjoyed the direct vision of God during his life on earth.”
61
  Rahner
thus makes it clear that he intends to speculate on a still open theological question while
also respecting the received tradition of the councils and the knowledge of Jesus Christ,
i.e., the beatific vision. With this methodology in mind, what are the questions he 
considers to be open concerning the consciousness of Jesus Christ?
Rahner begins his essay by stating the theological foundation to the question
concerning the consciousness of Jesus Christ as indicated by the manualist tradition. He
writes:
Theological tradition attributes a knowledge to Jesus as man which
embraces and exhausts all past, present and future reality, at least to the
extent in which these realities are related in some way to Christ’s
soteriological task … This theological tradition furthermore attributes to
Jesus—from the very first moment of his human existence—the
possession of the direct vision of God as it is experienced by the blessed
in heaven.
62
The first question for Rahner is how Jesus is consciously aware of this vision in his
humanity. Rahner writes that when Jesus is understood as having an unqualified and
absolute knowledge of all things and all times, “Such statements sound almost
mythological today when one first hears them; they seem to be contrary to the real
humanity and historical nature of Our Lord.”
63
  The next two questions Rahner raises are
directly related to this first question. In all three questions Rahner’s inquiries concern the
meaning of Jesus’ living in and having an authentic human nature along with his having
the beatific vision.
The second question that Rahner asks involves a clarification of “consciousness”
61
 Rahner, Theological Investigations, 5: 215.
62
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and its application to Jesus. What is human consciousness?  How is human
consciousness understood when specifically applied to the man Jesus?  For Rahner, in
order to understand how Jesus could be conscious of the vision of God in his soul, it is
important to acknowledge that human consciousness is a complex and multifaceted
reality. Rahner explains:
Human consciousness is an infinite, multi-dimensional sphere: there is
reflex consciousness to things to which we attend explicitly; there is
conceptual consciousness of objects and a transcendental, unreflected
knowledge attached to the subjective pole of consciousness; there is
attunement and propositional knowledge, permitted and suppressed
knowledge; there are spiritual events in consciousness and their reflexive
interpretation; there is non-objectified knowledge of a formal horizon
within which a determined comprehended object comes to be present…It
cannot be our job to draw up an empirico-psychological or transcendental
scheme of these different ways in which something may be present in
consciousness. The point just touched on is merely meant to indicate the
fact of this multiplicity of possible forms in which a reality can be present
to consciousness.
64
Here Rahner makes an important point for understanding the consciousness of Jesus
Christ. Any speculation concerning the consciousness of Jesus must be aware that human
consciousness is a complex reality with immense possibilities. It seems to me that this
also raises a very important anthropological point. To enter into a discussion of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ is to enter into a theologically complex reality that does not 
simply involve an ordinary human being, but rather enters into the colossal reality of the
God-man.
The third question Rahner raises involves the meaning of Jesus’ having the
“beatific vision” in his soul from the moment of his conception. Concerning Jesus’
64
 Rahner, Theological Investigations, 5: 200. 
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beatific vision, Rahner writes, “it is far too easily taken for granted as self-evident that
direct contact with God must always be beatific”
65
 in the same manner as the blessed in
heaven. Rahner does not doubt that as a result of the hypostatic union in Jesus there is
“direct contact” between the two natures in Christ. However, Rahner asks, “[Is] it certain
that what is meant, in the tradition of theology, by the consciousness of Jesus is really
intended to convey an idea of beatitude by direct union with God over and above this
union [i.e., hypostatic union] itself?”
66
If there is already a real union between the two
natures in Jesus, is it also necessary to postulate that he additionally has the beatific
vision as well? In Rahner’s view the hypostatic union itself would be the most radical
actualization of human nature without the need for the addition of the beatific vision.
Nonetheless, Rahner summarizes the various explanations of Jesus’ having the beatific
vision and divides the solutions into two categories. Either the beatific vision has been
viewed as an external addition to Jesus’ human nature, or it has been viewed as being an
integral part the internal make-up of the God-man.
The external solutions have understood the beatific vision as “really an additional
perfection and gift granted to Jesus, a perfection which is not ontologically bound up with
the Hypostatic Union but which at the most is connected with it by a certain moral
necessity.”
67
  According to Rahner, those who view the beatific vision of Jesus in this
manner also ascribe perfections to Jesus “which are not absolutely incompatible with his
earthly mission, especially if this perfection can be proved to be—or at least probably
65
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be—a help or a more or less necessary presupposition for his teaching authority.”
68
  On
the other hand, those who offer an internal explanation of Jesus’ having the beatific
vision understand it to be the direct result of the hypostatic union. In this view Jesus has
the beatific vision in his human nature because of his union with the Logos and the divine
nature. Rahner views Thomistic epistemology and metaphysics as the basis for the
internal view, where “something which exists is present to itself, to the extent in which it
has or is being.”
69
  Applying this methodology to the hypostatic union, Rahner writes:
The hypostatic Union implies the self-communication of the absolute
Being of God—such as it subsists in the Logos—to the human nature of
Christ which thereby becomes a nature hypostatically supported by the
Logos. The Hypostatic Union is the highest conceivable—the
ontologically highest—actualization of the reality of a creature, in the
sense that a higher actualization would be absolutely impossible.”
70
The humanity of Jesus would be consciously aware of this union because “what is
ontologically higher cannot be lower on the plane of consciousness than what is
ontologically lower.”
71
  Herein Rahner locates one of the current problems in
understanding Jesus’ consciousness and his having the beatific vision.
When we hear about Christ’s direct vision of God, we instinctively
imagine this vision as a vision of the divine essence present before his
mind’s eye as an object, as if the divine essence were an object being
looked at by an observer standing opposite it … we pass equally
unconsciously and naturally to the thought that this divine essence
offering itself and viewed in this way as an object of vision from without,
is like a book or mirror offering, and putting before Christ’s
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Understanding the beatific vision and Christ’s consciousness in this manner brings us 
back to the initial statement of Rahner’s quoted at the beginning of this section, namely,
that such a conception of Jesus makes the Incarnation seem more like a myth than a 
reality. Rahner does not deny that Jesus is consciously aware of his divinity, but he does
significantly nuance how he understands the beatific vision and its relation to Jesus’
conscious awareness.
In evaluating the consciousness of Jesus Christ, the main question that Rahner
asks is that if in his human consciousness Jesus is fully aware of the beatific vision, can
we still affirm that Jesus’ humanity is still genuinely human?  Specifically, Rahner
questions Jesus’ human free will and the Paschal Mystery in light of such a conception of 
the beatific vision and Jesus’ conscious awareness. Rahner posses the question thus:
In view of the data provided by the historical sources regarding Christ’s
death-agony and feeling of being forsaken by God in his death on the
Cross, can one seriously maintain—without applying an artificial layer-
psychology—that Jesus enjoyed the beatitude of the blessed, thus making
of him someone who no longer really and genuinely achieves his human
existence as a ‘viator’?
73
Likewise, Rahner writes that if the human consciousness of Jesus were immediately
aware of the divine essence in an unqualified manner, how can one then make sense of
the historical consciousness of Jesus presented in the Gospels?  According to Rahner, the
Gospels present the consciousness of Jesus as being “the consciousness of the one who
questions, doubts, learns, is surprised, is deeply moved, the consciousness of the one who
is overwhelmed by a deadly feeling of being forsaken by God.”
74
  Rahner emphasizes
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that great caution should be used when the reality of the Gospel narratives is
overshadowed by a theological concept, i.e., the beatific vision.
Rahner’s solution to the question of the consciousness of Jesus Christ seeks to
maintain the traditional teaching of Jesus having the beatific vision in light of the
aforementioned questions. Rahner believes that the human nature of Jesus, by virtue of
the hypostatic union, is uniquely aware of being God’s Son through a subjective religious
awareness much like other men.
75
 Rahner postulates that the beatific vision in Jesus’ soul
should not be understood as a direct vision of God but rather as a spiritual awareness of 
the divine presence, albeit in Jesus this unique awareness springs from the depths of the
hypostatic union. “This means, however, that this really existing direct vision of God is
nothing other than the original unobjectified consciousness of divine sonship, which is
present by the mere fact that there is a Hypostatic Union.”
76
  Jesus does not “look” at the
divine essence as though he were gazing upon something external to himself as an object
of his attention. Rather, he is spiritually aware of himself as united to the Logos.
What necessitates such an understanding of the beatific vision is Rahner’s desire
to maintain Jesus’ likeness with humanity and the “genuine human nature of the Son as
essentially similar to our own … not to be degraded into a myth of a God disguised in
human appearance.”
77
In maintaining the authenticity of Jesus’ human nature, Rahner
writes that as Jesus grows and matures into adulthood, so too does his awareness of his
union with the Logos mature and becomes clearer within his human consciousness. In
Rahner’s opinion, “just as there is this objectively reflexive process of becoming
75
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conscious of what has always been already understood consciously but without knowing
it and in an unsystematic and unobjectified manner, so it is also the case of Christ’s
consciousness of divine sonship and his basic condition of direct presence to God.”
78
A second point Rahner makes regarding Jesus’ awareness of being united with the
Logos concerns the freedom of the man Jesus.
A philosophy of the person and of the freedom of a finite being, a 
philosophy of history and of decisions, could undoubtedly show with
comparative ease that the fact of challenge, of going into the open, of 
confiding oneself to the incalculable, of the obscurity of origin and the
veiled nature of the end—in short, of a certain kind of ignorance—are all
necessary factors in the very nature of self-realization of the finite person
in the historical decision of freedom.
79
Rahner highlights that the Greek concept of the person, which views ignorance as an
imperfection that needs to be overcome, is behind the mentality of those theologians who
want to attribute knowledge of all things to the man Jesus. Instead, Rahner insists that
ignorance should not be understood in a negative manner because in his view genuine
human freedom always involves some degree of not knowing.
80
  Rahner makes this point
when he writes:
Thus, freedom in the open field of decisions is better than if this room for
freedom were filled with knowledge of such a nature as to suffocate this
freedom … this basic condition is precisely that knowledge which, rather
than cluttering up, opens up the room for freedom … the objective
perception of every individual object right down to the last detail would
be the end of freedom.
81
That Jesus is aware of his union with the Logos and his divine Sonship does not 
necessitate a direct knowledge in his human consciousness of all things and all times. To
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have such knowledge, according to Rahner, would be a contradiction to a genuine
freedom in Jesus and would instead impel him to do that which he understands in his
heightened spiritual awareness.
While Jesus is aware of his union with the Logos, as he makes choices he comes
to realize more fully the mandate of his mission as Son and Savior which is already
tacitly present to him in his transcendent religious experience rooted in the hypostatic
union. With each successive free choice Jesus makes, he opens up further possibilities to
himself while closing off others, all the while making authentic and real human choices.
Stated positively, it is ignorance which assures a real freedom in the human action and
consciousness of Jesus. If Jesus has a total knowledge of all things and all times, he 
would not make free human decisions. Instead, his human nature would be the passive
instrument of the Logos.  Rahner’s solution to the question of the consciousness of Jesus
is to affirm that Jesus has a real awareness of the Logos in his human consciousness but 
not in the traditionally understood manner of beatific vision which includes a complete
and total knowledge of all things. Rahner maintains the reality of the hypostatic union
while proposing a possible solution to the consciousness of the man Jesus which allows
for him to make genuine free choices especially in relation to his suffering and death.
In summary, Rahner’s article makes several points that are important for this
dissertation. First, it shares his methodological principles. This method includes
examining the question of the consciousness of Jesus Christ from the perspective of 
dogmatic (i.e., systematic) theology and not from an exegetical perspective, and
addressing the question from the perspective of Catholic dogmatic theology.
25
In regard to the beatific vision and the consciousness of Christ, the three
fundamental questions raised by Rahner are also important for our study. In summary,
Rahner asks: 1. How is Jesus aware of the beatific vision in his human intellect and soul?,
2. What is meant by consciousness?, and 3. What do we mean by “beatific vision”?
Perhaps these three questions can be summarized in the following question: Is it possible
to maintain that Jesus experiences genuine intellectual growth and a real human freedom
while also maintaining the presence of the beatific vision in his soul?  Such is the state of 
the question as presented by Rahner just prior to the publication of Maritain’s On the
Grace and Humanity of Jesus. Maritain’s small book is important because it attempts to
answer the question of intellectual growth and freedom in Jesus while affirming the
theory of Jesus’ having the beatific vision.
B. The Biblical Question, Luke 2.52 
General Inquiry
As previously stated this work is not primarily one of biblical exegesis. To
paraphrase Rahner, I have neither the intention nor competence to carry out a detailed
work of exegesis on all the biblical texts which seem to indicate real growth or limitation
in Jesus’ humanity. Rahner does indicate, however, that the scholarly findings of 




  One of the underlying questions of Maritain’s thesis, as will be seen, involves
his disagreement with Aquinas’ interpretation of Luke 2.52. The full range of New
Testament texts that show growth or limitations in Jesus’ knowledge and conscious
awareness is too vast to be dealt with at length here.
83
  However, the key text from
Luke’s Gospel cannot be overlooked. Consequently, the aim of this section is twofold:
first to show what various exegetes have to say concerning Luke 2.52, and secondly to
indicate in particular what the American Catholic exegete Raymond E. Brown has to say
concerning this passage within the broader vision of his writings.
Most biblical commentaries interpret Luke 2.52 in light of the larger story which
encompasses verses 41-52. The story, unique to Luke’s Gospel, tells of the Holy
Family’s trip to Jerusalem and the subsequent losing and finding of the boy Jesus in the
Temple by the Blessed Mother and St. Joseph.
84
  Concerning verse 52 most exegetes see
a parallel with verse 40, “The child grew and became strong, filled with wisdom; and the
82
 On this point see Gerald O'Collins, S.J. and Daniel Kendall, S.J., The Bible for
Theology: Ten Principles for the Theological Use of Scripture (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press,
1997). O’Collins and Kendall’s fifth principle is that theologians should “prefer, all things being
equal, the line taken by widely respected, centrist biblical scholars or at least a majority of them.
In reflecting on the scriptural texts, theologians ought not to plunge forward by themselves and
ignore what professional exegetes have to say” (25).
83
 See Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christology (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist
Press, 1994). In Chapter 4, “What Can be Discerned about Jesus” (31-59), Brown discusses
many biblical texts which imply limitations in Jesus’ knowledge (i.e., Mark 5.30-33, Luke 2.52, 
and John 7.38), including the Scriptures and religious ideas of Jesus’ time in addition to cases
where he exhibits extra-ordinary knowledge of events or people.
84
 Samuel Oyin Abogunrin, "Luke," in The International Bible Commentary: A Catholic
and Ecumenical Commentary for the Twenty-First Century, ed. William R. Farmer (Collegeville,
Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1998). Abogunrin helpfully places the parallels between the
infancy narratives of the Mathean Gospel side by side with the Lucan Gospel (1376). Luke
Timothy Johnson, The Gospel of Luke, Sacra Pagina, ed. Daniel J. Harrington, (Collegeville,
Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1991), regards Jesus’ being left behind for three days, pointing
out that the text indicates that the “boy remained behind because of his own choice and not
because of his parents’ neglect” (3: 59).
27
favor of God was upon him” (influenced by I Sam 2.26?), although not all agree whether
the two verses serve as an inclusion to or as the end of separate stories.
85
  For example,
Mark Coleridge, utilizing narrative criticism, points out the obvious similarities between
the two verses in which both refer to Jesus (v. 40-child, v. 52-Jesus), to an increase (v.
40-grew and became strong, v. 52-increased), to his gaining wisdom (v. 40-filled with
wisdom, v. 52-wisdom and stature), and finally both refer to his grace, i.e., favor (v. 40-
upon him, v. 52-with God and men).
86
  Coleridge believes that the goal of the narrative is
to show that Jesus has now entered the “public arena” for the first time as an independent
agent and will be the object of the narrative for the rest of Luke’s story.
87
  According to
this, verse 52 is best understood as the summation of the Temple story and points out the
obvious, namely, that the boy Jesus continued to grow into adulthood.
There is no question that verse 52, however, indicates “progress” or 
“advancement” in Jesus.
88
  Johnson notes that among the moral philosophers of the
evangelist’s day, the Greek prokoptein (advancement, progress) “had technical force for
85
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2 (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1993), 210. Coleridge writes, “… narrative criticism is more
concerned with the work of the evangelist as artist, which is not to say it ignores the theological
question.  It simply approaches it differently” (16).
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 Reiling and Swellengrebel, A Translator's Handbook on the Gospel of Luke, 155.
“This is the first time that the name [Jesus] occurs without a qualifying opposition” (155).
Coleridge, The Birth of the Lukan Narrative, 211, 213.  On this point see Jerome Kodell, O.S.B.,
"Luke," in The Collegeville Bible Commentary, ed. Diane Bergant and Robert J. Karris
(Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1989), 936-980. “At his presentation, Jesus was
unable to speak for himself, others interpreted his identity and mission for him. Now he 
proclaims the meaning of his life” (942-943).
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 Reiling and Swellengrebel, A Translator's Handbook on the Gospel of Luke, 155.
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growth in the moral and intellectual life.”
89
It can be posited, however, that Jesus’





 and not necessarily as a reference to his being divinely self-
aware (although this would render verse 49 as either contextually awkward or
unintelligible). Referring to this verse Scott Hahn and Mitch Curtis note the “human
development of Jesus was a process of building character and acquiring experiential
knowledge that kept pace with his physical and psychological growth.”
92
  Maintaining
the real humanity of Jesus and his “growing” does not in any way take away from his
divine identity as revealed in the Annunciation scene (1.26-38). Joseph Fitzmyer makes
this point in his commentary on Luke’s Gospel when he writes:
Furthermore, in certain circles of systematic theology today, people are
seeking to substitute for a “christology from above” a so-called
christology from below. Say what one will about the legitimacy of this
distinction and of the later understanding of Jesus, one has to realize that
the Lucan infancy narrative, like that of Matthew, knows only a 
“christology from above.”
93
The problem pointed out by Fitzmyer is one that relates directly to Luke 2.52 and how it
89
 Johnson, The Gospel of Luke, 60. See also G. Stählin, "Prokopēғ," trans. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley, in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittle and Gerhard
Friedrich, Abridged (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 939-942.  Stählin adds
to the definition “cultural progress, or advance in virtue” (939), but notes that in Luke 2.52 “…
the stress is on spiritual progress and (as in 2.40) the controlling concept is that of favor with God
reflected in favor with men. Luke never follows up on the progress of Jesus, and the verse offers
no basis for speaking about his growth in self-awareness or his moral development” (940).
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 J. Schneider, "Hēlikía," trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, in Theological Dictionary of the
New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittle and Gerhard Friedrich, Abridged (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 308.  Schneider favors “years” for Luke 2.52 instead of “age”
(308).
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 U. Wilckens and G. Fohrer, "Sophía," trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, in Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, Abridged (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 1062. “When Luke 2.40 says that Jesus grows in
wisdom, this reflects OT usage (cf. 1 Sam. 2:26); the reference is to knowledge of the law and a 
pious mode of life.”  Wisdom in Luke 2.52 can be understood in the same manner.
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 Scott Hahn and Curtis Mitch, The Gospel of Luke, The Ignatius Catholic Study Bible
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2001), 25.
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 Joseph Fitzmyer, S.J., The Gospel According to Luke (I-IX), The Anchor Bible, (New
York: Doubleday & Company, 1981), 28: 447. 
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needs to be understood and interpreted. From the exegetical perspective the verse clearly
indicates a growth of some kind in Jesus, but the question remains how this particular
verse fits into the larger whole of any given Christology, be it biblical, systematic or both.
N. T. Wright fittingly points out that the claim of historical objectivity by exegetes is
“hopelessly outdated,”
94
 and I would argue that this also applies to systematic theologians
as well. As will be seen in Maritain’s On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, Maritain
disagrees with St. Thomas’ glossing over Luke 2.52 because it fails to fit his overall
Christological perspective. Needless to say, the works of the exegetes examined here
concerning Luke 2.52 leaves open the possibility for systematic theologians to probe
more deeply into the question of the consciousness of Christ.
95
94
 N. T. Wright, "Jesus' Self-Understanding," in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary
Symposium of the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J. and
Gerald O'Collins, S.J. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 49-50. On this point see
Joseph Fitzmyer, S.J., Scripture & Christology: A Statement of the Biblical Commission with a 
Commentary (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), “Christology and Historical Research,” section
1.1.3 (6-7, 62-66). See also Ben Witherington, III, The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the
Jew of Nazareth (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1997). Witherington traces the
third quest for the historical Jesus through the works of such well known authors as John Dominic
Crossan, Marcus Borg, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, John P. Meier, James D. G. Dunn, and N. T.
Wright, among others, and finds that many of these authors define their methodological
parameters in such a way as to find a Jesus that is consistent with their own methodology.
95
 In An Introduction to New Testament Christology, Brown points out dogmatic
statements need not be found explicitly in the New Testament to be biblically based. He writes,
“On a broader level…in Roman Catholic thought there is no need to torture biblical texts in order
to find in NT times an awareness of church doctrines articulated in later centuries, even though
those doctrines cannot be seen to contradict the NT. We should be alert to lines of development
from the NT to a subsequently defined doctrine so that it is clear that the church is interpreting
revelation rather than imposing extrinsic dogma: yet doctrine may stem from later Christian
insights into what was involved in the mystery revealed in Christ” (30, footnote 32).
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Raymond Brown
Raymond Brown is a modern exegete who pays attention to systematic questions.
Brown examines Luke 2.41-52, “The Boy Jesus in the Temple Speaks of His Father,” in
his most detailed work on the infancy narrative of Luke and Matthew’s Gospels, The
Birth of the Messiah.
96
  Much of Brown’s treatment of the terms, vocabulary and
expressions of the passage as a whole, and verse 52 in particular,
97
 are harmonious with
what has already been noted. The principal contribution that Brown makes is his
examining the story in light of its being a transition from the infancy narrative as a whole
(chapters 1-2) to the rest of the Gospel, and in light of Luke’s overall Christological
perspective.
While the story of the finding of the boy Jesus in the Temple follows after his
presentation as an infant in the Temple by Mary and St. Joseph (Luke 2.22-40) and
precedes his adult baptism by John the Baptist (Luke 3.21-23), in Brown’s view the
Temple scene “can scarcely be called a section of the infancy narrative.”
98
  Although the
Gospel writer has intertwined some sections of story (the previously noted verse 40 with
verse 52), Brown believes this was previously an independent story from that which
96
 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in the
Gospels of Matthew and Luke (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 471-496. In his Introduction to the
New Testament (New York: Doubleday, 1997) he spends a little over a full page on the same
material (234-235).
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 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 478. For example, Brown notes the definite
connection between Luke 1.80, 2.40 and 2.52, each of which builds upon the verse that precedes
it (494). The only substantial difference is his treatment of grace, which he believes is best
understood as “a basic goodness manifested in a life that is harmonious with God’s
commandments” (495).
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 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 480. See Brown, An Introduction to the New
Testament, 235. “No matter what the origin of the story of Jesus at age twelve, by placing it
between the infancy and public ministry accounts, Luke has constructed a most persuasive
Christological sequence” (235). Whereas in the annunciation an angel declared Jesus as God’s
Son (1.35), and God’s voice asserts this at the baptism (3.22-23), in the Temple scene Jesus
himself declares that God is “my Father” (2.49). See also Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 481. 
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precedes it (i.e., the gradual expansion of verses 1.80, 2.40 and 2.52).
99
  According to
Brown, the content, tone and chronology all point to this being a separate story inserted
by the evangelist with other pre-ministry Jesus stories and then adapted to act as the
transition piece between the infancy stories and the beginning of Jesus’ public
ministry.
100
  Brown also views this as an important Christological development by
Luke.
101
  He sees a definite correlation between this childhood story of Luke’s Gospel
with other similar stories from the Old Testament (i.e., Samuel and Daniel) and non-
canonical writings (i.e., Infancy Gospel of Thomas).
102
  Nonetheless, while much can be
said about Jesus’ growth in wisdom, age and grace, for Brown the “center of the story is
not the boy’s intelligence but his reference to God as his Father in vs. 49.”
103
  While it is
undisputable that Jesus was born and had a childhood like any other, “in Luke those
historical reminiscences serve as the occasion for the articulation of a revelation
apprehended by post-resurrectional faith, namely, the divine sonship.”
104
  This leads
Brown to emphatically state:
And so, whether one is liberal or conservative, one must desist
from using the present scene to establish a historical development (or
lack of development) in Jesus’ self-awareness. It is not possible to argue
from vs. 49 that Jesus as a boy knew he was the Son of God. It is equally
impossible to argue from vs. 52 (which is a standard description of 
growth) that Jesus grew in human knowledge. At most one can argue
that Luke’s appreciation of Jesus did not cause him to see any difficulty
in stating that Jesus grew in wisdom and God’s favor, and that Luke’s
99
 Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament, 234. See also Brown, The Birth of the
Messiah, 494. 
100
 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 481-482.
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 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 481-482, 495. Like the majority of exegetes, Brown
holds that Mark’s Gospel is the earliest written Gospel (“Marcan primacy”) (26-29). He points
out that for both Luke and Matthew the Christological importance of the infancy narratives (and
the Temple scene in particular for Luke) is to reveal Jesus as God’s Son earlier than his baptism
in the Jordon by John the Baptist (Mark 1.9-11), something Brown considers a development in
Christological thinking (which operates in a “backward” manner).
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 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 480-482.
103
 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 483.
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Christology did not cause him to see any difficulty in affirming that,
already as a boy, Jesus was God’s Son.
105
Brown, however, acknowledges that questions relating to Jesus’ growth in
knowledge and grace “are problems of systematic theology rather than of exegesis.”
106
In
his short work, Biblical Reflections on Crises Facing the Church, he asserts, “all modern
christology is based on the theory that the human knowledge of Jesus was limited,”
107
 but 
“a limitation of human knowledge does not mean that Jesus was not God; it means he 
was man.”
108
  While “ignorance” seems to have a negative connotation in modern
languages and was viewed in a negative manner by the scholastics, Brown points out that
while such questions relate to the New Testament, they are better addressed as questions
of systematic theology and philosophy.
109
  From the biblical perspective, however,
Brown notes that aside from being sinless (Heb 4.15), within the New Testament “[no]
other exception is made in Jesus’ likeness to us; and so we might assume that Jesus was
like us in having limited knowledge.”
110
Interestingly enough, however, Brown does ask
a philosophical question related to the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus:
If Jesus seems to have known who he was throughout his whole recorded
life, why would knowing his divine identity have prevented growth in his
105
 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 483.
106
 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 483, footnote 18.
107
 Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Biblical Reflections on Crises Facing the Church (New
York: Paulist Press, 1975), 35, footnote 27. 
108
 Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christology, 28. 
109
 Brown, Biblical Reflections, footnote 27, 35. See also Brown, Responses to 101 
Question on the Bible (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), 101. On the negative
view the scholastics had of ignorance see Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christology,
28.
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 Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christology, 28. In Jesus God and Man:
Modern Biblical Reflections (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), Brown writes,
“Unless we understand that Jesus was truly human, we cannot comprehend the depth of God’s
love. And if theologians should ultimately come to accept limitations of Jesus’ knowledge that
we have seen reflected prima facie in the biblical evidence, then how much the more shall we
understand that God so loved us that He subjected Himself to our most agonizing infirmities … a 
Jesus for whom the future was as much a mystery, a dread, and a hope as it is for us … this is a 
Jesus who would have gone through life’s real trials” (104-105).
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comprehension of how that identity interacted with a human life where
growth, experience, the events of the ministry, and indeed his death,
brought increased understanding of the human situation?”
111
Specifically referring to Luke 2.41-52, Brown writes, “Luke is giving us a perceptive
theological insight into history: there was a continuity from the infant Jesus to the boy
Jesus to the Jesus of the ministry to the risen Jesus.”
112
Utilizing Brown’s exegesis of this passage, we can now ask if the question posed
by Rahner, that biblical exegesis and systematic theology need only be compatible with
one another, holds true vis-à-vis Luke 2.52. Brown answers that the passage in question
is ambiguous and that the biblical text does not answer the question of Jesus’ knowledge
or consciousness positively or negatively. He also notes that such a question is best
addressed by systematic theologians.
113
  Thus Luke 2.52 does not definitively answer
whether or not there is or is not a real intellectual growth in Jesus.
111
 Brown, Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, 100. On the previous page Brown
points out that “there is never a scene in the Gospel portrait where he [Jesus] discovers something
about himself that he did not know before” (99).
112
 Brown, The Birth of the Messiah, 494.
113
 See Brown, Responses to 101 Questions on the Bible, 91. In speaking of the Virginal
Conception Brown writes, “But since both Testaments are the product of believing communities,
I see no contradiction in allowing the ongoing life of believing communities to serve as an
interpretive element, casting light on the obscurities of the biblical record. I would much rather
do that than force the biblical evidence either by insisting that it is totally clear and probative, or
by insisting that it disproves when at most is obscure” (91).  In utilizing this same principle for
Jesus’ knowledge and consciousness, there is room for a development in the understanding of his
growth in knowledge as present in Luke 2.52.
34
C. Jacques Maritain: Intellectual and Personal Life
Since there are already several detailed expositions of Maritain’s personal life and
intellectual achievements available, it is not my intention to duplicate the work of others
here.
114
Instead, the modest intention of this section is to briefly illuminate the most
important aspects of Maritain’s life and thought in order to give the reader some
foundational insights to the author behind On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus.
Jacques Maritain was born in Paris on 18 November 1882, the son of Paul
Maritain and Geneviève Favre. His maternal grandfather had been a leading figure in
French politics in the nineteenth century and, in the words of one biographer, “had
been…among the most representative of the great intellectual and political families of 
liberal and republican France.”
115
Jacques’ mother, the illegitimate child of an adulterous
affair, repudiated her Catholic faith before the birth of her children, Jacques and his older
sister Jeanne. Instead, she chose to raise her family in a social and intellectually liberal
114
 For a good biography of Maritain that highlights his personal and intellectual
life in summary form see Henry Bars, "A Maritain Bio-Bibliography," trans. Anthony O.
Simon, in Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend, ed. Deal W. Hudson and
Matthew J. Mancini (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 15-23. For a very
condensed account of Maritain’s life and thought see Joseph W. Evans, "Introduction," in
Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1963), ix-xii. The best detailed evaluation of Maritain’s personal life is
Ralph McInerny, The Very Rich Hours of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). See also his Art and Prudence: Studies in the
Thought of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1988), “Preface,” ix-xv, and “The Intellectual Vocation of Jacques Maritain,” 1-16. For a 
good evaluation of the progression of Maritain’s thought spanning the course of his
lifetime see Jude P. Dougherty, Jacques Maritain: An Intellectual Profile (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003). See also Jacques Maritain,
Notebooks, trans. Joseph W. Evans (Albany, New York: Magi Books, Inc., 1984), which
is an edited version of Maritain’s memoirs. Two books by Raïssa Maritain, We Have
Been Friends Together, trans. Julie Kernan (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1942)
and Adventures in Grace, trans. Julie Kernan (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
Inc., 1945) offer many beautiful insights into the Maritain’s early life together and
friendships prior to the Second World War. Raïssa’s private journals were published
posthumously in one volume as Raïssa's Journal, ed. Jacques Maritain (Albany, N.Y.:
Magi Books, Inc., 1974). The journal gives added insights into the private life of Jacques
and Raïssa Maritain.
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 Evans, Introduction, ix.
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household. Far less is known about his father, whom McInerny refers to as a “hazy
figure.”
116
  After his parents’ divorce Maritain was raised by his domineering mother,
with his father’s involvement greatly limited.
117
At the age of sixteen, Maritain began studying rhetoric at the Lycée Henri IV.
Within a year he was also taking classes at the Sorbonne in Paris, formally entering the
university two years later in 1901. Maritain studied both philosophy and science at the
Sorbonne, passing the agrégation exam in philosophy in the spring of 1905. The most
defining moment in Maritain’s life, both personal and intellectual, occurred when the
young university student met Raïssa Oumansov, a non-practicing Russian Jew.
118
Engaged a few years after their first meeting, the couple was married by the end
of 1904 and would enjoy close to six decades of married life together as husband and
wife.
119
  At the end of 1906 Raïssa’s sister Vera permanently took up residence with her
sister and brother-in-law and, in McInerny’s estimation, became the Maritain’s
116
 McInerny, The Very Rich Hours, 8. 
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 In The Very Rich Hours McInerny writes that Maritain “tells us so little of his
antecedents and boyhood” (7). It is purely conjectural as to why this is the case. It should be
noted, however, that at the time Maritain began writing publicly, he was already a fervent convert
to the Catholic faith.  Seen in this light, the less than respectable aspects of his lineage, including
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 R. Maritain, We Have Been Friends, 40-42. Raïssa writes that very soon after meeting
Jacques in the winter of 1900, “We soon became inseparable” (41). The reader will note that
from the time Jacques met Raïssa, any discussion of the one almost inevitably involved the other.
McInerny notes that while biographers have disagreed on how much Raïssa influenced Jacques,
by his own accounts (i.e., Notebooks, Preface, 4) she was highly influential to him in spiritual and
intellectual matters: “The aid and the inspiration of my beloved Raïssa have penetrated all my life
and all my work.”  Even in death Jacques gives precedence to his wife, having their grave-marker
inscribed with Raïssa’s name and dates in large letters, and in smaller letters on the lower right
corner “And Jacques.”  See William Bush, "Raïssa Maritain…et Jacques," in Understanding
Maritain: Philosopher and Friend, ed. Deal W. Hudson and Matthew J. Mancini (Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press, 1987), 57. He adds, “…Jacques Maritain did, in fact, and particularly in
his later years after Raïssa’s death, say quite clearly just what he tells us once and for all on the
tombstone: he owed everything to Raïssa and regarded himself as but an appendage, an
afterthought, a name tacked on in small print on her life, just as the tombstone indicates.”
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 The Maritains were married on 26 November 1904, and Raïssa died 4 November
1960.
36
“secretary, research assistant, nurse.”
120
  Perhaps the most extraordinary event in the
Maritain’s marriage occurred on 2 October 1912, when in the Cathedral at Versailles,
Jacques and Raïssa took a vow to live the remainder of their marital life as brother and
sister.
121
  This vow of marital chastity between Jacques and Raïssa can only be
understood in light of the single most important aspect of their life together—their
Catholic faith. “The vow was not based on any contempt for nature … but in their course
toward the absolute and their desire to follow, at any price, while remaining in the world,
one of the counsels of the perfect life in order to clear the way for contemplation and
union with God.”
122
  The Maritains, however, did not begin their marriage as Catholics,
but came to the faith after near-death despair.
Jacques Maritain’s first intellectual affiliation was not with religion but politics.
In Notebooks he recalls the influence of the family cook’s husband, who in the absence of 
a father figure “watched over my childhood.”
123
  The man, François Baton, openly
discussed socialism with the young Maritain and provided him with a daily edition of the
local socialist newspaper. Maritain writes, “at about thirteen or fourteen I had become a
Socialist.”
124
  As providence would have it, Jacques’ early socialist tendencies led to his
meeting Raïssa outside a classroom at the Sorbonne. While Jacques was soliciting
120
 McInerny, The Very Rich Hours, 29.  Maritain devotes an entire chapter to Vera in
Notebooks, fondly remembering the strength and spirituality of the woman who formed a third of
the Maritain’s “little lay community.”  Maritain tells of her prayer life (205-212) and the final
sufferings of bone cancer which took her life (212-217).
121
 McInerny, The Very Rich Hours, 54-55. This fact was initially revealed when Jacques
privately published and distributed Raïssa’s Journal among friends. McInerny writes, “This
extremely private decision was of course kept secret throughout their marriage, but as an old man,
Jacques decided to reveal it in the privately circulated Journal of Raïssa. The reaction of friends
prompted him to remove it from the public edition” (54-55). While the permanent vow was made
in October 1912, through the counsel of their spiritual director it was preceded by a temporary
vow 1911. 
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124
 Maritain, Notebooks, 7. 
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signatures in protest of the Russian government’s treatment of socialist students, he 
approached the young Russian woman and began a relationship that would change his
life.
As the young couple’s relationship blossomed both became more and more
dissatisfied with their academic studies. The story of their “suicide pact” is well known,
and Raïssa devotes seven pages to it in We Have Been Friends Together.
125
  Raïssa
recalls that “after two or three years of study,” she and Jacques had accumulated “a rather
considerable amount of specialized scientific and philosophical knowledge. But this
knowledge was undermined by the relativism of the scientists, by the skepticism of the
philosophers.”
126
  Raïssa recalls the “metaphysical anguish” that both she and Jacques
felt as a consequence of not being able to grasp the truth. She writes:
On this particular day, then, we had just said to one another that if our
nature was so unhappy as to possess only a pseudo-intelligence capable of 
everything but the truth, if, sitting in judgment on itself, it had to debase
itself to such a point, then we could neither think nor act with any dignity.
In that case everything became absurd … If we must also give up the hope
of finding any meaning whatever for the word truth, for the distinction of 
good and evil, of just from unjust, it is no longer possible to live humanly.
I wanted no such part in such a comedy. I would have accepted a sad life,
but not one that was absurd.
127
Before finishing their walk that day Raïssa recalls the mutual decision she and Jacques
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 R. Maritain, We Have Been Friends Together, 72-78.
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 R. Maritain, We Have Been Friends Together, 73. See also Peter Redpath, "Romance
of Wisdom: The Friendship Between Jacques Maritain and Saint Thomas Aquinas," in
Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend, ed. Deal W. Hudson and Matthew J. Mancini
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 91-113. Redpath writes “Jacques Maritain’s
friendship with wisdom and with Aquinas must be understood within the context of his reaction
to the relativism, skepticism, and moral nihilism that were the consequences of the
antimetaphysical and reductionistic spirit of his early teachers of philosophy” (93).
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made to commit suicide if after “extending credit to existence” they could not ascertain a
deeper meaning to life, the truth. “We wanted to die by a free act if it were impossible to
live according to the truth.”
128
  Attending the lectures of Henri Bergson
129
 temporarily
alleviated the self-imposed death sentence, but it was the eccentric Catholic author, Léon
Bloy, who beginning in 1905 presented the Maritains with an answer to their intellectual
angst—the Catholic faith.
130
The “metaphysical anguish” the Maritains experienced in their university studies
was lifted by the spiritual truths they found in the writings of the saints and spiritual
masters of Catholicism.
131
  Within a year of meeting Bloy, Jacques, Raïssa and Raïssa’s
sister Vera were baptized in the Roman Catholic Church, an affiliation that became the
128
 R. Maritain, We Have Been Friends Together, 78.
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 Bergson affirmed the mind’s ability to know the truth, and very soon Maritain became
a well known proponent of Bergson’s philosophy. See McInerny, The Very Rich Hours, 16-18.
Raïssa dedicates an entire chapter of We Have Been Friends Together to Henri Bergson and the
impact he had on both her and Jacques (79-103). Jacques would later write a book highly critical
of Bergson, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, trans. Mabelle L. Andison and J. Gordon
Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955). In the Foreword to the English Edition he
writes, “La Philosophie Bergsonienne was my first book; it was published forty years ago when I 
was young, and did not hesitate to rush in where angels feared to tread” (5). In the Preface to the
Second Edition he adds, somewhat apologetically, “What makes the reading of the early text
somewhat painful to me today is the youthful turgidity, the uncompromising bombast of its style”
(12).  While Maritain was critical of Bergson’s thought, both he and Raïssa remained personally
devoted to Bergson throughout their lives.
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"Léon Bloy and Jacques Maritain: Fratres in Eremo," in Understanding Maritain: Philosopher
and Friend, ed. Deal W. Hudson and Matthew J. Mancini (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
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Who Was Poor: A Contemporary Novel of the French Eighties, trans. I. J. Collins (New York:
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 On this time in Jacques and Raïssa’s life see We Have Been Friends, Chapter 6, “The
Call of the Saints” (141-179).
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most defining aspect of their lives.
132
  Soon after, through the advice of her spiritual
director, Raïssa began reading the Summa Theologiae and found immediate joy and the
truth she had been seeking. “Everything, here, was freedom of spirit, purity of faith,
integrity of the intellect enlightened by knowledge and genius.”
133
It would take more
than a year before Jacques began reading the Summa, and his reaction mirrored Raïssa’s.
“Finally!  Thanks to Raïssa, I begin to read the Summa Theologica. As it was for her, it
is a deliverance, an inundation of light. The intellect finds its home.”
134
  A lifetime of 
study and scholarship began for the man who would eventually be known as one of the
foremost Thomists of the twentieth century.
135
Maritain spent the majority of his life as an educator, teaching philosophy at
several different universities. His first teaching post was at the Collège Stanislas in Paris
132
 When the Maritains entered the Catholic Church on 11 June 1906, their fidelity was
absolute even when their personal opinions differed from that of the Church’s hierarchy. For
example, Jacques wrote a book on the apparitions of the Virgin Mary in La Salette, France, to two
shepherd children. While the Maritain’s inherited a devotion to Our Lady of La Salette from
Bloy, the Church’s hierarchy remained cautious because one of the “secret messages” entrusted to
the shepherdess Melanie began with a scathing critique of the French clergy. After presenting his
book to the proper officials in Rome with the hope of receiving approval to publish the
manuscript, Maritain accepted the negative response he received shortly thereafter. To this day
the manuscript has not been published. See Notebooks, Chapter 3, 81-99.
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 R. Maritain, Adventures in Grace, 16.  Raïssa began reading the Summa in 1909 as
noted by Jacques in Notebooks, 51. 
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 Maritain, Notebooks, 65. The Maritain’s were so convinced that Thomism was the
answer to the intellectual crisis of their time that they formed the “Thomist Circles,” which
encouraged its members to read and disseminate St. Thomas’ writings. Fr. Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange acted as the group’s spiritual director, offering yearly retreats for the members of the
circles. See Maritain, Notebooks, Chapter 5, “Thomist Study Circles and their Annual Retreats,”
133-185.
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 Yves R. Simon, "Jacques Maritain: The Growth of a Christian Philosopher," in
Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1963) writes that while Maritain was a Thomist he “was the first non-scholastic among the
disciples of St. Thomas” (4). By “scholastic” Simon means a method, language, and cultural
form, all of which Maritain willingly modified in order to integrate Thomism with modernity.
Perhaps Dougherty says it best: “He [Maritain] was not a textual exegete, but a speculative
philosopher who thought ad mentem divi Thomae.”  In Jacques Maritain, 1. 
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(1912-1914), but he soon took a post at the Institut Catholique in Paris in 1914, which he 
kept until the outbreak of the Second World War. Maritain spent the duration of the war
in the United States, leaving to represent the French government as its Ambassador to the
Vatican after the liberation of Paris in 1944. He would return to the United States to
teach at Princeton University in 1948, and retire from full time teaching responsibilities
in 1952.
What is interesting is that Maritain did not view himself as a teacher, but instead
understood his role of being an educator as one of practical necessity. “What am I, I
asked myself then. A professor? I think not; I taught by necessity. A writer? Perhaps.
A philosopher?  I hope so.”
136
  After the death of both Raïssa and Vera, Jacques lived
with the Little Brothers of Jesus in Toulouse until his death on 28 April 1973. Over the
course of his life, he wrote more than fifty books and received numerous honors.
137
Perhaps the best summation of Maritain’s life comes from Maritain himself, where he
indicates the relationship between his pursuit of intellectual and personal interests:
“Unless one loves the truth, one is not a man. And to love the truth is also to love it
above everything, because we know that Truth is God Himself.”
138
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 Maritain, Notebooks, 1954 Preface, 3.
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 Jude P. Dougherty, Jacques Maritain: An Intellectual Profile (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2003) observes that Maritain received, among others, the
Medal of the French Resistance, the Grand Prix of Literature from the French Academy, the
French National Grand Prize for letters, and was named Commander of the Legion of Honor and
a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Gregory the Great (Introduction, 3).
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 Jacques Maritain, The Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself
About the Present Time, trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 85. See also McInerny, Art and Prudence, 2-3. McInerny rightly
points out that Maritain was interested in intellectual truth as well as a life of sanctity.
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D. Michael Polanyi: Intellectual and Personal Life
Much like the previous brief exposition of Jacques Maritain’s life the intention of 
this section is to offer a similar account for the life and thought of Michael Polanyi.
139
Michael Polanyi was born on 11 March 1891, in Budapest, Hungary, the fifth of six
children born to Mihály and Cecilia Polanyi.
140
  From a very early age Polanyi exhibited
a fine intellect, being multilingual by the age of six.
141
  Although both of his parents were
of Jewish descent, it does not seem that religion played a part in the family’s daily life.
142
During Polanyi’s childhood his father’s company afforded the family a very comfortable
lifestyle. However, the family’s wealth was lost in part because of the family’s Jewish
ancestry so that by the time Polanyi entered the gymnasium in 1900, he required the
assistance of a scholarship for poor Jewish students.
143
  He graduated from the
139
 The best available work on the life and thought of Polanyi is the recently published
William Taussig Scott and Martin X. Moleski, S.J., Michael Polanyi: Scientist and Philosopher
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). The book was originally written by Scott and then
edited and corrected for publication after his death by Moleski. Moleski writes, “The book 
placed before you is not the book Bill wrote, nor is it the book that I would have written if I had
started fresh and worked alone” (Preface, viii). One of the many benefits of this book is the
inclusion of a chronological listing of all Polanyi’s publications (327-350). There are several
other good introductions to Polanyi’s life and thought including Richard Gelwick, The Way of 
Discovery: An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1977); Harry Prosch, Michael Polanyi: A Critical Exposition (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1986); and Drusilla Scott, Everyman Revived: The Common Sense
of Michael Polanyi (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1995). For a precise account see Martin X. Moleski, S.J., Personal Catholicism: The Theological
Epistemologies of John Henry Newman and Michael Polanyi (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of American Press, 2000), 49-60.
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 10. The authors note, however, that when
Polanyi was born, “family life was hectic enough so that his birthday was not recorded until the
next day, so that he celebrated March 12 as his birthday.”  It should be noted that Polanyi’s
original Hungarian name was Mihály Lazar Pollacsek.
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 10. Polanyi became fluent in English, French,
German and Hungarian.
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 William T. Scott, "The Question of Religious Reality: Commentary on the Polanyi
Papers," Zygon 17 (March 1982), 85.
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 12-15. Polanyi attended the Minta Gymnasium
which was founded “as a practice teaching school for the training of future professors” (15).
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gymnasium in 1908, and later that year entered the University of Budapest as a medical
student, earning his degree in 1913.
144
With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Polanyi volunteered to serve as a
medical officer in the Hungarian Army. Although he had not done the required year-long
internship, he was accepted into the army and permitted to practice medicine.
145
It was
also in 1914 that Polanyi published his first article concerning his theory of adsorption,
which was later accepted as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Budapest.
146
  He passed
his written examinations for the doctoral degree in 1916, but his defense was delayed
until 1918 as a result of the ongoing war and because of internal difficulties in his
thesis.
147
  The degree was finally awarded to Polanyi in 1919.
148
  What is interesting is
that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge seems to have already been present to him in
germ form at the time of doctoral thesis. Although Polanyi insisted that his thesis was
144
 Gelwick, The Way of Discovery, 32. 
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 33. 
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 Gelwick, The Way of Discovery, 32. Polanyi continued working on the topic
throughout the war, primarily during several convalescences in Budapest for diphtheria. The
theory of adsorption involves measuring the way a gas reacts when it is in contact with the
surface of a solid. The theory states that gases adhere more easily to the surface they are in
contact with depending on the pressure they are under.  Thus changing the pressure changes the
rate of adsorption of a gas to a solid.  See Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 24-25.
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 While Polanyi’s conclusion was deemed correct, his theory supporting his conclusion
was not. Thus, he had to re-work those areas of his dissertation that dealt with the mathematical
theory which served as the foundation to his theory of adsorption. When his director asked how 
such an occurrence had happened, Polanyi emphasized that a conclusion could be correct
although the argument behind it was not, at which his director “scoffed.”  See Scott and Moleski,
Michael Polanyi, 43. 
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 Polanyi would later write, “I doubt that I could have got my theory of adsorption
passed by the referees of any scientific journal had I presented it five years later than 1916. I was
lucky enough to profit by the relative ignorance of referees in 1916, and also by the complete
ignorance of the professor of theoretical physics at the University of Budapest, who accepted the
substance of my theory as a Ph.D. thesis in 1917.”  In Michael Polanyi, "The Potential Theory of 
Adsorption," in Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 123-37.
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correct, had experiments been done at the time his theory would not have been verifiable.
Subsequently, Polanyi would probably not have received his degree. Gelwick writes:
Both Haber and Einstein opposed Polanyi’s theory on the grounds that he 
had displayed a total disregard for the new knowledge of the electrical
concept of interatomic forces. Polanyi persisted with further evidence at a
later meeting, but his theory was rejected again as a failure. If Polanyi had
not gone on immediately to prove himself in other work in physical
chemistry, the opposition to his theory would have ended his scientific
career. Still, the most striking point to the story is the fact that Polanyi’s
theory was right and is in use today. The evidence to confirm the theory
began to appear in 1930, and others went on to establish what Polanyi
began.
149
After completing his degree in physical chemistry, Polanyi moved to Germany to escape
the rising anti-Semitism in Hungary. At this time in his life, Polanyi was baptized a 
Roman Catholic in October 1919, “though he never participated in any other Catholic
sacraments.”
150
It is unclear whether Polanyi was baptized at this time out of a desire to
conceal his Jewish roots or out of a genuine desire to identify himself with Christianity.
Although he embraced Christian worship as an Anglican in the late 1940s,
151
 later in his
life Polanyi did not associate with any particular church.
152
Shortly after moving to Germany, Polanyi met Magda Kemeny, a graduate
149
 Gelwick, The Way of Discovery, 33.
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 55.
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 Scott, “The Question of Religious Reality,” 85.
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 While Harry Prosch asserts Polanyi was not a Christian later in his life (see his
"Polanyi's View of Religion in Personal Knowledge: A Response to Richard Gelwick," Zygon 17
[March 1982]: 470), Scott asserts that Polanyi most likely believed in some “preexisting reality”
although Polanyi himself remained ambiguous about his own personal religious convictions (see
“The Question of Religious Reality,” 85-86). In a conversation with William H. Poteat later in
his life, Polanyi declared, “I don’t believe in God, or at any rate, I don’t believe in him enough for
it to make any difference” (quoted in Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 278).  Scott and
Moleski, however, sidestep the real issue by emphasizing the “vocational” aspect of Polanyi’s
life, stating that he “was a complex and reverent person. He took God seriously” by 
understanding his calling to be a seeker of the truth (291).
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student in chemical engineering who was, like Polanyi, Hungarian. The two were
married in a civil ceremony on 21 February 1921, the day after her father’s funeral in
Budapest. The two would be married for fifty-five years and have two sons, with Magda
outliving Polanyi by ten years.
153
  The young couple moved to Berlin shortly after their
marriage. While living there, Polanyi did research and directed doctoral students in
physical chemistry for twelve years. He began his career in Germany at the Fibre
Institute and soon after became its acting head. Because of his success working on x-ray
diffraction and crystals, he was promoted to the Institute of Physical Chemistry in 1923, 
where he devoted himself to reaction kinetics. He became a lifetime member of the
institute in 1929, and was considered to be one of the finest scientists in the institute.
Polanyi also had the gift of expressing criticism without provoking
hostility. He exercised acute physical insight, thinking and speaking in
helpful images, rather than arguing by means of calculations. After
overcoming his initial shyness, Polanyi earned a reputation in the
colloquium for his critical faculties and his ability to clarify
disagreements. After listening to a difficult lecture, Polanyi would often
take the podium and give a lucid summary and critique of what had been
said.
154
Polanyi was also a courteous scientist, delaying the publication of an article he had
written so that a doctoral student could publish the same findings first and receive the
credit.
155
It is also during this time in Germany that Polanyi began thinking about topics
outside of his scientific expertise, especially economics. In 1932 the University of 
Manchester, England, invited Polanyi to fill the chair of Physical Chemistry, a post he
initially turned down. With the rise of Hitler, increasing anti-Semitism and the burning
153
 Of Polanyi’s two sons, George and John, the younger followed in his father’s
footsteps as a scientist and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1986 (Scott and
Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 207). Magda Polanyi died 17 February 1986. 
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 85.
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 127. This occurred in 1932.
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of the Reichstag in Germany, Polanyi reconsidered the offer and moved his family to
England in September 1933.
156
It was shortly after his move to the University of Manchester that Polanyi began
studying economics more thoroughly, eventually producing a film on the benefits of the
theory of Keynesian economics.
157
  His interest in economics grew to such a degree that
he would be absent from the laboratory for days at a time while writing or studying
economic topics. By 1941 he was writing on economics and non-scientific issues so
much that he had to hire a secretary to type all of his notes for him, although his
newfound interests did not prevent him from being elected as a Fellow of the Royal
Society for his scientific achievements in 1944.
158
While his interest in economics never left him, by 1942 Polanyi was devoting a 
great deal of time to the consideration of epistemological questions. In the Forward to
Polanyi’s The Logic of Liberty, Stuart D. Warner writes, “Though Polanyi continued
writing scientific articles until 1949, their numbers began to diminish by the mid-1930s
as he turned his intellectual energies to reflections about things human.”
159
  There are two
main reasons for this shift in Polanyi’s thought.
160
  The first reason is comprised of two
closely related aspects concerning the nature of science.
156
 Because most of the scientists at the institute in Berlin were Jewish or of Jewish
ancestry, like Polanyi, the institute dissolved when Hitler came to power (see Scott and Moleski,
Michael Polanyi, 142-143).
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 121, 158, 179. The film was put out for the
general public, and although it received good reviews from economists, the outbreak of World
War II made other issues more pressing for both the government and the general public. Polanyi
also published a book on economic theory, Full Employment and Free Trade (New York:
MacMillan Publishing Co., 1948).
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 193. 
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 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1998), Forward, x. The work was originally published in 1951.
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 This point will be further explicated in Chapter 3. 
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On the one hand, Polanyi was dissatisfied with the idea that science was the only
field that could establish facts in a purely “objective” manner. On the other hand,
Polanyi was disturbed by communism’s utilitarian view of science—that science should
serve the well being of a classless society and not the scientist’s pursuit of truth. In 1946 
Polanyi published Science, Faith and Society in which he began to address these very
issues.
161
  The second reason that Polanyi began thinking about epistemological questions
is related to the first but addresses society and not the scientific laboratory. The scientific
method and its ideal that “only that which is provable is true” started to be applied to
other aspects of society, including religion and moral values, with destructive
consequences.
162
  The rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe during his lifetime was, in
Polanyi’s opinion, the natural consequence of the erosion of objective moral ideals such
as truth and justice.
163
  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, in answer to this erosion of 
society, Polanyi’s epistemology attempts to show that all knowledge is dependant on the
individual’s personal acceptance of established facts which pre-date him, much of it
remaining beyond “proof” in the strict sense of the word. This will be made clearer in
Chapter 3 but is mentioned now to show the reasons behind Polanyi’s moving away from
scientific matters and into the area of epistemology.
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 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society: A Searching Examination of the
Meaning and Nature of Scientific Inquiry (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1964). The book 
was originally a series of lectures that he modified for publication.
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 Scott, Everyman Revived, 7.
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 In The Logic of Liberty, Polanyi writes, “The ideal of a free society is in the first place
to be a good society; a body of men who respect truth, desire justice and love their fellows.”  In
“Scientific Convictions,” 36. As a clarification to this he adds, “… if truth is not real and
absolute, then it may seem proper that the public authorities should decide what should be called
truth. And if justice is not real and absolute, then it may seem proper that government should
decide what shall be considered just or unjust … We have here a full justification of totalitarian
statehood.”  In “Foundations of Academic Freedom,” 58. 
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By the late 1940s it was apparent to the administration at the University of
Manchester that Polanyi’s interests and writings had moved away from the sciences and
into the humanities. In 1948 the University offered him a chair in the social studies
department teaching economics, which Polanyi gladly accepted. Soon after being moved
from one department to another, Polanyi was invited to give the Gifford Lectures at the
University of Aberdeen. Although Polanyi had delayed giving the lectures several times,
with the help of Marjorie Grene, he finished preparing the lectures and delivered them in
1952.
164
  While the lectures went well and were eventually re-worked and published in
1958 under the title Personal Knowledge,
165
 the “substantial controversy” that Polanyi
thought his ideas would create never materialized.
166
The same year that Personal Knowledge was published, Polanyi gave the Lindsay
Memorial Lectures at the University College of North Staffordshire, applying his theory
of tacit knowing to human history. The lectures were published the following year as The
Study of Man.
167
In the Preface to The Study of Man Polanyi writes, “The whole series
can accordingly be read as an introduction to Personal Knowledge”
168
 even though the
book post-dates Personal Knowledge and is an application of its ideas. Polanyi continued
164
 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 203-222. Grene spent the spring of 1952
working with Polanyi and is credited with helping him develop his philosophical skills, especially
the correct use of technical philosophical language.
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 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1974). This work was originally published in 1958.
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 Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 221. Andy F. Sanders, Michael Polanyi's Post-
Critical Epistemology: A Reconstruction of Some Aspects of 'Tacit Knowing’ (Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1988) writes that the main controversy that philosophers have with Polanyi is that
“controversial issues are sometimes treated without much reverence for the philosophical
tradition” by him (Introduction, i).
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 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959).
In Scott and Moleski, Michael Polanyi, 232, the author’s clarify that this work is not so much an
anthropological study as it is a study of history.
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to think and write about his epistemological theory, receiving the honor of being elected a
Senior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford University, in 1959. During this time
Polanyi’s epistemology was beginning to be noticed in a host of academic fields,
especially in the United States, but remained largely ignored by philosophers in Europe.
In the spring of 1964, Polanyi was invited by the religion department to be a visiting
professor at Duke University and was so well received by the faculty and students that
Scott and Moleski call this semester in America “the high point of his career as a 
philosopher.”
169
In 1966 Polanyi published The Tacit Dimension,
170
 a summary account of his
epistemological theory of tacit knowing that shows a degree of clarification in his thought
not present in Personal Knowledge. Scott and Moleski claim that The Tacit Dimension
was the beginning of Polanyi’s interest in spirituality,
171
 and it is true that in the final
decade of his life, Polanyi was seemingly more interested in applying his epistemological
theory to religious questions than to scientific ones. His final book, Meaning,
172
explicitly dwelt with religious themes and was published in collaboration with Harry
Prosch in 1975. In the final few years of his life, Polanyi continually tried to get
assistance from friends and disciples to help publish and further disseminate his thought.
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 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1983). This
work was originally published in 1966.
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 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: The University of Chicago,
1977). This work was originally published in 1975. Scott and Moleski address the difficult
question of whether or not Polanyi wanted Meaning published and considered it his own thought
(Michael Polanyi, 285-292). The text is a composite of lectures he gave at the University of 
Chicago and the University of Texas in 1969 and several other lectures he gave in 1970-1971.
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William T. Scott recalls the last time he visited with Polanyi in 1974, stating, “we [Scott
and his wife Ann] sensed his sadness at the loss of his full powers and the consequent
frustration that his work would remain incomplete.”
173
  The man who spent decades
thinking and writing about human knowledge spent the final days of his life in a nursing
home, dying 22 February 1976, one day after his fifty-fifth wedding anniversary.
173





In 1948 Jacques Maritain resigned his post as the French Ambassador to the
Vatican and accepted a teaching position at Princeton University at the age of sixty-six.
It had been sixteen years since he published his tome on epistemology entitled The
Degrees of Knowledge,
174
 which, according to McInerny, “remains both his major
achievement and a convenient summary of his thought.”
175
  The trio of Jacques, Raïssa
and Vera Oumansov (Raïssa’s younger sister) settled into their final decade of life
together in Princeton, New Jersey, making yearly trips back to their native France.
During this time Maritain continued to teach (through 1952) and published ten more
books, including his seminal work on art and epistemology Creative Intuition in Art and 
176
Poetry.
It was not long after the end of his teaching career and the publication of Creative
Intuition in Art and Poetry that the serenity of the devout trio began to decline. In 1954 
Jacques had a heart attack, and a few years later Vera also suffered the same malady,
after which she was diagnosed with cancer. In less than three years the companion and
fellow sojourner succumbed to her illness and returned to God on the last day of 1959.
174
 Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. G. B. Phelan (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). The original French edition was published in
1932.
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 Maritain, Degrees, Introduction, xiv.
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 Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1977). The work was originally published in 1952.
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Jacques and Raïssa embarked on the final months of their marriage as they did the first,
without the companionship of their devoted sister Vera who had been with them for the
past fifty-three years. While in Paris the following summer, Raïssa fell ill and
subsequently died on 4 November 1960, leaving Jacques a solitary sojourner for almost
another thirteen years.
177
It is during these final years of his life that the well known Catholic philosopher
directed his intellectual gaze toward topics of a more explicitly theological nature.
McInerny’s assertion that “Maritain was a philosopher who metamorphosed into a 
theologian in his last years”
178
 is certainly true in light of his final publications. In the
last years of Maritain’s life he published Raïssa’s Journal, God and the Permission of 
Evil, Notebooks, The Peasant of the Garonne, On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, and
finally On the Church of Christ.
179
This chapter will examine Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Christ in On
the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, beginning with the book’s methodology, specifically
addressing the distinction Maritain makes between Jesus-viator and Jesus-comprehensor
and the threefold knowledge of Jesus. After these preparatory topics are examined, we
will explore Maritain’s theory of consciousness and supraconsciousness, followed by a
177
 The “Maritain Chronology” in Degrees (xxii-xxviii) incorrectly dates Raïssa’s death
as 7 July 1960 (xxviii). In Maritain’s own account, “At the end of four months of suffering, the
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 of November, 1960, God took her with Him, and I am henceforth alone here on this earth, at
least according to the appearances of this visible world.”  In Notebooks, 1.
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summary section which will show the unity of the preceding points. Finally, two works
that further elucidate some of the points Maritain makes in On the Grace and Humanity
of Jesus will briefly be examined, namely, The Degrees of Knowledge and Creative
Intuition in Art and Poetry.
A. On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus
Methodology … Distinguish
According to Maritain, the subject of the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus
Christ was a topic that both he and Raïssa had thought about for many years. The subject
eventually came to fruition in two “research-meetings”
180
 between Maritain and the
superiors of the Little Brothers of Jesus at Toulouse, France, and was later reworked into
book form.
181
  Maritain divides On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus into two sections,
the “First Approach” and the “Second Approach.”
182
In the First Approach, Maritain
does two things. First, he provides a general outline of the life of Jesus from his birth to
his death on the Cross.
183
  Second, within this context he briefly discusses several issues
relating to his theory of the consciousness of Christ which he will explore in greater
180
 The French edition reads “deux reunions de recherchè.”  See Jacques Maritain, De la
grace et de l’humanité de Jésus (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1967), 7. 
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detail in the Second Approach.
184
  The Second Approach builds upon these ideas and is
about three times as long. Indeed, at the beginning the Second Approach Maritain writes,
“I have proposed up to this point very general views. Now I would like to attempt a 
second approach, in taking up again my considerations in order to try to complete them in
a more systematic manner.”
185
  Thus the Second Approach is divided up into three
separate sections, each addressing in a more thorough manner what was previously
mentioned without much detail.
Although Maritain’s work follows numerous other attempts to understand the
consciousness of Jesus Christ as cited in Chapter 1, it is noteworthy that there are only
three references in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus to the previous controversy.
Maritain mentions Herman Diepen twice
186
 and clarifies according to his own theory the
often quoted section of Pius XII’s Mystici Corporis that refers to Jesus’ soul as having
present at once the knowledge of all the members of his mystical body, past, present and
future.
187
It is highly unlikely that Maritain would have been unaware of the previous
controversies surrounding the consciousness of Jesus Christ, especially in light of the
encyclical letter Sempiternus Rex, 1951, and the fact that many of the earlier attempts at
understanding Jesus’ consciousness were being made on the European stage. So how and
184
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why does Maritain avoid entering into the particulars of the previous debate over the
consciousness of Jesus?
What is interesting about Maritain’s approach in entering the question of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ is that he avoids the controversy as it stands in his own day
but rather engages the controversy as it stood at the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. Instead
of challenging or clarifying a modern author and entering into the particulars of the
modern debate of the consciousness of Jesus, Maritain takes issue with his intellectual
mentor St. Thomas, about whom he published a small work in 1930.
188
In On the Grace
and Humanity of Jesus Maritain poses his question and opposition to St. Thomas thus:
First question: from the creation of His [i.e., Jesus’] soul He has
had the plentitude of grace, yes; but has this plentitude of grace increased?
St. Luke (2, 52) says yes … he grew in wisdom, in age, and in grace
before God and before men. This is the Gospel. St. Thomas says no,—in
itself the grace of Christ has not increased; it could increase only
according to its effects and its manifestations.
189
The issue, according to Maritain, is that St. Thomas “lacked the philosophical
instrument” in his own day to recognize what modern psychology understands to be 
various levels of human consciousness, albeit this “applies in the case of Christ in a 
transcendent and absolutely unique sense.”
190
188
 Jacques Maritain, Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly
(New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959). Maritain states that this work is not an exposition of St.
Thomas’ thought so much as it is a promotion of the Saint himself and some of the more general
premises of his thought (15). Maritain, in this book as well as on other occasions, insisted that he 
was not a neo-Thomist but a Thomist, taking the thought of the Angelic Doctor and integrating its
enduring truths as a corrective to modern errors. “There is a Thomist philosophy; there is no neo-
Thomist philosophy.  I am not trying to include the past in the present, but to maintain in the now
the present of the eternal” (18).
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 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 17. Maritain softens his criticism later when
he writes, “If St. Thomas has not done justice to the text of St. Luke, it is, I believe, for reasons of 
an accidental order” (53-54). Maritain notes that St. Thomas did not have modern notions of
human consciousness to consider in his explanation of Christological doctrines.
190
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 48-49.
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Where St. Thomas is found wanting, Maritain insists, is in his integration of the
three degrees of knowledge in Jesus Christ without considering that these different
degrees of knowledge may not have been explicitly present in the human consciousness
of Jesus all at once. For this reason St. Thomas comes into conflict with the text of the
third Evangelist and finds a solution that, in Maritain’s opinion, is in direct contradiction
to the plain meaning of the text itself.
191
This is the point which causes difficulty for me, and which I
contest: this manner in which St. Thomas treats St. Luke. With St.
Augustine and the Fathers of the Church, one can proceed thus: they have
but a human authority. But with the Gospel text it is altogether different,
because one has to deal there with revelation itself; and very clearly St.
Luke is not thinking of the effects and of the works produced; he is
thinking of the grace and of the wisdom themselves, it is all the more clear
as he says in the same breath: in wisdom, in age, and in grace. The
growth in wisdom and in grace is for him in the same case as the growth in
192
age.
Subsequently, Maritain adds in a footnote on the bottom of the same page:
Let us not forget that as dear and venerable as are to us the Fathers and the
Doctors, and the greatest among them, a million St. Augustines and a
million St. Thomases will never make a St. Paul or a St. Luke. If on a
given point St. Luke and St. Thomas are truly and really in conflict, the
authority of St. Thomas, however high it may be, is nothing before that of 
St. Luke.
193
Maritain states that it is not so much his intention to correct the Angelic Doctor on this
point as to utilize a new “philosophical instrument” (i.e., consciousness and
supraconsciousness) to “extend his [St. Thomas’] movement of thought” and show how 
191
 See St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae, III, q. 7, a. 12, obj. 3. St. Thomas discusses
Luke’s Gospel in a question on the grace of Christ.
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fundamental points of St. Thomas’ Christological doctrine can in fact be understood in
light of the text from Luke’s Gospel.
194
However the case may be, I am conscious of being faithful to the
spirit and to the principles of St. Thomas in the reflections that I am
proposing to you, even when they contradict his letter, and I am convinced
that they do but go further in the direction in which he himself was
going.
195
What Maritain does in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus is integrate the modern
understanding of consciousness with the Thomistic (and scholastic) notion of the
threefold knowledge of Jesus, thus advancing St. Thomas’ thought in such a way as to
eliminate the “conflict” that exists between him and the Evangelist. This is Maritain’s
intention, but how does he view his small research endeavor on the knowledge and
consciousness of Jesus?
On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus is, according to its author, the private
opinion of a philosopher hoping to make a contribution that will help further the work of 
theology.
196
  Maritain stresses that, unlike a theologian who utilizes “the light of Faith
illuminating Reason in order to enable it to acquire some understanding of revealed
mysteries,” his role as a philosopher involves using “the light of Reason comforted by
Faith in order to do better its own work in intellectual investigation.”
197
  What Maritain is
doing is establishing the methodology of his work by indicating that this particular
194
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 52. Maritain also states that in St. Thomas’
thought (and the “tinged Platonic” thought of his day) it was only necessary “to satisfy the non-
temporal type of humanity” in Jesus (54), whereas modernity “recognize[es] that movement of 
growth, not only as to the body but as to the things of the soul and spirit, is essential to every true
man” (48).
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 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 54. 
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 Maritain states in the first line of On the Grace and Humanity, “Shall I hesitate to
make this exposition because I will appear to be treading on the flower-beds of theologians, I who
am not a theologian, but a mere philosopher?” (11).
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 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 11. 
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composition is a work of speculative philosophy and has as its stated goal the desire to
assist and present to the theologian research that may open up new avenues of thought.
198
While Maritain hopes to make a contribution to the question of the consciousness of 
Jesus Christ, he does not hesitate to state that the “last word will naturally belong to the
theologian.”
199
  One might wonder why Maritain places such an emphasis in the opening
section of his book on its being a work of philosophical research and not a work of 
theological investigation (since that is what it clearly seems to be, and which Maritain
later acknowledges does in fact involve “a very difficult doctrinal recasting”).
200
The obvious answer to this question is that Maritain is a philosopher and so enters
the question of the consciousness of Jesus Christ as such. While this is a reasonable
answer to the question, it falters when one considers that Maritain is also considered to be 
one of the foremost Thomists of the last century.  Although he was not a theologian by
training, it would be hard to argue that he was not a competent Thomist, and as such,
competent in both Thomistic philosophy and theology.
However, a more probable answer as to why Maritain presents his thoughts on the
consciousness of Jesus Christ as a work of speculative philosophy and not as a work of 
theology (by questioning St. Thomas and not engaging in the modern discussion) can be 
found in the history of the question in the decades preceding Maritain’s conferences and
subsequent book on the subject. One theologian after another found himself under
scrutiny or censure by Rome for various theological and doctrinal deficiencies in his
198
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 11-12, 48. Maritain indicates that he is
pursuing this topic “Because I love the Little Brothers of Jesus, and because I would like very
much to tell them certain things which I believe truly important on the plane of research, and
which others than I could perhaps develop more fully” (47).
199
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 12. 
200
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 47. Italics added for emphasis.
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writings on the consciousness of Jesus Christ during this ecclesiastical epoch. A
summary review of that history will make this point more clearly.
Schell’s limiting Jesus to having only experiential knowledge gained him the
attention of the Holy Office in 1918. Seiller divided the ontological unity of Christ, an
action that caused his book, La psychologie humaine de Christ, to be placed on the Index
in July of 1951. Moreover, just a few months later the encyclical letter Sempiternus Rex
condemned those theologians who emphasized the human nature of Christ to the point of 
making the man Jesus a human person in his own right and not ontologically united to the
Word of God (Déodat de Basly and Seiller). With this in mind, it should be clear why
Maritain would emphasize the speculative nature of On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus
by indirectly entering the debate on the consciousness of Jesus Christ from a 
philosophical perspective.
Earlier in his life Maritain had written a book on Our Lady of La Salette that was
never published, even posthumously, because neither the Pontiff nor the appropriate
Roman Curial office would consent to its publication. Maritain’s obedience to that
decision, even in death, should be taken as an indication of his disposition towards the
hierarchical Church he deeply loved throughout his Catholic life. If he was unwilling to
cross Roman sensibilities over devotion to Our Lady of La Salette, then it is unlikely he 
would do so over such a controversial question as the consciousness of Jesus Christ in the
waning years of his life.
Maritain is cautious in both the presentation and the method of On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus precisely because the issue of the consciousness of Jesus Christ had
proved to be such a volatile topic, and because Maritain certainly would not have wanted
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his name added to the list of Schell, Seiller and Déodat de Basly. If anything, Maritain’s
stratagem of presenting his thesis as contra St. Thomas while stressing the philosophical
nature of his work shows the depths to which he understood the complexity and
controversy involved in the question of Jesus Christ’s consciousness among theologians
in his day.
Comprehensor and Viator
Throughout each successive section of On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus,
Maritain makes two fundamental points from which his investigation of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ emerges. The first point is his understanding the soul of 
Jesus as existing simultaneously under two different states, namely that of comprehensor
and viator. The second point from which Maritain bases his discussion of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ is his division of the life of Jesus into eight successive
stages.
201
  The second point is directly related to the first and shows the trajectory of the
life of Jesus-viator. Maritain points out, however, that his division of the life of Jesus
into eight stages is applicable only to the human life of Jesus as viator and not as the
divine person of the Word.
202
  That having been stated, a closer look at the distinction
between comprehensor and viator will help make this point clearer and establish a 
working vocabulary from which Maritain will discuss the consciousness of Jesus Christ.
201
 Maritain refers to “eight stages” (16) in the life of Jesus Christ but then subsequently
lists seven, dividing 5 into two connected but distinct aspects of Jesus’ life. This will be made
clearer after the present discussion.
202
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 16. 
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When Maritain discusses Jesus’ soul as existing under the two states of 
comprehensor and viator, he is utilizing a distinction already present in the scholastics,
including the Angelic Doctor.
203
  As a matter of fact, Maritain first mentions the
distinction between these two states in the soul of Jesus when he is formulating his initial
disagreement with St. Thomas over Luke 2.52.
204
  Perhaps it would be easier to explain
these two states by setting Christ aside for a moment and looking at these distinctions in
the context of a Saint—Thomas Aquinas himself. When St. Thomas dies and is rewarded
for the grace of a holy life, we say that he “goes to heaven” and is now in the presence of 
God. This heavenly reward of divine presence is the completion of life’s faith journey
and explains what the state of comprehensor is. St. Thomas no longer lives by faith,
“believing that which he cannot see,” but instead sees the God he believes in directly.
While still alive, however, St. Thomas was in the state of way journeying towards God,
i.e., as viator. For St. Thomas to be comprehensor is for him to cease being viator.
By definition then, St. Thomas cannot be both viator and comprehensor at the
same time, that is he cannot be journeying towards God (as viator) if he is already present
to God (as comprehensor). Saying that St. Thomas is comprehensor is tantamount to
saying that he enjoys the beatific vision of God, he “sees” God as he is.
205
It seems that
St. Paul parallels these two states when he writes, “At present we see indistinctly, as in a 
mirror [as viator], but then face to face [as comprehensor]. At present I know partially
203
 St. Thomas specifically discusses Jesus as both comprehensor and viator in Summa
Theologiae III, q. 15, a. 10. 
204
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 17. 
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 By definition human beings are finite and limited and thus do not see the divine
essence in its totality. Therefore, to “comprehend” does not mean that the human seer fully
grasps the divine essence. Rather, seeing God “face to face” is the biblical explanation which
parallels the systematic understanding of the beatific vision, i.e., 1 John 3.2. 
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[as viator]; then I shall know fully [as comprehensor], as I am fully known” (I Cor.
13.12). In summary, during his life on earth we say that St. Thomas is journeying toward
God and is thus in the state of way or is a viator. After his death he ceases to be a 
journeyman and is now present to God being in the state of comprehensor.
With this clarification in mind, let us return to Maritain’s discussion of Jesus
Christ and examine a little more closely what he understands these distinctions to mean
when applied to Jesus as concurrently existing under the two states of comprehensor and
viator. According to Maritain, when he refers to Christ as comprehensor, he means,
Jesus had from the creation of His soul a Vision of God that was all that
which there is of the most perfect; but to this perfect Vision there was
lacking a complementary perfection which is connatural to it,—the state of 
beatitude or of glory,—the state which Christ, the Word Incarnate,
renounced from the instant that He became incarnate and was viator, as
He renounced many privileges of His divinity itself.
206
In other words, the state of comprehensor in the human soul of Jesus is a unique result of 
the hypostatic union of the Word subsisting in a human nature.
207
  This unique privilege
accorded to the human soul of Jesus, namely that he has the beatific vision and is thus
comprehensor, begins at the creation of his soul. According to Maritain, the state of 
comprehensor will not express itself fully until Jesus’ death on the Cross.
208
  However, as
viator, the human faculties of Jesus function in a truly human manner with the exception
of infused knowledge. As viator, Jesus lives an authentic human life in that he is a 
journeyman like any other human being. After Jesus dies on the Cross and is raised from
206
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 23. Thus Jesus’ perfections are as perfect as
possible to a human nature.
207
 Maritain writes, “Let us note, in passing, that He was comprehensor, by reason only of 
an exigency proper to the hypostatic union, but that He was viator by reason of the very motive of 
this union, by reason of the very motive of the Incarnation [i.e., victory over sin]” In On the
Grace and Humanity, 57.
208
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 22-23, 24, footnote 7.  See also 137-138.
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the dead this changes, and his human nature and faculties are completely ruled by the
state of comprehensor.
209
  Thus, while Jesus is viator in the here-below of his soul during
his earthly life, he is simultaneously comprehensor in the heaven of his soul.
Nonetheless, once Jesus enters into death in his humanity, he forever ceases to be 
in the state of viator and subsequently exists only in the state of comprehensor. In
Maritain’s own words, one of the things that he is attempting to do in On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus is to reconcile St. Thomas and the Gospel of Luke. He says, by
pushing
further the distinction between the state of comprehensor and that of 
viator, and in placing in an interior world absolutely inaccessible to
consciousness all that which was proper to the state of comprehensor, one 
arrives at new views which permit us to save at the same time the truths to
which St. Thomas adhered and that which is in my opinion the obvious
meaning of St. Luke.
210
In doing these two things Maritain is coming closer to a fuller understanding of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ.
While Jesus as comprehensor enjoys the beatific vision, Maritain writes that this
needs to be understood in a nuanced manner. In Maritain’s opinion, there are two
limitations that Jesus experiences in having the beatific vision. The first limitation
Maritain refers to is one of nature, namely that the humanity of Jesus is finite and, as
such, is unable to fully comprehend the divine essence. Jesus’ limited, finite human
nature would not be capable of fully grasping the infinite essence of God. Maritain notes
that St. Thomas explains the meaning of comprehensor in Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a.
209
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 22-23, 24. 
210
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 17. Maritain adds, “St. Thomas thought that
he had to exclude all growth properly so called of grace, of charity, of wisdom in Jesus during his
earthly life.  And the matter seems to me grave, because, once again, growth is characteristic of 
the verus homo in the state of way” (52).
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7, in which he states that Jesus is “perfectus comprehensor.” In Maritain’s opinion, St.
Thomas’ explanation is “true but expressed in an unfortunate vocabulary” because as
comprehensor Jesus “saw but did not comprehend the divine essence (this is impossible
to any creature).”
211
  Along this same line of argument, Maritain adds that Jesus would
not be able to articulate or express that which he sees in the beatific vision because the
vision is conceptually inexpressible by a finite nature.
212
  The second limitation that Jesus
encounters in having the beatific vision is that while the state of comprehensor involves
both beholding God and the connatural state of beatitude (or glory) for the Saints who
have died, in the human soul of Jesus the state of comprehensor does not include
beatitude or glory.
213
  Maritain explains that this absence of beatitude is the result of a 
voluntary renunciation by the Word in becoming Incarnate, supporting his position by
citing the Philippians hymn of 2.6-11.
What is unique to Maritain’s consideration of Jesus is the manner in which he
understands the interaction between the two simultaneous states of viator and
comprehensor in Jesus’ soul.
I admit, therefore, these two worlds in the soul of Christ, corresponding to
the two simultaneous states of comprehensor and of viator in which He
found himself. I think that there was clearly a certain communication
between these two states and these two worlds … But I think that there
was also a certain incommunicability between them, which caused that the
content of the supraconscious heaven of the soul was retained, could not 
pass into the world of consciousness, except, as I indicated in the first




 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 23. 
212
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 60, 72. As a human example one might cite
the difficulty the mystics experience in conceptualizing their experiences.
213
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 23. For this reason Maritain states that Jesus is
not “blessed,” he is comprehensor (86).
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While Maritain’s major contribution to the discussion of the consciousness of Jesus
Christ is his distinction between consciousness and supraconsciousness, his theory is
rooted in this fundamental distinction of Jesus’ soul existing concurrently as viator and
comprehensor. This approach to the consciousness of Christ will be examined at length
and is mentioned presently only to show the importance of why Maritain devotes so
much time to distinguishing in Jesus between the states of viator and comprehensor.
While this point is fundamental to On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, a second
important clarification Maritain makes is his division of the life of Jesus into seven
distinct stages.
When dividing the life of Christ into the various chronological stages, Maritain is
clear that these are proper to the finite human nature of Jesus as man and not to the
eternal person of Word.
215
  It is only the humanity of Jesus that experiences a progression
through time which Maritain insists is a “perfect unity of the movement of the life of 
Christ.”
216
  While in his humanity (as viator), he follows the progression of life that any
human person would follow, i.e., birth, childhood, adult life, death etc. Nonetheless,
there remains an intrinsic underlying unity to his life. For Maritain this unity is the direct
result of the hypostatic union and the beatific vision in his human soul (as
comprehensor). It is in this context that Maritain proposes the seven stages of the life of 
Jesus from which he bases his discussion of Jesus’ consciousness. Because they are an
intrinsic element of Maritain’s arguments in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, a
215
 One of Maritain’s cursory tangents is his lament that most of the faithful have no clear
understanding of the acts of the eternal Logos and those of the human nature of Jesus, thus
indiscriminately attributing divine things to the humanity of Jesus. See On the Grace and 
Humanity, 29, 52-53.
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cursory review of these stages will be helpful to the reader.
The first three stages all involve the life of Jesus prior to the beginning of his
public ministry, namely his conception and birth in Bethlehem, his childhood, and lastly
the hidden adult life at Nazareth.
217
  This is followed by two stages: the public ministry
and subsequent death of Jesus. The latter Maritain subdivides as two separate but related
aspects of the one stage, the Cross and the Resurrection. The final two stages involve
Jesus’ exercising his universal kingship before the final consummation of the world and
after the final consummation of the world. As Jesus moves through the early stages of
infancy to his adult life, death and Resurrection, the state of viator moves closer and
closer to the state of comprehensor.
218
  Maritain explains this trajectory of Jesus’ life by
utilizing “the principle of the asymptote.”
219
Maritain makes use of the geometric principle of the asymptote and applies it to
the person of Jesus as viator and comprehensor specifically in his discussion of whether
or not grace increases in the human nature of Jesus.
220
It seems clear, however, that
Maritain understands the principle in a manner that allows for its application to other
aspects of the human life of Jesus, explicitly applying it to the sufferings of Christ in the
final section of the book.
221
  The geometric principle of the asymptote states that an
oblique line bends along a horizontal x-axis and a vertical y-axis but never reaches or 
crosses either of the two.
222
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 For a summary explanation of the theory of the asymptote see J. Richard Byrne,
Modern Elementary Geometry (New York: McGrath-Hill Book Company, 1970), 276-277.
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On a standard graph as the asymptote approaches the vertical-horizontal
intersection, the distance from either axis is at its greatest. Concurrently, as the
asymptote moves along either axis away from the 0, 0 intersect point the distance
between the asymptote, and either the horizontal x-axis or the vertical y-axis diminishes.
Maritain’s application of this principle to the life of Jesus can be conceptualized in the
following manner. The horizontal x-axis represents Jesus’ soul in the state of
comprehensor, already experiencing the beatific vision. At any given point along this
vertical x-axis, Jesus-comprehensor already has the fullness of grace and knowledge
possible. The vertical y-axis represents the human life of Jesus in the state of viator. At
any given point along the y-axis (the various stages of Jesus’ life), Jesus-viator has the
fullness of grace and wisdom proper to that particular point in his life.
Hence, as a twelve year old boy, Jesus-viator has the fullness of grace and
wisdom proper to his human capacity at that age and point in life. Nonetheless, both his
grace and knowledge will still increase over time in proportion to his human and
intellectual growth. Maritain states, however, that to attribute to the baby Jesus as viator
things proper to the baby Jesus as comprehensor would place us “in the presence of a 
kind of fairy-story marvel which is unworthy of Christ and contrary to the verus
homo.”
223
In utilizing the principle of the asymptote, Maritain is able to state two
concurrent things about Jesus Christ. First, at any given point along the horizontal x-axis
as comprehensor, Jesus’ humanity has the fullness of grace and wisdom possible (recall
that this is the heaven of the soul of Jesus which experiences the beatific vision).
Secondly, Maritain is able to affirm that there is a genuine increase in grace and wisdom
223
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 19. 
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as the man Jesus moves along the vertical y-axis as viator, all the while increasing as it
gets closer to union with the horizontal x-axis under the state of comprehensor.
While in the geometric definition the asymptote approaches but never touches
either axis, Maritain asserts that there is a convergence of the vertical y-axis of Jesus-
viator with the horizontal x-axis of Jesus-comprehensor. At the convergence of these
points, the charity, grace, and knowledge present in Jesus’ human soul becomes
infinite.
224
  According to Maritain, this moment occurs as Jesus is dying on the Cross and
utters his final words.
225
  At the union of these two states, Jesus ceases being a viator and
his human soul hereafter exists solely in the state of comprehensor with his human
faculties illuminated immediately and directly by the light of the beatific vision.
226
  This
helps to clarify the distinction between the two states of viator and comprehensor in the
soul of Jesus, a fundamental point in Maritain’s theory of the knowledge and
consciousness of Jesus Christ. An examination of Maritain’s understanding of the
threefold knowledge of Jesus will help further elucidate this point.
224
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 138.  Maritain offers his reader the “Thomas-
Summa” example in order to clarify this point. The horizontal x-axis would be the Summa as
conceived in the mind of St. Thomas. Insert any Thomist scholar along the vertical y-axis and, as
they increase in understanding the Summa the oblique line moves closer to the horizontal x-axis.
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 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 137.  Maritain writes, “the sixth and seventh
Words … is precisely the point where the ascending oblique straight line of which I spoke at the
beginning [of the book], and which symbolizes the constant growth in grace and in charity all
through the earthly life of Christ as viator, meets the horizontal straight line which symbolizes the
supreme and unsurpassable perfection … of this same grace and of this same charity of Christ as
comprehensor.”
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The Threefold Knowledge of Jesus Christ
The final distinction to be made as a prelude to exploring Maritain’s theory of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ is the way in which he understands the threefold
knowledge of Jesus Christ, namely the beatific vision, infused knowledge and
experiential knowledge.
227
  In reading through On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, one 
immediately notices that Maritain devotes a good deal more of his attention to discussing
the infused knowledge of Jesus than he spends on either Jesus’ beatific knowledge or 
experiential knowledge, the latter being hardly mentioned at all although Maritain does
affirm it.
228
It seems that this disparity has more to do with the content of each concept in
light of the previously discussed states in Jesus’ soul and Maritain’s theory of the
consciousness of Christ. Whereas the beatific vision is proper to Jesus-comprehensor
and experiential knowledge is proper to Jesus-viator, infused knowledge bridges the
chasm between the two states. Hence, infused knowledge makes accessible within the
human faculties of Jesus-viator what is present in the beatific vision and would otherwise
be inexpressible and beyond human comprehension. A brief explanation of how Maritain
understands these three types of knowledge will make this clearer.
Maritain understands the beatific vision of Christ largely in harmony with the
scholastics, in particular St. Thomas. He understands the beatific vision of Jesus as being
synonymous with “beatific love,” as unlimited in nature, is simple and unexplainable, and
is the fullness of divine truth.
229
  All of these explanations are present in the scholastic
theory of the beatific vision.
230
  Maritain affirms that Jesus has the beatific vision from
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the creation of his soul but distinguishes that the vision is proper to the “celestial” part of 
his soul as comprehensor and not “here-below” of his soul as viator.
231
  The illumination
from the beatific vision in Jesus enlightens all things for him as both comprehensor and
viator, but the vision is only accessible, although in different degrees, to these states of 
Jesus’ soul through the mediation of infused knowledge.
232
For Maritain infused knowledge is to be distinguished in Jesus according to its
presence in either the state of comprehensor or viator. According to Maritain, infused
knowledge in Jesus-comprehensor is absolute and totally enlightened by the beatific
vision but is nonetheless necessary for a created intellect to comprehend the beatific
vision. However, as comprehensor, this knowledge remains incommunicable to and
above the sphere of Jesus-viator.
233
  Recall that for Maritain, the beatific vision directly
enlightens the heaven of the soul of Jesus-comprehensor only. Nonetheless, without
infused knowledge the vision would remain “superfluous” to the human intellect of Jesus
Christ even in the elevated state of comprehensor.
234
  Of itself the beatific vision is far
too vast and inexpressible for the human intellect to “use” in making value-judgments or 
gaining concrete knowledge. It is through the mediation of infused knowledge that the
“light” of the beatific vision is transformed in such a way that it becomes accessible to
the human intellect and soul of Jesus. Infused knowledge acts as the “exchange agency”
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between the beatific vision and the human soul, under both states, of Jesus.
235
  While all
things created and uncreated are present in the beatific vision and consequently present to
the soul of Jesus through the beatific vision, even so, without infused knowledge neither
state in Jesus’ soul would benefit from the beatific vision.
236
  Maritain does not spend
much time explaining infused knowledge in Jesus-comprehensor other than noting its
absolute, perfect content and concurrent presence with the beatific vision. Infused
knowledge in the state of comprehensor makes intelligible to the human intellect of Jesus
what is otherwise unintelligible as the beatific vision. However, as comprehensor, such
knowledge remains above the consciousness of Jesus-viator and will not be exercised
directly by Jesus until the Paschal Mystery.
237
In Jesus-viator infused knowledge is not total and absolute but limited in scope
and governed according to his conceptual and experiential knowledge. However,
Maritain states, “The case of the infused science is thus, in my view, the only case where
something in the here-below of the soul of Christ [as viator] was immediately ruled by
His Beatific Vision, because produced by God using the latter as instrument.”
238
Maritain clarifies that infused knowledge in the state of viator grants Jesus divine
certitude specifically as “required by His mission as Revealer.”
239
  Maritain holds that
235
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through the mediation of infused knowledge, the soul of Jesus-viator is able to participate
in the beatific vision in a limited fashion and to understand in a tangible manner things
present in the vision.
240
  How exactly does Maritain understand this to occur in Jesus?
While Maritain writes very little about experiential knowledge in Jesus, it is
usually presented in relation to the infused knowledge of Jesus-viator. What is unique
about infused knowledge in Jesus-viator is that it makes use of concepts and knowledge
obtained in an ordinary human manner. For example, Maritain notes that Jesus’
knowledge of the Hebrew Law and of God the Father is divinely certain knowledge
241
yet
is fundamentally rooted in what he has learned from the Blessed Mother and the
teachings of Judaism.
242
Maritain writes, “All that which He [Jesus] expressed to others and expressed to
Himself in His consciousness of viator required species expressae, concepts, notions,
which refer either to His experiential science [knowledge], or to His infused science
[knowledge], but could not come from the vision.”
243
  This is a unique understanding of 
infused science in Jesus-viator. If Jesus’ human intellect was being enlightened by
infused knowledge without utilizing human concepts and ideative forms already present
to his mind through experiential knowledge, infused knowledge would not be anymore
understandable to the man Jesus than the beatific vision. Hence as comprehensor,
infused knowledge presents to the mind concepts or ideas in a human manner things that
do not require any previous experiential knowledge or concepts. Simply put, in either the
240
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state of viator or comprehensor, infused knowledge presents to the mind knowledge in a 
manner harmonious with experiential knowledge and concepts.
In understanding infused knowledge in Jesus in this manner, Maritain is able to
maintain two aspects of the mystery of the Incarnation at once. On the human level Jesus
is epistemologically truly human. He learns and knows in the same way as the rest of the
human race. At the same time by virtue of the hypostatic union, he is also endowed with
supernatural gifts and knowledge. While Maritain cites two exceptions to this,
244
 his
general understanding of infused knowledge in Jesus is that it both requires and builds
upon his ordinary human experiential knowledge.
Already it has become evident that Maritain consistently addresses the problem of 
the knowledge of Jesus Christ by remaining rooted in and elaborating scholastic
categories as applied to Christology. We are now better prepared to enter into Maritain’s
discussion of consciousness.
Consciousness and Supraconsciousness
Before looking at the consciousness of Jesus Christ according to Maritain in On
the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, we must first elucidate in a more general manner what
he means when he makes use of the terms infraconsciousness, consciousness, and
244
 In On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus Maritain indicates two instances during Jesus’
life when the partition between the consciousness of the viator and the divinized
supraconsciousness of the comprehensor was let down.  The first is the Transfiguration (172,
footnote 1) and the second was the moment of death on the Cross (142). In the case of the
Transfiguration this was a “miracle,” and in the second instance the transition from the state of
viator to that of comprehensor. This will be made clearer below in the discussion of
consciousness and supraconsciousness in Jesus.
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supraconsciousness. We will then examine how Maritain applies these concepts to Jesus
Christ and note how these terms take on a slightly different meaning when used by
Maritain for Jesus because the acting subject is a divine person acting through a human
nature. Let us begin by first looking at consciousness in general.
245
  Maritain writes:
Let there be no misunderstanding: when I speak of a world of 
consciousness, I am speaking of a world of which consciousness and the
conscious faculties are the seat and, as it were, the sun,—but in this world
there is, on the one hand, below consciousness, the vast psycho-somatic
unconscious of tendencies and of instincts, of sensations not yet elaborated
in perceptions, of latent memories, etc., and, on the other hand, above
consciousness, a preconscious or supraconscious of the spirit, in which are
found the agent intellect and the sources of the intuitive activities of the
spirit. It is all this that I am calling, in order to simplify, the world of 
consciousness. And this world of consciousness thus defined is the world
of each one of us.
246
The first aspect of consciousness Maritain mentions, the “below consciousness,” he also
calls the “infraconsciousness.”
247
  Maritain writes that both infraconsciousness and
supraconsciousness are, “strictly speaking, only logical categories negatively established:
that which is not conscious, either as above, or as below consciousness.”
248
  Nevertheless,
what he mentions as being a part of the infraconsciousness in a person are all natural
human functions: tendencies, instincts, sensations, and latent memories. All of these
245
 Maritain writes “the explicit and explicitly elaborated notion of the unconscious in
man” is a philosophical instrument lacking in St. Thomas’ time. In a rare reference he explicitly
credits “our modern psychologists” with this elaboration. See On the Grace and Humanity, 48-
49.
246
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 55. Bertrand De Margerie, The Human
Knowledge of Christ: The Knowledge, Fore-Knowledge and Consciousness, Even in the Pre-
Paschal Period, of Christ the Redeemer (Boston, MA: Daughters of St. Paul, 1980) associates
Maritain with those who attempt to understand the knowledge of Christ in psychological terms,
specifically citing Maritain’s theory of supraconsciousness (28-29). De Margerie does not give a 
full evaluation of Maritain’s theory, however, and fails to mention its rootedness in the scholastic
understanding of the threefold knowledge of Jesus as well as its attempt to reconcile conciliar
Christology with the modern understanding of consciousness.
247
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 55, footnote 8.
248
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 49, footnote 2.
74
remain “below” the level of consciousness in that they are natural happenings in a person
that occur without the person directly willing or being consciously aware that they are
happening.
Above the level of infraconsciousness is a person’s conscious awareness.
According to Maritain, consciousness is “a knowledge wholly experimental and felt,
which of itself is obscure and inexpressible in concepts.”
249
  He also indicates that in
“every man in the state of way…the functioning of human nature and of its faculties is
centered on reason” and by nature is limited and finite.
250
Let us briefly synthesize this
for clarity. Consciousness involves those things that the acting subject is directly aware
of and to which he can deliberately give his attention. At the same time human
consciousness is limited and finite. While I am aware of this or that thing and can tell
you about this or that thing, it is far more difficult to tell you how I am aware, or 
conscious, of this or that thing. I think what Maritain is indicating here is part of the
great mystery of human life. I may be able to express my thoughts, knowledge and
feelings to another person, but my subjective conscious awareness will always remain
beyond the sphere of someone else’s ability to grasp it. Whatever I may express to
another is but a fragment of the totality of my conscious awareness. I can express the
content of my consciousness, but not consciousness itself. With this in mind, it is clearer
what Maritain means when he affirms that an individual’s conscious awareness is not 
expressible in concepts.
249
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The third aspect of the world of consciousness according to Maritain is what he 
calls supraconsciousness.  As indicated in the above quote, supraconsciousness is “above
consciousness, a preconscious or supraconscious of the spirit, in which are found the
agent intellect and the sources of the intuitive activities of the spirit.”
251
  While above
consciousness, supraconsciousness nevertheless “functions in us only in the zone of ‘the
spirit in its living springs,’ where the world of conscious activity has its hidden
source.”
252
  This “intuitive activity of the spirit” and “spirit in its living springs” is for
Maritain a twofold reality.  On the one hand, it is a place of unconscious intellectual
activity and synthesis. This aspect will be made clearer in the examination of his
Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry below.
253
  On the other hand, it is also the place of
communion between the human soul and God.
Maritain writes, “the spiritual preconscious or supraconsciousness is not only in
us the natural sphere of ‘the spirit in its living springs,’ it is also the secret sphere where
in virtue of the supernatural gift of God is found the seat of grace, the beginning of 
eternal life.”
254
  Maritain includes in this aspect of supraconsciousness not only its being
the place of grace but also, albeit in an unformulated way, the place where knowledge of 
divine truths spring. Maritain cites, by way of example, the Blessed Mother and St.
Joseph. Because both were taught divine truths directly by Jesus, what was otherwise
251
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unformulated but true in their supraconsciousness later became explicit and present to
them in their consciousness awareness.
One can think, as I indicated a few moments ago, that this
conversation with the Doctors of the Temple has marked the beginning of 
the communications through which, once returned to Nazareth, Jesus
began to confide to these two loved ones—by what a sublime and gentle
initiation in which He spoke from the abundance of the heart … the
secrets of the uncreated Life and those of Redemption. Then Mary
recognized, in a contemplation filled with wonder (conscious
participation, now that Jesus taught her and in proportion as He taught her,
of the prophetic illumination received at the Annunciation), that which she
knew already in the heights of the supraconscious, but which remained
there hidden to her conscious thought…And that which I have just said of 
Mary, it is fitting to hold as likewise true, though in a less elevated plane,
of St. Joseph.
255
Thus, for Maritain, after the finding in the Temple, Jesus began “to teach them [Mary and
St. Joseph] progressively, under the mode of communicable concepts, all the mysteries of 
revelation (which in another manner, as I indicated also, they knew already, but 
inexpressibly).”
256
  While Maritain uses two extraordinary human beings as his example
it remains, nonetheless, true for all human beings.  Although this example highlights how 
divine truth, descending from what is otherwise the unformulated supraconsciousness
into the realm of consciousness may enter the conscious thoughts with the aid of a word
from outside, the theory would also apply to those truths inherent in creation, i.e.,
goodness and beauty.
These three aspects of the world of consciousness, infraconsciousness,
consciousness and supraconsciousness, are for Maritain the three degrees of 
consciousness present in each human person. When applied to the person of Jesus Christ,
Maritain slightly nuances these aspects of consciousness. We have already pointed out 
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Maritain’s recognition that the modern concept of consciousness was not available to St.
Thomas when he was formulating his Christology.  Had it been available, Maritain does
not believe St. Thomas would have encountered any difficulty in understanding the
aforementioned text from Luke’s Gospel.
257
How does Maritain advance St. Thomas’ Christological thought with his theory of 
consciousness?  For Maritain the world of consciousness in the ordinary sense, including
the infraconscious and supraconscious, is proper to Jesus-viator, what he refers to as the
“terrestrial” or the “here-below” consciousness of Jesus.
258
  As previously noted,
however, in Maritain’s discussion of the infused knowledge of Jesus-viator, Jesus’
conscious awareness also includes the supernatural gift of infused knowledge, although in
a manner proper to his state and stage of life.
259
  Nonetheless, Jesus’ consciousness
operates “freely and deliberately”
260
 in him as it would for any person,
261
 albeit in a 
manner absolutely free from sin. However, because Jesus’ consciousness as viator
includes the supernatural gift of infused knowledge, there is in his consciousness a rapid
development of his awareness of himself.
It is in regard to this aspect of Maritain’s theory of consciousness that there exists
a substantial difference between the supraconsciousness in all people and the divinized
supraconsciousness particular to Jesus alone. Maritain refers to the divinized
257
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supraconsciousness in Jesus as the “celestial” or “heaven” of the soul proper to the state
of comprehensor.
262
It is in the divinized supraconsciousness of the soul under the state
of comprehensor that Jesus sees the beatific vision and is thus “divinized.”
But when I speak of the world of the Beatific Vision or of the
divinized supraconsciousness in the soul of Christ, I am speaking of a
world absolutely proper to the soul of Christ alone,—world
transcendent,—seat from which the Holy Spirit spreads His plentitude
over the entire being of Christ,—domain infinitely superior to the
“supraconsciousness of the spirit” which forms naturally a part of that
which I an calling the world of consciousness.
263
The divinized supraconsciousness in Jesus is “divinized” as a direct result of the heaven
of his soul being “enlightened” by the beatific vision.
264
  This “influx of intellectual
light” (i.e., divinization) from the beatific vision is present in the supraconsciousness of 
Jesus Christ as a general influx or radiance of divine light as well as through the
mediation of infused knowledge. Of this Maritain writes:
One can therefore say, if one wishes, but in a manner which needs
to be well understood, that an influx of intellectual light stemming from
the Vision was communicated to the infused science of Christ, and that
something of that which He knew through the Vision in His divinized
supraconsciousness was communicated to the sphere of the conscious,—
not, indeed, according as the ineffable and indivisible content of the
science of Vision would have been parceled out in communicable species
and in conscious ideas, but according as the infused science was the
exchange agency thanks to which the divine gold of the Vision was
changed into the coin of the expressible and communicable species.
265
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It is in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor that one can say that
Jesus has divine certainty of all things past, present and future.
266
  This brings us back to
Maritain’s initial distinction of Jesus’ soul existing under the state of comprehensor and
viator as well as the distinction of his threefold knowledge. The divinized
supraconsciousness, including infused knowledge as comprehensor, remains “beyond”
the here-below consciousness of Jesus-viator. This is true because, Maritain writes, there
exists a partition between the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus under the state of 
comprehensor and the consciousness of Jesus under the state of viator. It is in this
“partition” between consciousness and the divinized supraconsciousness in Jesus that all
of the above-mentioned aspects of Maritain’s thought converge and thus require further
explication.
The infused knowledge in the heaven of the soul of Jesus-comprehensor remains
inaccessible to the here-below of the soul of Jesus-viator. Since this is such a 
fundamental point in Maritain’s conceptualization of the consciousness of Jesus Christ, I
would like to quote him at some length on this point.
During the earthly life of Christ, His infused science, taken according as it
found itself, in the sphere of the divinized supraconsciousness, under the
state of final consummation,—was strictly incommunicable. For in the
sphere in question, which was that where reigned the Beatific Vision (a
Beatific Vision which did not invade and did not glorify the entire soul,
and did not replace the reason as immediate rule of the action of the soul,
in short which created in the heights of the soul a sort of closed heaven),
all that which was seized behind the veil was perfectly luminous and at the




 On this point Maritain writes in On the Grace and Humanity, “In the sphere of the
divinized supraconsciousness (where Christ was perfect comprehensor), it embraced all things
absolutely, yes,—in this I am entirely of St. Thomas’s opinion” (94).
267
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 94.
80
I think that there was clearly a certain communication between these two
states [viator and comprehensor] and these two worlds [consciousness and
divinized supraconsciousness]: to be sure, since it is the same nature and
the same faculties which were under the state of comprehensor and under
the state of viator. Hence this communication … But I think that there
was also a certain incommunicability between them, which caused that the
content of the supraconscious heaven of the soul was retained, could not 
pass into the world of consciousness, or of the here-below, except … by
mode of general influx, and of comforting, and of participated light. In
short, there was, so to speak, a partition between the world of the Beatific
Vision and that of the conscious faculties,—but translucid partition which
let pass, through the light of infused science which participated in the
evidence of the vision, as through the virtue and the attractions of the
sovereign peace which reigned in the heaven of the soul, a vivifying
radiance over all the faculties,—proper climate of unity, of the humble but 
absolute certitude of self, of the stability, of the impeccability, of the
superhuman power of the soul of Christ.
268
According to Maritain, the partition separating the two states and worlds of Jesus’ soul is,
in general, impassable, although there are instances where the partition becomes passable.
How does Maritain clarify this seemingly contradictory point?  Maritain indicates that
whether or not the partition is penetrable depends on what is being communicated and
whether the communication is growing toward or descending from the divinized
supraconsciousness.
The content of the divinized supraconsciousness does not descend into the here-
below world of consciousness except by means of infused knowledge. However, the
experiential knowledge and consciousness below the sphere of separation (in the here-
below of Jesus’ soul) is able to grow toward the realm of the divinized
supraconsciousness, especially via Jesus’ prayer. While Maritain indicates that the
divinized supraconsciousness will in fact completely rule the human faculties of Jesus
when he is glorified,
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would not be able to grasp the totality of infused science illuminated by the beatific
vision and present to him in the heaven of his soul under the state of comprehensor. We
have already noted, however, that through infused knowledge under the state of viator,
Jesus’ consciousness participates in the light of the vision in an indirect and limited
fashion.
270
Maritain indicates that infused knowledge in the here-below of Jesus’ soul “did
not cease to grow during His whole earthly life. And at each moment of this
development it extended itself to all that which Jesus had need to know at that
moment.”
271
In the consciousness of Jesus-viator, infused science, utilizing concepts and
ideas experientially acquired, increases in proportion to and with Jesus’ intellectual
growth but does not fully reach the state of comprehensor and the divinized
supraconsciousness until the moment of death on the Cross. Even though infused
knowledge in the consciousness of Jesus-viator is a unique privilege of the hypostatic
union and taking its origins in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor,
it always operates in a connatural manner with the here-below of Jesus’ soul. However,
Maritain indicates that the partition separating the two states and two consciousnesses
was penetrable at certain moments by Jesus-viator through his life of prayer.
It is clear that Maritain wants to maintain the possibility of growth of Jesus-viator
into the realm of Jesus-comprehensor in order to substantiate that the eternal
Word, hypostatically united to a human nature, truly “experiences” a human life.
Although the here-below of the soul of Jesus-viator is comforted by a faint light which
270
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originates in the beatific vision, Maritain insists that Jesus’ human existence is otherwise
genuinely human. This point is especially important to Maritain’s understanding the
eternal Word’s experience of the Paschal Mystery, where Jesus’ conscious awareness
gives way at the moment of death to his divinized supraconsciousness, viator to the state
of comprehensor. However, there comes a time in the life of Jesus where this upward
penetration of the partition through prayer and the descending comforting of light
emanating from the beatific vision is closed off from the here-below consciousness of 
Jesus-viator. Maritain writes:
At that time [the Agony and Passion] Jesus in His prayer could no longer
penetrate with His consciousness into the supraconscious paradise of His
soul; all experience, through His conscious faculties, of this paradise and
of its radiance was refused to Him, it was the night of the spirit at its
absolute supreme degree,—at the moment of the Agony as at that of the
fourth Word on the Cross: Ut quid dereliquisti me?
272
It seems that when Jesus is suffering on the Cross, he is also experiencing in his
conscious awareness a “dark night of the soul,” cut off from any direct divine comfort.
Maritain has already indicated that the consciousness of Jesus-viator only receives a
general comforting and infused knowledge in a manner concomitant to his state of viator
from the radiance of the vision in his divinized supraconsciousness. Beginning with the
Agony in the Garden, this comfort and penetration is closed to his conscious awareness.
Thus, Jesus enters into the Paschal Mystery in a truly human manner devoid of any
special divine comfort, and he experiences death in a connatural manner with the rest of 
humanity. Nonetheless, while Jesus-viator is no longer able to penetrate the partition and
enter into the realm of his divinized supraconsciousness, the human experience of agony
and suffering is wholly appropriated by the Word.  Although the conscious experience of 
272
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Jesus-viator is closed off from the descending comfort of the divinized
supraconsciousness, “the ascending oblique line”
273
 of his conscious experiences as
viator continues to cross the partition to the realm of Jesus’ divinized
supraconsciousness. In this way Maritain can truly affirm that the divine Word has
suffered and died on the Cross.
274
Perhaps an example offered by Maritain will help to make the previous comments
clearer concerning the interaction in Jesus between the infraconsciousness, consciousness
and supraconsciousness divinized by the beatific vision. Maritain writes:
(Imagine that I am in a cellar and am reading there a book by the light of a 
candle. To my left, beyond the circle of light of my candle, there is the
darkness of the cellar, and if I place my book there I cannot distinguish
anything in it, —this is for the infraconscious. And to my right there is a 
ray of the midday sun which, passing through a window and falling on the
surface of some object in the cellar, makes there a zone of dazzling light.
If I transfer my book there I can absolutely not read anything there either,
I am dazzled by the brightness disproportionate to the strength of my eyes.
— This is for the divinized supraconsciousness.)
275
The book being read in the light of the candle is tantamount to the consciousness of the
reader. To the left of the reader in the darkness of the cellar is that which is below the
light of consciousness, the infraconsciousness. To the right of the reader is a bright ray of 
sunlight which is so radiant that it renders the text unreadable, the divinized
supraconsciousness. If the reader places the book in the ray of sunlight, the radiance of 
the light washes out the text of the book and renders it unreadable. If the blinding light of 
the beatific vision were not kept separate from the consciousness of Jesus-viator, he 
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would be unable to experience life in the state of way. Likewise, the infused knowledge
he had in his divinized supraconsciousness could only be communicated to his
consciousness by using “instrumental concepts formed under the light of the agent
intellect.”
276
Excurses: Jesus’ Self-Knowledge … to Unite
It is fitting to conclude this survey of Maritain’s On the Grace and Humanity of 
Jesus by uniting the various aspects of his theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ by
elucidating what Maritain believes Jesus would have been consciously aware of 
concerning himself. In the realm of the divinized supraconsciousness in the heaven of 
the soul of Jesus, the knowledge that he has of himself as being a divine person subsisting
in a human nature is total and absolute. This knowledge, this evidence means that Jesus
does not have the virtue of faith. Maritain writes:
Not having theological faith, it is through the evidence,—but
participated—of the science of Beatific Vision that the infused science of 
Christ caused Him to know the divine things,—His own divinity, His own
procession from the Father, His Incarnation, His redemptive Mission, the
unity in nature of the three divine Persons, the procession of the Holy
Spirit, in short, all the divine Inaccessible which he had to reveal, “tell” to
277
men.
According to Maritain’s theory, in the heaven of the soul of Jesus, the divinized
supraconsciousness under the state of comprehensor would include the highest degree of 
knowledge possible in Jesus’ human intellect. As such, Jesus would not only have divine
certainty of all created things but would also have absolute certainty of himself as a 
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divine person, i.e., the second person of the holy Trinity. “Insofar as comprehensor, He
knew Himself God through the Vision, in seeing the divine essence and His own divine
Person and the Father with whom He is one.”
278
  Through the mediation of infused
knowledge, in the divinized supraconsciousness (in the state of comprehensor) his
created intellect would have been aware of the truth of his divine identity, albeit in vastly
different degrees. Recall that Maritain has already indicated, following the scholastics,
that the beatific vision is inaccessible to any created intellect and requires some form of 
mediation in order to be utilized by that intellect. In the state of comprehensor and Jesus’
divinized supraconsciousness, the knowledge of his divine person, according to Maritain,
would be absolute by virtue of its origin in the beatific vision. But how does this absolute
knowledge of himself find its way into the here-below of the soul of Jesus-viator?
In the consciousness and here-below of the soul of Jesus, Maritain believes that
Jesus’ knowledge of his divine identity would have emerged rather quickly and begun the
moment he was aware of himself as an individual being in the world. Maritain does not 
restrict his theory to trying to explain the intellectual knowledge of Jesus-viator. He
devotes a special section to Jesus’ consciousness understood in a much broader sense.
Maritain first clarifies that consciousness amounts to two kinds of knowledge of self. He
writes that the intellectual knowledge that we have of ourselves is not the same as our 
conscious awareness of ourselves. Intellectual knowledge of self occurs by reflecting on 
action. Consciousness, however, is “experimental and perceived (by reversion on acts);
this is an obscure knowledge and which of itself is inexpressible in concepts.”
279
  Thus
we have two kinds of knowledge of ourselves which Maritain clarifies by way of an
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example. He notes that before he had formed the conceptual knowledge of being a man
he already had the “obscurely perceived content of the consciousness” of being a man.
280
Through a later reflection on this obscure knowledge the agent intellect presents to the
intellect the concept of the self acting as a man.
281
  Maritain then applies this directly to
Jesus. He notes that along with this “obscure and inexpressible” knowledge of himself,
Jesus would also experience himself “through the lived experience of His absolute
impeccability, of His faultless wisdom, as also through the ineffable memory of that
which He had experienced in prayer,—He had consciousness of the fact that He
transcended the human condition, and that there was in Him something divine.”
282
In his
daily action Jesus would reflect his divine status without necessarily having this status
present in his conscious awareness. Applying Maritain’s personal example to Jesus,
being consciously aware of being God is not necessarily the same as being intellectually
aware of being God.
Returning to the consciousness of Jesus-viator, Maritain indicates that by the time
Jesus reached the age of twelve and was found in the Temple by the Blessed Mother and
St. Joseph (Luke 2.41-52), Maritain is clear that Jesus “… was in full possession, even
conceptual, of His knowledge of the things of God, and of His consciousness of Himself
as God.”
283
  Addressing the here-below consciousness of Jesus, Maritain writes:
I have already noted that the knowledge through infused science that Jesus
had of His own divinity developed during the childhood of Jesus probably
very quickly. This is to say that the consciousness that Jesus had of His
own divinity also developed very quickly in the course of His childhood.
And if this was so, it is not only owing to the natural intuitivity
proper to the child, it is also for a more profound reason, because it is
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entirely unthinkable that the fact of being God should have one day
irrupted into the consciousness of an adolescent who up to that moment
would have had consciousness of Himself without being yet informed of 
such a fact, while on the other hand the idea of God would have already
taken form in Him. He would have been simply crushed by such a
revelation (before which, besides, He would have taken Himself for a
mere man, and,—another impossibility in that which concerns Christ,—
would have to that extent been in error).
284
Maritain states that Jesus’ awareness of his divine identity in his human consciousness
originates in his awareness of himself as being a divine person subsisting in a human
nature. Maritain writes, “all His human activity, including that of His free will, was the
instrument of the divine Word … just as our activity is the instrument of our created
person…and the human consciousness of Jesus held the Word as His own I just as our 
consciousness holds our created person to be our own I,”
285
 adding that “He had thus … 
consciousness of Himself as of a divine person, He had consciousness of being the Word
Incarnate.”
286
While this may seem like a controversial claim to make, recall Maritain’s
principle of the asymptote as he applies it to growth in the human soul of Jesus under two
differing states of viator and comprehensor. While Jesus experiences the limitations
appropriate to any created human nature, he is nonetheless hypostatically united to the
divine Word. As such, his human nature is unique because of its union with the Word
and also grants him certain privileges particular to his person. The beatific vision is the
most obvious privilege unique to the humanity of Jesus under the state of comprehensor.
According to Maritain’s theory, however, as a result of the beatific vision and the
corresponding infused knowledge which makes the vision “knowable” in the human
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intellect of Jesus Christ, at any given point in the asymptote’s vertical ascent from birth to
death, Jesus would have the fullness of knowledge and grace possible at that point along
the curve.
With this clarification in mind, Maritain writes, “The knowledge that Christ,
insofar as viator, had of His divinity and of His mission and of the other supernatural
truths hidden in the glory of God, was the highest knowledge possible of infused
science.”
287
  Recall also that for Maritain, the infused knowledge of Jesus-viator operates
according to his intellectual capacities proper to him at any given point or stage in his
life. As a result, Maritain leaves open the possibility of growth in Jesus, including the
conscious knowledge he has of himself.
288
  Maritain writes, “What seems to me, in any
case, is that it had already attained its point of perfect maturity at the time when He
remained in the Temple,”
289
 but he immediately adds, “The consciousness that Jesus had
of His divinity was to be much higher still at the time of the Last Supper and of the
appearance before Caiphas. What I mean is that at twelve years of age, before the
Doctors, He had already, with the full consciousness of His divinity, a science of the
divine things more perfect and more ample that that of any man here on earth.”
290
In the
here-below of his soul as viator, Maritain maintains that Jesus’ certain knowledge of 
himself is the result of infused knowledge stemming from the light of the beatific vision
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and operating within the parameters of his ordinary human knowledge.
In fact, He [Jesus] knew certainly, and in the most perfect manner,
His divinity though the Beatific Vision, but the Vision was shut up in the
supraconscious paradise of His soul, and, moreover, it was by essence
absolutely simple and absolutely inexpressible in any idea. It is not,
therefore, through the Vision that He could know in the sphere of the here-
below of His soul, and know so as to express it to Himself, that He was
God. It is on the infused science, itself participating in the evidence of the
Vision, that depends this knowledge that Christ as viator had of His
divinity (and, at the same time, of His mission).
291
Maritain’s theory of the multi-faceted world of consciousness in Jesus enables
him to maintain that, while Jesus-viator is aware of his divine identity in his human
consciousness, that awareness is still finite and limited (in proportion to the capacity of 
his human nature) and thus able to increase over time. As has already been stated, this
does not mean that at any given time Jesus was not aware of his divine identity. Rather,
it affirms that the conscious awareness Jesus has of himself increases in proportion to his
experiences and intellectual development. According to Maritain, this increase comes to
full fruition when, dying on the Cross, the here-below consciousness of Jesus-viator gives
way to the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor.
292
  From the moment of 
death, Jesus’ soul is hereafter in the state of comprehensor and solely ruled by his
divinized supraconsciousness. This brings to an end the possibility of growth in Jesus’
human nature, as it would for you or me.
In Maritain’s theory of consciousness Jesus is always aware of his divine identity,
although in different degrees depending on whether he is referring to the state of Jesus as
comprehensor (and thus referring to his divinized supraconsciousness) or viator (and thus
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referring to his consciousness). Even while maintaining real human growth in Jesus’
consciousness as viator, Maritain firmly maintains that through infused knowledge, he is
aware of himself as being a divine person. Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of 
Jesus allows him to concurrently affirm that Jesus is truly God, while at the same time
living a truly human existence.
B. Further Works
The Degrees of Knowledge (1932)
The Degrees of Knowledge is considered Maritain’s greatest work. As cited
earlier, according to McInerny it “remains both his major achievement and a convenient
summary of his thought.”
293
  One would be remiss to enter into a discussion of Maritain’s
thought without consulting or including The Degrees of Knowledge in that discussion.
Indeed, Maritain’s epistemological tome offers two helpful clarifications to his theory of
the consciousness of Christ. However, both of these clarifications, as will be seen, come
from the appendices and not the main text itself. The question is, then, how the main text
of The Degrees of Knowledge relates to the appendices and Maritain’s later writings,
specifically On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus.  Unfortunately, this is a difficult
question to answer for the simple reason that even a brief survey of such a large, detailed
work is sure to fall short of doing it any real justice and lies outside the stated intention of 
this work. Fortunately, there is a secondary work that summarizes Maritain’s
epistemological thought in The Degrees of Knowledge in light of his theory of
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consciousness that we can look to for assistance, James Arraj’s “Mysticism, Metaphysics
and Maritain.”
294
Arraj summarizes the progression in Maritain’s thought throughout The Degrees
of Knowledge as being rooted in the fundamental affirmation that being exists, and by
existing it is able to be known.
295
  Maritain then develops this point to show that through
a natural knowledge of things (i.e., being exists) one is led to a metaphysical knowledge
of things (i.e., there is more to being than existence). In other words, by affirming that
something exists, our “intuition of being” moves from seeing the existence of some thing
to a recognition that there is something “more” to that being, its essence.
296
  Thus
Maritain moves his reader from the concrete existence of things to what lies behind them,
ultimately coming to God.
297
  Arraj summarizes Maritain thus:
We have arrived much closer to our goal of understanding Maritain’s
metaphysical contemplation. It is going to be a contemplation that gazes
into the very ontological depths of things where the very what or essence
of things shows its deepest face, which is existence. And this existing
essence, this existent, draws us further to the center of the mystery of 
being where God dwells. In the metaphysics of Maritain, as in that of St.
Thomas, the question of God is not something added to it from the outside
out of some misplaced piety, but it emerges as its absolute center as we
pursue the most obvious of facts, the what and that of things, to their final
conclusion.
298
Arraj further explains that according to Maritain, this metaphysical knowledge of things
serves as the basis of both natural and supernatural mysticism. The main difference
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between the two is that supernatural mysticism looks at what is concrete in this world—
individual beings—through the eyes of faith, while natural mysticism does not.
299
  More
simply, whereas the intellect is able to grasp the existence and the essence of things, it is
faith and grace that elevates such knowledge to a mystical contemplation of God.
300
Hence Arraj concludes that The Degrees of Knowledge begins with knowing things as
they are (existence), moves to a metaphysical understanding of things (essences), and
then proceeds to the ultimate goal of all human knowing, the contemplation of God.
301
It
is from this basis that one must view all Maritain’s subsequent writings.
So how can we relate Maritain’s epistemological tome to his later writings, in
particular On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus? Arraj sees a decisive turn in Maritain’s
thinking with the publication of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. It is at this point
that he begins to move from the objective evaluation of knowledge as such to an
evaluation of its subjective manifestation, specifically in the artist and poet. Arraj writes,
“… but when we reach Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry the emphasis is on the
subjectivity of the artist and the creative processes that take place there.”
302
  This is
especially true of the development by Maritain of his psychological theory of the human
person, which reaches its most mature expression and development On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus. Maritain has not abandoned his earlier work on epistemology.
Rather, he builds on it in his examination of poetic intuition and supraconscious knowing.
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With this brief survey in mind we are contextually better prepared to examine the two
clarifications present in the appendices of The Degrees of Knowledge.
Even though Maritain’s work on epistemology, The Degrees of Knowledge,
predates On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus by almost three decades, as stated earlier it
offers two noteworthy clarifications to Maritain’s later theory of the consciousness of 
Christ. The first clarification The Degrees of Knowledge offers Maritain’s theory of
Jesus’ consciousness concerns the manner in which the beatific vision can be known by a 
created and finite intellect, namely by means of analogous concepts and language. The
second clarification concerns the manner in which Maritain seeks to understand the
divine person of the Word subsisting in and acting through a human nature in light of St.
Thomas’ theology and philosophy.
303
As noted previously, in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus Maritain maintains
that infused knowledge in the here-below of the soul of Jesus-viator utilizes concepts and
ideas experientially acquired in order to make intelligible eternal truths emanating from
the beatific vision. Infused knowledge in the here-below of the soul of Jesus thus
operates in a concurrent manner with his human intellectual capabilities. According to
Maritain in his appendices to The Degrees of Knowledge, Jesus sees the vision of God
(understood in his human intellect by means of infused knowledge) in the heaven of his
soul, but nonetheless does not “know” God’s essence directly. Rather, Jesus “knows”
303
 The 1954 edition of The Degrees of Knowledge included the small supplemental,
“Further Elucidations,” (458-468) to “Appendix IV: On the Notion of Subsistence.”
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God’s essence in his human intellect through analogy and human concepts.
304
Concerning the analogy of being, Maritain writes, “In analogy of attribution there
is a princeps analogatorum whose notion is included in that of all the other analogates … 
because all those analogates are only made known through the diverse relations they have
to the supreme analogate [God].”
305
  While Maritain indicates that anyone can understand
the interconnection of things and their relation to the Creator, the effects of sin influence
the mind’s ability to reason through and know such things. In Jesus, however, the truth
of creation as it relates to the Creator is not affected by sin. In this understanding, Jesus’
mind is freer, and with the help of infused knowledge, he sees with greatest clarity the
interconnection of things in creation as they relate to their Creator. Jesus’ unique ability
to understand the unity of the created world and its relationship to the Creator is itself
related to the particular privilege of having the beatific vision in his human soul under the
state of comprehensor.
For other members of the human race (under the wages of sin), the analogy of
being may enable the created intellect to know that “God is” through the analogy of 
creation and the Creator, but seeing the divine truth of creation and its relationship to God
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in such a full manner is unique to Jesus alone.
306
  However, after death it is possible for a 
created intellect to “see” the beatific vision of God directly, albeit any “knowledge” the
mind has comes from infused knowledge, making intellectually accessible what is
otherwise inaccessible. In Jesus, however, these two states of experiencing creation and
seeing their implicit unity occur at one and the same time.
As a result of this, Maritain states that when Jesus sees the beatific vision in the
“sur-conscious or super-conscious,” he has divine certitude of what he sees (since the
light of the vision made intelligible through infused knowledge cannot be false).
However, in the mode proper to Jesus-viator, infused knowledge enables him to know 
“with communicable and reflexively conscious knowledge” his divine identity, mission,
creation, etc.
307
 So how does Jesus communicate the knowledge that he has of the beatific
vision mediated through infused knowledge to others?  As mentioned previously,
whereas the human mind can by analogy come to understand that “God is,” in Jesus such
knowledge is already present to him by means of infused knowledge originating in the
beatific vision. Note here that the Gospels indicate that in his public ministry, Jesus
frequently had recourse to analogous language in order to make divine truths intelligible
to others as he understood them in his consciousness and divinized
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knowledge remains partial and incomplete compared to the unity and totality of the beatific
vision.
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In Maritain’s view, when one understands Jesus’ use of human analogies to
convey to others what he knows divinely, one comes to a greater understanding of Jesus’
use of parables or even the “Kingdom of Heaven” sayings of Matthew 13.  When Jesus
declares that the Kingdom of Heaven is like a farmer planting, a mustard seed growing,
or yeast leavening, he is translating into finite human language and images infinite truths
originating in the beatific vision and present to his mind in the form of infused
knowledge. Nonetheless, Maritain is making the point that, while Jesus’ analogous
language is true, one cannot consider such analogous examples stemming from human
conceptual knowledge as being tantamount to a direct understanding of God’s essence.
In explaining the knowledge we have of God’s essence, Maritain writes, “Let us conclude
that we should not say, purely and simply: ‘We do not know what God is,’ but rather,
‘We do not know what God is in Himself.’  Nor should we say purely and simply, ‘We
know what God is,’ but rather, ‘We know imperfectly what God is, without being able to
grasp His essence in itself.’”
309
Although in this particular citation Maritain is not speaking of Jesus’ awareness, I
believe that he would affirm, in a nuanced manner, that it holds true for Jesus’ use of 
analogous language under the state of viator. Jesus’ created intellect, like any other
created intellect, would not have been able to directly grasp the expanse of the divine
308
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essence except through analogous human concepts. Even in the divinized
supraconsciousness of the soul of Jesus-comprehensor, there would remain an inherent
intellectual inability to “know” the divine essence without the assistance of conceptual
images. What is peculiar to Jesus as both viator and comprehensor is that his intellectual
knowledge is aided by the light of the beatific vision and thus affords him a greater
clarity in understanding the relationship of creation to God and the ability analogously to
reveal aspects of the divine to others. Thus, while analogous language is limited and
finite, it can help to reveal to created intellects some understanding of God, albeit in a 
limited, finite manner.
The second point in The Degrees of Knowledge that offers some clarification to
Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ concerns the way in which
Maritain understands Jesus as being the divine person of the Word subsisting in a human
nature. Maritain writes:
… the Incarnate Word lives and acts according as He is God, or in virtue
of the Divine Nature, within the uncreated Trinity.  He lives and acts
according as He is man, or by His human nature, among us on earth. In
His terrestrial life He has lived and acted in all things by His human nature
and its operations—acting also to be sure by His Divine Nature but 
precisely insofar as it uses, as instrument, the human nature and human
operations … It is by His humanity, or always humanly, always by the
exercise of His human operations—moved by the divinity more perfectly
than any purely human man could be—that the Son of God has
accomplished everything He did here below, has spoken, acted, suffered,
accomplished His divine mission.
310
Throughout On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, Maritain has sought to establish an
authentically human theory of consciousness as applied to the human nature of Jesus. At
the same time, he respects what he understands to be the unity of the divine person of the
310
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Word to that human nature. Maritain does not deviate from St. Thomas in holding that
nature receives (or expresses) the essence of a thing, and that it is the supposit or person
who then exercises the nature.
311
In Jesus Christ, however, the eternal Word acts in a 
different manner according to the mode proper to either the divine or human nature.
A final remark can be made on the subject of the Thomist theory of 
subsistence or of supposit. It is the supposit that lives and acts only by
nature. Hence, it follows that Christ the Person, who is Divine, lives and
acts at once in two totally distinct orders: on the one hand, in virtue of the
Divine Nature with which it is identical; on the other hand, in virtue of the
human nature which it has assumed.
312
The human nature of Jesus Christ always operates in a manner connatural to the
hypostatic union with the divine person and not as a separate entity artificially joined to
the divine nature of the Word. Maritain writes, “Because the subsistence of the Word is
an infinite subsistence, It can receive in Itself the human nature of Christ, a created
substantial quo (without a created personality) which subsists and exists by the Divine
Subsistence and the Divine Existence themselves.”
313
  However, although the human
nature is assumed and subsists in the divine person of the eternal Word, when the Word
operates through that human nature, he must do so within the confines of that nature’s
abilities and limitations. Thus, while the Word’s subsistence is eternal (that is, a divine
essence fully in act), as it subsists in the human nature it operates in a manner consistent
with the limitations of a nature not fully in act but also in potency. So even though the
divine person of the Word can assume a human nature and function according to its
limitations, the inverse is not the case, because the finitude of human nature would not 
allow for an infinite subsistence. In Maritain’s opinion, there is only one personal
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existence in Jesus Christ, and that is the eternal Word who also exercises his existence in
a human nature.
314
Maritain is seemingly asserting (in contradiction to theories like Déodat de Basly
and other proponents of extreme Antiochene Christologies) that in Jesus, there is a single
person who is acting through both the human and divine natures and not two persons
acting separately. What has already been made clear in Maritain’s theory of
consciousness in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus is that there is only one acting
subject, the Word, operating in accord with two distinct natures. This point is an
essential element to Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ.
In his theory Maritain affirms that there is only one supposit or person (the Word)
acting in both a divine and human nature, allowing Maritain to affirm that the Word
really “does experience” genuine human activities through that assumed human nature.
315
Nonetheless, when the divine person of the Word acts in that human nature, he 
encounters all the limitations proper to a created soul and intellect. This brings into focus
the scholastic theory of the threefold knowledge of Jesus and the limitations of the
beatific vision and infused knowledge in Jesus’ human intellect. It is interesting that in
an addition attached to Appendix IV in the 1954 edition of The Degrees of Knowledge,
one can already see in embryonic form Maritain’s fundamental thesis of Jesus’
consciousness that will later be laid out in greater detail in On the Grace and Humanity of 
Jesus. Concerning the exchange of knowledge between the divine person of the Word
and the assumed human nature Maritain writes:
Hence it follows that the uncreated divine science that He possessed as
God did not enter into His human knowledge and His terrestrial life. And
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according as He was man that which pertained to His state as
comprehensor was reserved, so to say, for heaven by reason of the
exigencies of His state as viator. Even the share of His human soul in the
Divine Life—the beatific vision which it enjoyed here below—remained a 
paradise above, sealed off from its faculties … For, indeed, the beatific
vision, being of itself strictly ineffable, shone on the highest part of the
soul without being expressed in any concept or communicable idea.
316
As I indicated earlier, Maritain insists that the topic of Jesus’ consciousness was one that
both he and Raïssa had been thinking about for a long time, and the above-mentioned
quote from The Degrees of Knowledge shows that the theory articulated by Maritain in
On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus was already beginning to take form as early as
1954. While these two clarifications from The Degrees of Knowledge may seem
relatively inconsequential, namely that Jesus’ human knowledge is informed by and
expresses divine truths through analogous language and concepts, and that there is a 
single person who acts through both the natures in Jesus, both of these points further
elucidate Maritain’s theory of consciousness in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus.
In summary it should be noted that Maritain’s intention in explicating a theory of
knowledge and consciousness in Jesus is not a purely academic endeavor. At the
beginning of The Degrees of Knowledge, Maritain states that “metaphysics is not the
doorway to mystical contemplation. That door is Christ’s humanity, for by Him we have
been given grace and truth.”
317
In better understanding the humanity of Jesus, one is
drawn into a deeper, connatural union with God, something both Jacques and Raïssa
sought after their entire lives.
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Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (1952)
One of the fundamental questions that Maritain addresses in Creative Intuition in
Art and Poetry is how the poet or artist is able to synthesize the totality of human
experience and create a particular work of art that captures and expresses some
mysterious aspect of the created order. In the process of exploring this topic, Maritain
continues to build upon the explanation of the spiritual unconscious, which he began in
The Degrees of Knowledge and brought to full fruition in On the Grace and Humanity of 
Jesus. There are two significant points of synthesis that appear in Creative Intuition in
Art and Poetry that illuminate his theory of the spiritual unconscious, especially as they
relate to his theory of the consciousness of Jesus.
The first point of clarification concerns the way in which Maritain understands the
three degrees of consciousness. While he explains in On the Grace and Humanity of 
Jesus the various notions of consciousness, he is far more detailed in his explanations of 
them in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. Maritain goes to great lengths to explain his
understanding of the various states of consciousness, especially supraconsciousness, in
Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. The main reason Maritain offers such a detailed
explanation of his theory of consciousness is that it is fundamental to his theory of poetic
intuition, which we will examine shortly. For the present, however, it is best to let
Maritain articulate his theory of the unconscious in his own words.
There are two kinds of unconscious, two great domains of psychological
activity screened from the grasp of consciousness: the preconscious of the
spirit in its living springs, and the unconscious of blood and flesh,
instincts, tendencies, complexes, repressed images and desires, traumatic
memories, as constituting a closed or autonomous dynamic whole. I
would like to designate the first kind of unconscious by the name of 
spiritual or, for the sake of Plato, musical unconscious or preconscious;
and the second by the name of automatic unconscious or deaf
102
unconscious—deaf to the intellect, and structured into a world of its own
apart from the intellect.
318
What Maritain is here referring to as the “automatic or deaf unconscious,” on the one 
hand, and the “preconscious of the spirit in its living springs,” on the other, he will later
refer to as “infraconsciousness” and “supraconsciousness” in On the Grace and
Humanity of Jesus. While the automatic, or deaf, unconscious is a fairly straightforward
notion and has already been previously examined, his understanding of the preconscious
of the spirit requires further explanation. Maritain believes the spiritual unconscious to
be the place of intellectual and sensible synthesis along with its being the place of God’s
dwelling in the human person. The preconscious of the spirit is rooted in the depths of 
the human soul where all the soul’s powers, both intellectual and sensible, converge.
Although this preconscious of the spirit lies beyond the realm of conscious awareness, it
can and does, nonetheless, penetrate into conscious awareness.
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Maritain speaks of the preconscious of the spirit as a separate entity from
consciousness in a manner consistent with his theory. Maritain discusses the “above” and
“below” states thus:
Reason does not only consist of its conscious logical tools and
manifestations, nor does the will consist only of its deliberate conscious
determinations. Far beneath the sunlit surface thronged with explicit
concepts and judgments, words and expressed resolutions or movements
of the will, are the sources of knowledge and creativity, of love and
suprasensuous desires, hidden in the primordial translucid night of the
intimate vitality of the soul. Thus it is that we must recognize the
existence of an unconscious or preconscious which pertains to the spiritual
powers of the human soul … a spiritual or musical unconscious which is
specifically different from the automatic or deaf unconscious.
320
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Maritain explains this further and likens the synthetic and creative powers of the
preconscious of the spirit in the human person to the creative powers of God illuminating
the darkness during creation. Maritain writes that we must:
… realize that there exists a deep nonconscious world of activity, for the
intellect and the will, from which the acts and fruits of human
consciousness and the clear perceptions of the mind emerge, and that the
universe of concepts, logical connections, rational discursus and rational
deliberation, in which the activity of the intellect takes definite form and
shape, is preceded by the hidden workings of an immense and primal
preconscious life. Such a life develops in night, but in a night which is
translucid and fertile, and resembles that primeval diffused light which
was created first, before God made, as the Genesis puts it, “lights in the
firmament of heaven to divide the day from the night” so as to be “for
signs, and for seasons, and for days and years.”
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The preconscious of the spirit is above both the infraconsciousness (the automatic or deaf
unconscious) and conscious awareness, yet it does not operate independently from either
one of them.
322
  Everything sensible and intellectual, whether explicitly or implicitly
acquired, becomes a part of the material of the preconscious of the spirit.
323
  Thus, things
below conscious awareness in the infraconsciousness and things present within the
conscious awareness both “feed” into and sustain the preconscious of the spirit.
Maritain understood that his theory of consciousness was not, in fact, verifiable,
although he considered it to be a probable philosophical theory. In explaining his theory
of consciousness, he has recourse to St. Thomas’ epistemology, which serves as both an
analogy to and an integral part of his theory. Maritain points out that, in St. Thomas, the
intellect is a spiritual reality where the Knowing Intellect receives images and such from
the senses (as spiritual “germs”) and are then transformed by the Illuminating Intellect
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  The Knowing Intellect and the Illuminating Intellect, according to
Maritain, are philosophical notions that are solidly grounded within the greater context of 
St. Thomas’ epistemological system but remain, nonetheless, speculative explanations of 
human knowing. Maritain uses this as an example and relates it to what he is doing on a 
much grander scale concerning his theory of consciousness, especially the preconscious
of the spirit. Thus, Maritain writes,
… we possess in ourselves the Illuminating Intellect, a spiritual sun
ceaselessly radiating, which activates everything in intelligence, and
whose light causes all our ideas to arise in us, and whose energy permeates
every operation of our mind. And this primal source of light cannot be 
seen by us; it remains concealed in the unconscious of the spirit.
Furthermore, it illuminates with its spiritual light the images from
which our concepts are drawn. And this very process of illumination is
unknown to us, it takes place in the unconscious; and often these very
images, without which there is no thought, remain also unconscious or 
scarcely perceived in the process, at least for the most part.
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Maritain adds:
Well, if there is in the spiritual unconscious a nonconceptual or 
preconceptual activity of the intellect even with regard to the birth of 
concepts, we can with greater reason assume that such a nonconceptual
activity of the intellect, such a nonrational activity of reason, in the
spiritual unconscious, plays an essential part in the genesis of poetry and
poetic inspiration. Thus a place is prepared in the highest parts of the soul,
in the primeval translucid night where intelligence stirs the images under
the light of the Illuminating Intellect.
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What makes the preconscious of the spirit different from the Illuminating Intellect is that
it is not just an intellectual operation but includes the totality of the human subject,
intellectual and emotional, things consciously present to the knower along with things
that remain hidden in the unconscious. Although done in a more subtle manner than was
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the case in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, Maritain uses the modern understanding
of consciousness to push further one or more of St. Thomas’ thesis.
In the current example, however, Maritain writes, “My contention, then, is that
everything depends, in the issue we are discussing, on the recognition of the existence of 
a spiritual unconscious, or rather, preconscious, of which Plato and the ancient wise men
were well aware, and the disregard of which in favor of the Freudian unconscious alone is
a sign of the dullness of our times.”
327
  As we will show momentarily, one must
understand Maritain’s theory of the spiritual unconscious in order to understand his
theory of poetic intuition, the latter being rooted in the former. To summarize then,
according to Maritain the preconscious of the spirit (what he will later call
supraconsciousness) is that place where all the powers of the human soul converge, the
intellectual, imaginative, and sensual.
328
  From this convergence springs poetic intuition,
our second point.
The second point of clarification concerns the manner in which poetic or creative
intuition emerges from the unconscious of the poet, bringing into consciousness things
which were previously outside the realm of conscious awareness.
329
   This point, it seems
to me, is extremely important for understanding how the infused knowledge of Jesus-
comprehensor comes to be known in the consciousness of Jesus-viator. Maritain’s
theory of poetic intuition is rooted in the recesses of the preconscious of the spirit.
Maritain writes, “In poetic intuition objective reality and subjectivity, the world and the
whole of the soul, coexist inseparably. At that moment sense and sensation are brought
327
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back to the heart, blood to spirit, passion to intuition. And through the vital though
nonconceptual actuation of the intellect all the powers of the soul are also actuated in
their roots.”
330
  This intuition, which occurs in the preconscious of the spirit, “… is both
creative and cognitive, can be considered especially either as creative, and therefore, with
respect to the engendering of the work, or as cognitive, and therefore with respect to what
is grasped by it.”
331
  While it seems that poetic intuition by name is geared towards some
aspect of artistic making, Maritain indicates that poetic intuition is also a grasping by the
poet of some mysterious aspect of creation within the poet’s soul. Maritain writes:
Poetic intuition is directed toward concrete existence as connatural to the
soul pierced by a given emotion: that is to say, each time toward some
singular existent, toward some complex of concrete and individual reality,
seized in the violence of its sudden self-assertion and in the total unicity of 
its passage in time … poetic intuition does not stop at this given existent;
it goes beyond, and infinitely beyond. Precisely because it has no 
conceptualized object, it tends and extends to the infinite, it tends toward
all the reality.
332
In an instant of poetic intuition, what occurs in the preconscious of the spirit is not 
just an existential grasp of this or that thing, but is also a metaphysical glimpse into the
objective reality of this or that thing as it stands in relation to the Creator. “Things are
not only what they are. They ceaselessly pass beyond themselves, and give more than
they have, because from all sides they are permeated by the activating influx of the Prime
Cause.”
333
  Such knowledge, however, is not tantamount to a mathematical formula that
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can be explained and demonstrated in a cogent manner. Rather, poetic intuition is a more
obscure but nonetheless real knowledge.
334
Maritain writes, “Thus poetic experience is, emerging on the verge of the spiritual
preconscious, a state of obscure, unexpressed and sapid knowing—the expression of 
which, when later on it will come about in a work, will also be sapid.”
335
  While it is clear
that everybody is not an artist or a poet, Maritain insists that although not everybody
experiences poetic intuition they have the ability within them. In fact, Maritain rather
forcefully asserts that most people “murder” the creative or poetic capacity and
inclination within themselves, leaving only a select few to experience it.
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Perhaps the reason most people fail to experience poetic intuition has more to do 
with the metaphysical aspect Maritain attaches to it than anything else. He writes that the
preconscious of the spirit and poetic intuition
… tends from the very start to a kind of revelation … but to a humble
revelation, virtually contained in a small lucid cloud of inescapable
intuition, both of the Self of the poet and of some particular flash of reality
in the God-made universe; a particular flash of reality bursting forth in its
unforgettable individuality, but infinite in its meanings and echoing
capacity.
337
In grasping some inexplicable aspect of creation, the poet also grasps his own mysterious
relationship with creation and the Creator. Understood in this manner, the poetic spark is
not just a glimpse into the deeper reality of creation but into the deeper reality of the
poet’s experience of God in creation. Thus, we see that, according to Maritain, poetic
intuition occurs in the recesses of the preconscious of the spirit with those who are docile
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and open to the metaphysical realities of the world around them. While the preconscious
of the spirit (later recast as supraconsciousness) is that aspect within the human soul
where the soul’s faculties and powers come together, poetic intuition is that moment
when they allow for a glimpse into the inner-connection and depths contained within the
poet himself and the world around him.
Although the following two quotes are long, it is best to allow Maritain to
summarize these two points, the preconscious of the spirit and poetic intuition, from
Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, both of which help to clarify aspects of his thought
in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus. The first quote captures in a succinct manner his
theory of the threefold understanding of consciousness, by considering images:
… there are for the images three possible states of existential conditions.
First, they can be part of the “externals of the imagination”—I mean
engaged in the ordinary, quotidian, and more or less superficial life of the
imagination as centered on sense perception and the needs of our
conscious daily activity, as well as of our rational knowledge of the
external world (Category number one). Second, they can be part of what
we called the automatic or deaf unconscious, where they are cut off from
the intellect and engaged in the structures and dynamism of the separate
world in which instincts, repressed memories and tendencies, dreams, and
libido lead a life of their own (Category number two). Third, they can be 
part of the preconscious life of the intellect in which they are illuminated
by the Illuminating Intellect—either to be used in the genesis of concepts
and abstract ideas or to be stirred and activated by poetic intuition
(Category number three).”
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Finally, according to Maritain poetic intuition originates in the preconscious of the spirit
and makes it possible for the poet to grasp the deeper reality of this or that thing. In a
very limited manner some of that intuition emerges from the depths of the preconscious
of the spirit into the poet’s consciousness. Maritain writes:
Poetic intuition is born in this preconscious, preconceptual activity; it
involves an obscure, emotive knowledge, ineffable and
338
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unconceptualizable in itself. It stirs the intuitive pulsions, both imaginal
and emotional, of which I spoke at the beginning, so as to make its
mysterious content known or seen in a manner, and brought to
consciousness. The images thus stirred are themselves in a state of 
fluidity—not organized but movable by every wind—and part of the
preconscious life of the spirit.
339
From this one can see that for Maritain poetic intuition is a more fluid and abstract
knowledge. When applied to Jesus the presence of this kind of non-conceptual
knowledge through an instance of poetic intuition would directly influence and effect his
actions and encounters with other people. Understood in this manner poetic intuition
would also be revealed through the creative actions of the knower. These clarifications
allow us to view Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus with more clarity.
Before moving to Polanyi’s epistemology and theory of tacit knowledge, a synthesis of 
the previous sections will bring greater clarity to Maritain’s theory of the consciousness
of Christ.
C.  Synthesis
 Maritain’s theory of poetic intuition is directly related to and springs forth from
his theory of the preconscious of the spirit (i.e., supraconsciousness) and is of particular
interest to our examination of his theory of the consciousness of Christ. Maritain’s
theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ has already been examined, including his
theory that Jesus’ supraconsciousness is unique in him because it is divinized by the light
of the beatific vision. It has also been noted that the infused knowledge of Jesus-
comprehensor and the infused knowledge of Jesus-viator are both rooted in the beatific
339
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vision. Maritain indicates that infused knowledge in Jesus-viator operates in a manner
consistent with genuine intellectual and personal growth. Thus, he postulates that at any
given point in Jesus’ life, infused knowledge operates in a manner connatural with his
human intellect and thus grants Jesus the fullness of knowledge possible at any particular
point throughout his life, while that knowledge remains limited in mode and extent.
It is in regard to this particular point that Maritain’s theory of poetic intuition
further clarifies his theory of the divinized supraconsciousness in Jesus. While in Jesus
the preconscious of the spirit is divinized and thus has the highest possible degree of
clarity, what would otherwise be a rare illumination of poetic intuition is, unimpeded by
sin and illuminated by the beatific vision, an intense existential and metaphysical clarity
in the supraconsciousness of Jesus-viator. In the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-
comprehensor, there would be an absolute clarity for Jesus of all things, both as things
exist in creation as a part of the created order (existentially) and as they exist in creation
concerning their ultimate end and relationship with the Creator (metaphysically).
It has already been pointed out that in Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of 
Jesus Christ, what is in his divinized supraconsciousness is mediated to the consciousness
of Jesus-viator by infused knowledge. Even so, while poetic intuition would function in
Jesus-viator according to a limited and finite human intellect, it would still operate in a 
manner far superior to that of any other human intellect. The reason for this is twofold.
First, Maritain has already indicated that the light of the beatific vision, present in the
intellect of Jesus, penetrates the partition separating the supraconscious and the
consciousness in Jesus. Consequently, the creative or poetic spark within Jesus’




  The second reason that this would be unique to Jesus is that, unlike
other human beings, Jesus is sinless. Whereas Maritain indicates that, in human beings,
poetic intuition is inhibited by the egoism of the poet,
341
 in the sinless God-man there
would be no such egoism. Hence, in the consciousness of Jesus, who lives his life
completely for the Father and for others, poetic intuition would function freely and
without the limitations brought about by sin. Thus, in the consciousness of Jesus-viator
the existential and metaphysical grasp of things initiated by poetic intuition in his
divinized supraconsciousness would penetrate the partition between the two states and
grant to him the greatest clarity possible of this or that thing.
Viewing Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus in On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus in light of his epistemological theory in The Degrees of Knowledge
and his theory of art and poetry in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, we are better able
to discern the interaction of the threefold knowledge of Jesus within his conscious
awareness. It is also clearer to see that the natural progression of Maritain’ theory of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ, united with his theory of poetic intuition, establishes Jesus
as the foremost poet, something his wife Raïssa would certainly have appreciated. What
remains to be seen is how Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge helps clarify the manner in
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When a creative or poetic intuition occurs in the preconscious of the spirit, it does not 
automatically well up in to the consciousness of the individual except in an obscure and limited
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in his poetry was but a fragment of what was originally in his preconscious of the spirit.
Therefore, it is no surprise that in the here-below of Jesus’ soul poetic intuition would function in
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which Jesus-viator grasps and understands in his consciousness and knowledge those
things that originate in his divinized supraconsciousness.
113
Chapter 3
Polanyi’s Theory of Personal Knowledge
Introduction
Although Michael Polanyi began his career as a physical chemist, his best known
intellectual impact occurred during the latter years of his life while writing philosophy.
His epistemological theory of tacit knowledge is particularly relevant to our study.
According to Polanyi, tacit knowledge refers to those aspects of human knowing that
form a base upon which all our explicit knowledge is built. In some cases, the underlying
tacit knowledge we have is able to be brought into our explicit awareness, but in many
instances our tacit knowledge remains cognitively unspecifiable. In either case, Polanyi
considers what we know tacitly to be real knowledge. It is Polanyi’s theory of tacit
knowing that we intend to apply to the person of Jesus Christ in light of Maritain’s
Christology in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus.
Polanyi’s views on matters of human awareness and knowledge bear directly
upon the question of Jesus Christ’s capacity to know himself, as well as our capacity to
contemplate his self knowledge. Polanyi’s view of scientific knowledge (and his critique
of the reductionist methodologies of positivism) sets up his more comprehensive analysis
of epistemological questions. This in turn leads to a refined perspective of human
psychology which has a great bearing on our inquiry into Christ’s special case of self
knowledge. Polanyi’s epistemological and psychological inquiries lead us directly to a
reconstruction of Maritain’s aesthetic sense of self awareness, and are therefore an
essential insight into the question of Jesus Christ’s self awareness.
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Before turning to Polanyi’s own works, we will first examine an article by Avery
Cardinal Dulles on the possibility of using Polanyi’s epistemology in theology. Second,
it is important to understand the context in which Polanyi developed his epistemological
theory. The formation of his epistemology bears the distinct mark of uniting his
profession as a scientist with his later writings as a philosopher. As will be shown in the
second section of this chapter, Polanyi developed his theory of tacit knowing in response
to the ideology of positivistic science on the one hand, and on the other hand in
explicating the freedom of scientific inquiry from external forces, namely the Marxist
state.
Once we have established the background from which Polanyi developed his
theory of tacit knowledge, the third section of this chapter will examine that theory more
closely. We will show how the theory of tacit knowing developed in Polanyi’s thought
from a peripheral role to a more primary role in his epistemology. Finally, several of 
Polanyi’s examples will be presented for clarity along with a synthesis of Polanyi’s
theory of tacit knowing.
A. Polanyian Epistemology and Theology
The stated purpose of this work is to utilize Polanyi’s epistemological theory in
order to clarify and further some aspects of Maritain’s Christology in On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus. Thus we intend to apply Polanyi’s epistemology and see if it helps
bring clarity to Maritain’s theory of the consciousness and knowledge of the person of 
Jesus Christ. It is not the purpose of this work, however, to apply Polanyi’s epistemology
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or thought to theology in general or to any area of theological studies other than
Christology. While there are several works that have utilized different aspects of 
Polanyi’s thought including his epistemology in various theological contexts, it is not our 
intention to present or evaluate any one of them here.
342
  Rather, this section intends to
show that Polanyi’s epistemological thought is being creatively employed in explicating
theological topics and does, in fact, hold future possibilities for theological studies as
well. An article by Avery Dulles, “Faith, Church, and God: Insights from Michael
Polanyi,”
343
 will guide us through this point.
The first point that Dulles makes concerning the potential for using Polanyi’s
epistemology in theological studies is Polanyi’s emphasis on the fiduciary aspect of 
human knowing, or the fact that all knowing requires an act of faith. Why is this an
342
 Of particular note is Joan Crewdson, Christian Doctrine in the Light of Michael
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similarity between Newman’s “illative sense” and Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing. “While
Newman treated the tacit dimension as a matter of fact, Polanyi attempted to develop a theory to
account for this fact” (96). The final chapter of Moleski’s work is fruitful in that he applies
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would note as an aside two theologians in particular whose works and thought have been
influenced by Polanyi. One is the Reformed Barthain theologian Thomas Torrance and the other
is the Roman Catholic Avery Dulles.
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important point?  “If this thesis is true, theology, as the work of faith seeking
understanding, is not an anomaly among the cognitive disciplines. Religious ideas are
acquired, developed, tested, and reformed by methods at least analogous to those pursued
in the natural and social sciences.”
344
  Hence while science evaluates the various physical
aspects of creation (i.e., chemistry, biology, etc.), theology addresses the teleological
purpose behind creation. In this context the hard sciences and theology do not sit in
radical opposition to one another. Rather, they deal with different aspects of the same
reality. In both cases, however, the fundamental claims of both require an assent of faith,
a belief in the premises that underlie the truth claims of either science or theology. In his
introduction to Moleski’s Personal Catholicism, Dulles writes, “Polanyi … mounted a 
massive critique of the ‘critical program’ in science. In its place he sought to erect a
‘fiduciary program,’ which admitted the priority of belief over all other forms of 
knowledge.”
345
  Dulles adds:
He [Polanyi] noted that the great scientific discoveries are regularly made
by reliance on antecedent intimations, and are transmitted to others by the
personal trust that disciples place in the authority of their masters or that
of the scientific community. These great insights, I realized, could be 
transferred to theological questions such as the nature of prophetic insight,
the importance of discipleship, and the authority of tradition. Religious
knowledge, I concluded, advances and perpetuates itself by methods akin
to those that Polanyi attributes to the scientific enterprise.
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When it is seen in this manner, Dulles notes that not only “is this Polanyian thesis
supportive of the credibility of religious statements,” but it also “opens up rich
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possibilities for theology to profit from the methodology of the natural and social
sciences.”
347
A second aspect of Polanyi’s thought which is helpful for theology, according to
Dulles, is the application of tacit knowing to apologetics. Dulles indicates that arguing
for the truth of Christianity from certain premises, for example the reality of miracles or 
the divinity of Jesus Christ, is not likely to inspire faith in unbelievers. Focusing on one 
particular subsidiary aspect of Christianity is no more likely to inspire faith in the whole
of Christianity than learning the alphabet will cause one to understand the meaning of a 
book. The goal of Christian apologetics is to help an individual to reevaluate his or her
commitments in light of the whole of the Christian faith. Hence it is “useful for
distinguishing between authentic grounds for belief on the one hand, and fraud, illusion,
and fanaticism on the other.”
348
  Through the integration of the numerous subsidiary
elements of faith, one comes to believe in God and may also change his personal
religious commitment. “In the last analysis, we believe because we responsibly decide to
do so on the basis of clues whose existence or evidential force cannot be fully
specified.”
349
It would seem, then, that the goal of Christian apologetics, and I would add
catechesis, is not to “prove” theological statements but rather to show how individual
aspects come to bear on some focal aspect of theology, i.e., the Church, Christology and
the like, and enable the believer to assent to them.  This aspect of Polanyi’s thought is
particularly helpful to theology in two ways.
First, it acts as a reminder and a catalyst to explore and understand the subsidiary
347
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elements that go into our focal awareness of any particular theological or dogmatic
teaching. Secondly, and this is a very important issue, Polanyi’s epistemology
establishes that “we know more than we can tell.”  Applied to theology we can
understand that while we are able to concentrate our focal awareness on Jesus Christ, for
example, there is far more to knowing him than we could ever tell. The relationship
between the believer and Jesus can never fully be explicated or understood by
memorizing theological statements. As much as we might learn about Jesus he remains,
by and large, a mystery to us. Polanyi’s epistemology allows us to comfortably maintain
a balance between knowledge and mystery in theology.
Dulles’ third and final point about how Polanyi’s epistemology can benefit
theology concerns Polanyi’s understanding of scientific discovery modeled upon the
Pauline scheme of faith, works and grace. “This three-step analysis of discovery can, I
believe, be profitably transferred to divine revelation.”
350
In particular, Dulles notes that
when this understanding of discovery is applied in a religious context, the one who
receives some kind of revelation does not always require further confirmation. The
discovery of any given religious truth or revelation is validated by the discovering
impulse and “further supported by their inherent intellectual beauty.”
351
  Dulles insists
that this point is particularly important because it lends credence to personal belief.
Citing St. Augustine, Pascal, Newman, de Lubac and Rahner, Dulles indicates that all of 
these theologians believed in some form of anticipatory knowledge of God.  What exactly
does this mean?  Basically, in order to discover God there must be some inner
anticipatory knowledge of God already present in the believer’s subsidiary knowledge,
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which is drawn out through the discovery process.  Thus we see that Polanyi’s
epistemological insight regarding discovery is useful in understanding not only revelation
but also the substantiation of personal belief. While we may not be able to demonstrate
all the subsidiary aspects that contribute to belief, it does not make our belief any less
credible. It merely demonstrates the presence of subsidiary knowledge in our focal
religious affirmations.
Dulles’ appraisal of the possibility of using Polanyi’s epistemology in theology is
mentioned here in order to demonstrate the feasibility of applying Polanyi to theological
issues. Indeed, Dulles writes that “It would be impossible to understand my own
theological contributions, such as they are, without being aware of my indebtedness to
Newman and Polanyi.”
352
  There remains, however, the issue of Polanyi’s personal
religious beliefs and their impact on understanding his writings. Moleski writes:
Because Polanyi was very reserved about his religious commitments, it is
sometimes difficult to determine exactly where he stood on theological
issues. There are ambiguities in his writings which allow strong theistic
interpretations (Gelwick, Scott, Torrance, Apczynski, Dulles, and others)
as well as atheistic interpretations (Grene, Prosch, Wetherick, Weightman,
and others).
353
While there are very divergent opinions as to Polanyi’s personal beliefs, it is not 
necessary to hold the same religious beliefs as Polanyi in order to utilize his
epistemological theory of tacit knowing. Moleski makes this clear when he writes, “In
affirming Newman’s view of the real apprehension of and assent to the dogmas of God,
Trinity, revelation, I argue that one may have an epistemology like Polanyi’s (as
Newman did) but not share his theology.”
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It may seem strange that while Polanyi may
352
 Dulles, Introduction to Moleski, Personal Catholicism, ix-x.
353
 Moleski, Personal Catholicism, 142.
354
 Moleski, Personal Catholicism, 142.
120
not have explicitly expressed religious belief, he nonetheless articulated an epistemology
that upheld forms of knowledge that cannot necessarily be explicitly proven, namely
religious truths. Colin Grant writes that “the theological significance of Polanyi’s
writings consists precisely in the fact that he offers a way of thinking theologically in a 
culture which has all but lost that ability through the triumph of the positivistic
perspective … [which] tends to depreciate belief because of the premium it places on 
knowledge in the sense of formalizable factuality.”
355
  Polanyi may not have been a 
religious believer in the Christian sense of the word, but his epistemological theory
certainly allows for the validation of theological claims. It seems clear then that
Polanyi’s epistemological theory of tacit knowing has numerous uses for theology and
this work in particular.
B. Origins of Polanyi’s Epistemology
Before moving into an examination of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, it is
important to understand the historical context in which his epistemological theory
developed. In so doing, the reader is able to understand more clearly Polanyi’s
epistemological theory through an understanding of the controversies from which it
emerged. At the same time this also allows the reader to see the gradual transformation
of Polanyi the scientist into Polanyi the philosopher. What events, then, precipitated the
articulation of Polanyi’s epistemological theory of tacit knowing?  The answer is twofold.
On the one hand, Polanyi’s theory developed in response to the shortcomings of 
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positivistic science. On the other hand, Polanyi’s theory emerged in response to the
planning of scientific research, specifically in Soviet Russia.
Polanyi believed that the theory of positivistic science amounted to a 
“philosophical prejudice.”  According to the positivistic model of science, only those
things which can be experimentally tested and confirmed are “facts.”  Anything that is
unable to be tested and confirmed by experiment lies outside the realm of scientific “fact”
and thus cannot be designated as “truth” in the strictest sense of the word. Polanyi
indicates that although the positivistic understanding of objectivity in science is widely
held as the goal of scientific research, the reality is that all scientists are personally
involved in the research they do and the experiments they choose to perform. Thus the
goal of scientific research is objective knowledge of the world, but that knowledge is
colored by the subjectivity of the individual scientist. Concerning this Polanyi writes,
Yet the prevailing conception of science, based on the disjunction of 
subjectivity and objectivity, seeks—and must seek at all costs—to
eliminate from science such passionate, personal, human appraisals of 
theories, or at least to minimize their function to that of a negligible by-
play. For modern man has set up as the ideal of knowledge the conception
of natural science as a set of statements which is “objective” in the sense
that its substance is entirely determined by observation, even while its
presentation may be shaped by convention. This conception, stemming
from a craving rooted in the very depths of our culture, would be shattered
if the intuition of rationality in nature had to be acknowledged as a
justifiable and indeed essential part of scientific theory.
356
What Polanyi seeks to accomplish in his tacit epistemology is a finer balance between the
relationship of reality (i.e., objectivity) and the role of the knower who seeks to know that
reality (i.e., subjectivity). In effect, Polanyi recognizes that all scientific research and
experimentation involves the personal commitments and decisions of the individual
356
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scientist and is not, therefore, strictly “objective.” In other words, while the focal
conclusion of some piece of scientific research may authentically grasp some aspect of 
reality, there are numerous subsidiary components of that knowledge which are
subjectively determined.  Polanyi insists, however, that his tacit theory was neither
objective nor subjective, but in fact, personal.
I think we may distinguish between the personal in us, which actively
enters into our commitments, and our subjective states, in which we
merely endure our feelings. This distinction establishes the conception of 
the personal, which is neither subjective nor objective. In so far as the
personal submits to requirements acknowledged by itself as independent
of itself, it is not subjective; but in so far as it is an action guided by
individual passions, it is not objective either. It transcends the disjunction
between subjective and objective.
357
Thus one of the goals that Polanyi’s tacit theory seeks to achieve is to bridge the
“disjunction” that positivistic science places between the objective and the subjective.
A second question that Polanyi sought to answer in response to positivistic
science was an adequate explanation of discovery.  This will be discussed in more detail
later, but a brief explanation on this point is in order. Based on his personal experience,
Polanyi knew that not all scientific “facts” could be experimentally proven.  Recall that
Polanyi’s doctoral dissertation was initially rejected because he could not substantiate his
conclusions.
358
  Nonetheless, in time his theory was able to be tested and confirmed as
true. That he had discovered and knew some aspect of reality without being able to prove
his theory made him realize that a scientist could have real knowledge of something that
he could not explain fully.  Polanyi realized that the process of discovery was filled with
numerous unspecifiable aspects. He believed that his philosophy of science, in particular
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his epistemological theory of tacit knowing, better explained these unspecifiable aspects
of knowledge not accounted for by the positivistic model of science. While Polanyi was
concerned to show that there is more to knowledge than the positivist scientific method
seemingly allowed, his epistemological theory also developed out of his confrontation
with the Marxist ideological control of scientific research current to his historical setting.
The state control and planning of scientific research was not limited to Soviet
Russia or communist countries alone but also had its proponents in England in the 1930s 
and 1940s.
359
In response to the movement for planned science, Polanyi helped found
“The Society for Freedom in Science” and also joined another group dedicated to social
and religious issues, “The Moot.”
360
In a private letter to one of the co-founders of the
Society, John Baker, an Oxford zoologist, Polanyi indicated that the founding of the
Society was the decisive turning point in his life from science to philosophy.
361
  The
founding of the Society acted as a catalyst for Polanyi to begin writing about
epistemological questions within the context of the defense of pure science. It was in
defending pure science from planned science that Polanyi “became aware of the
weakness of the position I was defending,”
362
 and, that he did not have an adequate
philosophy of science.
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In planned science, the state attempted to eliminate the notions of “pure” and
“practical” science. Science was practiced with the express intention of serving the
ideology of the state, namely dialectical materialism, and this forced scientists strictly to
explore issues of practical concern only. Science pursued for the sake of knowledge
alone (pure science) was abandoned as merely a reflection of class struggle.  Thus, the
underlying principle of the freedom of the individual scientist to pursue the truth was
replaced in Soviet Russia with the understanding that all scientific research must conform
to the ideological vision of the state. Polanyi responded to what he saw occurring in
Soviet Russia by articulating a philosophy of science that took into account the necessity
of the freedom of the individual scientist and the authority of the larger scientific
community to direct research accordingly.
The importance of Polanyi’s encounter with Marxism can be seen in the
development of his epistemological thinking in two ways. First, it caused him to
articulate in a more precise manner a philosophy of science that, while taking into
account the authority of the scientific community, still upheld the freedom of the
individual scientist to choose and do independent research. Second, while writing about
the freedom of the individual scientist, Polanyi was also working out his epistemological
theory of tacit knowing in order to explain the personal dimension that is involved in all
scientific discoveries, something noted previously.
In defending the freedom of science and explicating a scientific epistemology
based on the intuition of the individual scientist, Polanyi began directing his thought
more and more toward human knowing in general. We can see that in responding to the
positivist theory of science and in highlighting a scientific epistemology based on the
125
intuition of the individual scientist, two important aspects of tacit knowing had already
emerged in Polanyi’s thought. In response to the positivists, Polanyi demonstrates that
“we know more than we can tell,” and in response to the Marxist control of science, he
indicates that the freedom of research (and not state control) is the basis of genuine
scientific discovery. By the end of the 1940’s, Polanyi began to expand these ideas into a 
more comprehensive epistemological system based on his theory of “tacit knowledge.”
C. “Tacit Knowledge”
Personal Knowledge (1958)
While Polanyi was defending the freedom of science and beginning to articulate
his theory of tacit knowing during the 1940s, it was the opportunity to give the Gifford
Lectures at Aberdeen (1951-1952) which enabled Polanyi to focus his attention solely on 
epistemological questions.
363
  The Gifford Lectures were eventually published as
Personal Knowledge, considered to be Polanyi’s magnum opus.
364
  He continued writing
on epistemological themes after its publication, however, and by his own admission had
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developed his ideas enough to warrant a fresh account of his thought in 1966 published as
The Tacit Dimension. “This book [The Tacit Dimension] is an interim report on an
inquiry started more than twenty years ago … I have continued this inquiry and published
some twenty essays…as well as piled up much unpublished writing.”
365
  By the time The
Tacit Dimension was published, less than ten years after Personal Knowledge, Polanyi
could write,
Viewing the content of these pages from the position reached in Personal
Knowledge and The Study of Man eight years ago, I see that my reliance
on the necessity of commitment has been reduced by working out the
structure of tacit knowing. This structure shows that all thought contains
components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our 
thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were
parts of our body.
366
Polanyi had highlighted the idea of commitment in Personal Knowledge as a response to
the possibility that his theory of knowledge might be dismissed as subjective. Polanyi
writes, “It is the act of commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge
from being merely subjective.”
367
  Thus Polanyi affirmed that we (the subject) can truly
know the world of which we are a part (objectivity), but the manner in which we
investigate the world is always deeply personal and based on the various intellectual
commitments we choose to accept. William T. Scott defines Polanyian commitment as
the act “… in which a person accepts a proposition as true, enters into a relation of trust,
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127
committing ourselves to an intellectual position, we then perceive the world from that
particular perspective. This is an important aspect of Polanyi’s thought, because it
specifies that we view the world and make judgments about it according to the structures
of the particular commitments that we make. For example, if a person is committed to
the structure of science, that person will judge all knowledge according to a scientific
paradigm:
Science is a system of beliefs to which we are committed. Such a system
cannot be accounted for either from experience as seen within a different
system, or by reason without experience. Yet this does not signify that we
are free to take it or leave it, but simply reflects the fact that it is a system
of beliefs to which we are committed and which therefore cannot be 
represented in non-committal terms.
369
Our commitments, according to Polanyi, determine the framework through which we
actively engage our minds in relation to the world, and thus have a direct impact on the
manner in which we come to understand the world around us and its meaning.
370
Any act of factual knowing presupposes somebody who believes he knows
what is being believed to be known. This person is taking a risk in
asserting something, at least tacitly, about something believed to be real
outside himself. Any presumed contact with reality inevitably claims
369
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universality. If I, left alone in the world, and knowing myself to be alone,
should believe in a fact, I would still claim universal acceptance for it.
Every act of factual knowing has the structure of commitment.
371
Gelwick notes that commitments involve tacitly held aspects in the same manner as any
other kinds of knowledge that we have. “Notice how odd it is that the act of commitment
is both to what we do not see (the subsidiaries) as well as what can be seen (the focus of 
our attention).”
372
Like knowledge, our commitments involve tacitly held aspects, which
are not always explicit and present to the knower. From this it is clear that one of the key
elements of Polanyi’s epistemology in Personal Knowledge was his understanding tacit
knowledge in relation to the commitments an individual knower commits himself to. By
his own admission, however, in later works (especially The Tacit Dimension) Polanyi
focused his attention primarily on his theory of tacit knowing, instead of viewing it
secondarily and in relation to his understanding of commitment. For our purposes,
however, although Personal Knowledge is Polanyi’s original epistemological work, his
more focused thought concerning tacit knowledge, specifically as found in The Tacit
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The Tacit Dimension (1966)
Marjorie Grene, one Polanyi’s most dedicated students, went so far as to make the
claim that
Polanyi’s unique contribution to philosophy is the theory of tacit knowing,
the thesis that all knowledge necessarily includes a tacit component on 
which it relies in order to focus on its goal whether of theoretical
discovery and formulation or practical activity. It was this insight,
expressed in the section on “Two Kinds of Awareness” in Personal
Knowledge and elaborated in the first lecture of The Tacit Dimension and
in some of the papers collected in Knowing and Being, that constituted, in
his thought, a major break with the tradition and a possible foundation for
a new turn in the theory of knowledge and, a fortiori, in philosophy as
such.
374
In addition to her claim that Polanyi’s epistemology stands on the threshold of 
revolutionizing philosophy (and epistemological studies in particular), Grene indicates
that in Polanyi’s thought there are two different but wholly interrelated ways of knowing
the world. Before addressing this two-fold knowing (the focal and the tacit), one must
first understand what Polanyi means when he discusses “knowledge.”  For Polanyi,
knowledge is not just concrete facts and formulations, but includes both “practical and
theoretical knowledge.”
375
  Theoretical knowledge is best understood as “intellectual”
knowledge, namely those things which require thinking to accomplish. Examples of this
would be the intellectual construction of mathematical formulae, the interpretation of 
historical facts, strategizing through a game of chess, problem solving and the like.
According to Polanyi, practical knowledge includes those things that are not solely
intellectual endeavors but instead are “skills, whether artistic, athletic, or technical.”
376
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Practical knowledge involves the integration of both mind and body.
377
  Throughout his
writings Polanyi gives many different examples of this kind of knowledge.  The most
frequent example he uses is the use of a hand tool, for example a hammer or a walking
stick. Also included in this would be playing a musical instrument such as a piano, or 
dancing a choreographed dance. While these acts involve a degree of intellectual
integration, e.g., knowing the correct use of a hammer or a piano, there is also a degree of 
bodily integration in these kinds of knowledge. Indeed, Polanyi writes, “Our body is the
ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether intellectual or practical.”
378
Nonetheless, for Polanyi, knowing how to dance correctly is as much a form of knowing
(knowing how) as computing complex mathematical formulae. While this is a rather
broad definition of knowledge, the main thrust of Polanyi’s epistemological theory is that
all human knowing, both theoretical and practical, involves elements of knowledge that
are tacitly held. A closer look at Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge will clarify this
point.
When Polanyi writes about tacit knowledge, he is referring to that element of
human awareness that is not specifiable or the object of our immediate awareness, what
377
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he calls subsidiary awareness.
379
  Elements of subsidiary knowledge could remain
subconscious for numerous reasons. They might be elements of knowledge that we have
integrated so well that we simply “do” or “know” them responsively, or they may be 
clues so subtle that we are not aware of their bearing on our focal awareness. Of his
program of tacit knowing, Polanyi writes, “it is a mistake to identify subsidiary
awareness with unconscious or preconscious awareness, or with Jamesian fringe
awareness. What makes an awareness subsidiary is the function it fulfills; it can have any
degree of consciousness, so long as it functions as a clue to the object of our focal
attention.”
380
  While our focal attention or awareness is drawn to one particular object, in
Polanyi’s estimation, the way we understand that object is the result of an integration of 
other tacitly held knowledge. By way of a simple example: when I look at a clock I am
focally aware of what time it is based on what the clock indicates. At the same time,
however, I am also subsidiarily aware of numerous other elements that give meaning to
my focal awareness. While not all subsidiary knowledge is able to be expressed, in many
instances elements of it can be expressed and drawn into our focal awareness. In my
focal awareness of reading the time, it is my subsidiary awareness of numbers, electricity,
machinery, minutes, hours and days along with many other elements that give meaning to
my focal awareness, i.e., the particular time of day. Edward Moss remarks that one of the
379
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most useful ways that Polanyi formulates his theory of tacit knowing is by means of what
he calls the “triad” of tacit knowing.
381
  Simply stated, a person (A) integrates subsidiary
clues (B) in his attending to a focal point (C). Thus A moves through B in order to
understand the meaning of C.
However, if for some reason my attention is drawn away from my focal
awareness and shifts to one of the underlying subsidiary elements, the meaning of the
larger whole is lost, at least temporarily.
382
  “Scrutinize closely the particulars of a 
comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the entity is
destroyed.”
383
  For example, if the machine breaks, the electricity goes out, or if I look at
a clock showing military time, my awareness will move from the integrated whole to one 
of its subsidiary parts. I might be able to “solve” the problem, e.g., plug in the clock, fix
the machine, or count with my fingers to 18.00 hours and thus regain the focal meaning
of the time on the clock. Polanyi calls this process “tacit reintegration,”
384
 or a “from-to”
integration of the subsidiary clues. Polanyi writes:
… in an act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending to
something else; namely, from the first term to the second term of the tacit
relation. In many ways the first term of this relation will prove to be 
nearer to us, the second further away form us. Using the language of 
anatomy, we may call the first term proximal, and the second term distal.
381
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It is the proximal term, then, of which we have a knowledge that we may
not be able to tell.
385
In the example of telling the time, the “proximal” or “from” element are the tacit factors
that make telling time possible: number meaning, understanding a working machine,
electricity and the like. The “distal” or “to” element is the unity of these elements into a 
meaningful whole, namely, that the clock indicates a particular time. Thus the meaning
of a thing is always projected away from ourselves, i.e., our subsidiary knowledge bears
upon something outside of us and has a particular meaning even as it stands independent
from us. Walter Van Herck summarizes Polanyi’s tacit program and the various terms he 
uses in the following diagram:
386





The first column represents the clues that are nearest to the knower, and the second
column represents the unity of those clues outside or beyond the knower. The
combination of these two forms of knowing, those in the first column and those in the
second, are the foundational aspects of Polanyi’s tacit program of human knowing where
meaning is derived from the parts as they make up the whole. In summary, Polanyi
writes:
Since tacit knowing establishes a meaningful relation between two terms,
we may identify it with the understanding of the comprehensive entity
which these two terms jointly constitute. Thus the proximal term
represents the particulars of this entity, and we can say, accordingly, that
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we comprehend the entity by relying on our awareness of its particulars
for attending to their joint meaning.
387
Polanyi believed the distinction between focal and subsidiary awareness as a way of 
explaining human knowledge was an original approach to epistemological studies. Grene
writes that in reading the first part of The Tacit Dimension, one finds a “clear, relatively
economical, well-articulated statement of what should be the conceptual instrument for a 
one hundred and eighty degree reversal in the approach of philosophers to the problem of 
epistemology.”
388
In his tacit theory of knowing Polanyi has formulated an epistemology
that seemingly bridges the gap between the subjective knower and the objective reality
known. Through an examination of the individual subsidiary clues that make up our 
focal awareness of some thing, a knower is more fully able to grasp the whole truth of 
that thing which is external to himself. With this basic understanding of subsidiary and
focal awareness in mind, a closer examination of the four aspects of tacit knowing will
help to further clarify Polanyi’s tacit epistemology.
Four Aspects of Tacit Knowledge
Polanyi divides tacit awareness into four progressive types: the functional, the
phenomenal, the semantic and the ontological.
389
  Each of these four types of tacit
awareness brings more clearly into focus some aspect of how tacit knowing is brought to
bear on our focal awareness and knowledge of things. In each of these four aspects,
however, Polanyi is not only emphasizing the manner in which tacit knowing bears upon 
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our explicit knowledge, but also the fact that it is always involved in every aspect of 
human knowing. Before discussing this final point, a clarification of the fourfold
division of tacit awareness is in order.
The functional structure of tacit knowing is when we focus our attention from the
subsidiary particulars to their joint meaning. Examples of this may serve to make this
clearer. In the case of face recognition (physiognomy), we attend from certain features of 
the face (subsidiary elements) to the cohesive entity of the face itself (focal awareness).
“We are attending from the features to the face, and thus may be unable to specify the
features.”
390
  Polanyi likens the ability of recognizing a face to a skill that involves a 
combination of muscular acts in order to achieve some unified purpose. Much like face
recognition, which brings to bear numerous particulars on the face, in the skilled
movement of a dancer or an athlete there are a whole range of muscular movements that
make up the dance or athletic act, which an athlete would most unlikely be unable to
specify. Thus, in the functional structure of tacit knowing, we attend from the subsidiary
particulars, as they bear upon a pattern or thing, to the thing which we recognize, that is,
we see the subsidiary particulars within our focal awareness.
Polanyi insists the functional aspect of tacit knowing occurs when we integrate
the various subsidiary clues into a focal awareness without being aware of the subsidiary
clues themselves. Consequently, we are not deducing that something is, rather, we know
something is by our integration of its subsidiary clues.
391
In the case of recognizing a 
particular face, the difficulty in specifying how we do this is obscured by the fact that the
subsidiary particulars are present within the face itself. Simply put, the functional aspect
390
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of tacit knowing is our attending from the particulars as they give meaning to the
integrated whole. This is the most rudimentary aspect of tacit knowing.
In the act of attending from the subsidiary elements to the focal element, Polanyi
indicates that in recognizing an entity as a whole, we are conversely able to integrate and
recognize the particulars which bear upon it. He calls this the phenomenal structure of 
tacit knowing. Polanyi writes, “We may say, in general, that we are aware of the
proximal term [i.e., subsidiary awareness] of an act of tacit knowing in the appearance of 
its distal term [i.e., focal awareness]; we are aware of that from which we are attending to
another thing, in the appearance of that thing.”
392
In the case of the phenomenal
structure of tacit knowing, we recognize the subsidiary particulars and integrate them as
they appear in our focal awareness. For example, a skilled art critic can look at a painting
closely and discern the various brush strokes and colors in a more subtle manner than an
untrained observer viewing the same painting. At the same time the art critic will have a 
deeper appreciation of the painting because he recognizes how the subsidiary aspects bear
upon the focal presentation of the work itself.
Returning to Polanyi’s example of physiognomy, he would say that we are able to
recognize a particular nose or facial feature in terms of its relation to the whole face.
This is also true for athletic skills. Being able to integrate the proper motion, force and
feel of kicking a soccer ball are all phenomenal aspects of a well placed shot.
Accordingly, in the functional structure of tacit knowing, we attend from the features of a
face to the face itself, and in the phenomenal structure of tacit knowing we are able to
discern the features in light of the whole face. Both of these aspects taken together make
392
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up the semantic aspect of tacit knowing, the third part of the structure of tacit knowing.
The semantic aspect of tacit knowing, Polanyi explains, occurs when we integrate
the previous two aspects of tacit knowing in such a manner that we are able to recognize
the subsidiary particulars as they bear on the whole and understand the meaning of the
particular thing. Seeing a face in a crowd may mean nothing to us. However, if we see
the face of a friend in a crowd, that particular face will have meaning to us. In this case
we integrate the subsidiary parts as they bear on the whole, and thus see the joint
meaning that they have in the face of our friend. Polanyi also uses the example of a blind
man using a walking stick to “see” where he is going. The subsidiary aspects of using a
walking stick are many: the muscular ability to hold the stick, the sensory feelings in the
hand from the point of the stick, etc. To a person who is not familiar with the use of a 
walking stick, these particular feelings and skills would be meaningless. However, to a 
blind man who relies on the stick to “see” the various subsidiary particulars (the different
sensations in the hand) as they bear upon the whole (what is before the man), those
sensations have great meaning. Polanyi indicates this shows “that all meaning tends to be 
displaced away from ourselves.”
393
While the various subsidiary aspects of a particular entity dwell within the
knower, their bearing on that particular entity gives it meaning as it stands outside the
knower. This gives greater clarity to Polanyi’s distinction of subsidiary elements as the
proximal aspect of knowledge, while the focal aspect is the distal. Although the
subsidiary clues are known by the knower proximally, when they are intellectually
integrated they attain a meaning as they come to bear on some thing outside of ourselves.
393
 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 13. 
138
Gelwick summarizes this point thus:
Meaning lies in the distal term or terms. This is the one that we are
usually studying. The meaningfulness of the distal term depends,
however, upon the proximal clues upon which it relies. Meaning cannot
exist by itself. It requires a person who can integrate clues into coherent
patterns that he or she can see as meaningful.
394
Put more simply, the semantic aspect of tacit knowing occurs when the subsidiary
particulars are unified within the knower’s focal awareness of an entity, and brings about
the deeper meaning of that particular entity.
The fourth and final aspect of tacit knowing that Polanyi presents is the
unification of the three previous aspects of tacit knowing in what he calls the ontological
aspect of tacit knowing. The fact that we are able to know something by integrating its
subsidiary clues into a meaningful encounter with that thing indicates, Polanyi insists, an
encounter with something that is real. In moving from the subsidiary aspects of tacit
knowing and coming to focal awareness of that thing, we not only grasp that particular
thing and its meaning, but we are also able to comprehend the reality of its existence. We
have already indicated that, for Polanyi, all knowing presupposes a knower who bodily
encounters the world and really comes into contact with the world. At the very least, the
mind depends on the subsidiary aspect of our bodies being in and encountering the world
around us. The fact that a knower derives meaning from some thing is also an indication
that it is real and exists. This does not mean that our knowledge of a thing as being real
is the same as having an absolute knowledge of that thing. Indeed, Polanyi writes:
This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected ways in the future I
attribute to the fact that the thing observed is an aspect of reality,
possessing a significance that is not exhausted by our conception of any
single aspect of it. To trust that a thing we know is real is, in this sense, to
394
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feel that it has the independence and power for manifesting itself in yet
unthought of ways in the future.
395
For Polanyi then, while we may grasp the reality of some given entity, that does not mean
we have grasped everything there is to know about it. The ontological aspect of tacit
knowing affirms the reality of a given thing, as well as the fact that different things in this
world contain a meaning far deeper than we may presently be able to grasp.  Polanyi
believed, however, that his epistemological theory of tacit knowing not only explained
how we come to know the meaning of some particular thing (i.e., its semantic aspect), but 
also the fact our focal awareness comes to bear on some aspect of a real thing (i.e., its
ontological aspect). Hence the first three aspects of tacit knowledge, the functional,
phenomenal and semantic all unite to form a joint meaning in the ontological aspect of 
tacit knowing. Now that we have explained Polanyi’s four aspects of tacit knowing, a 
closer examination of a few of his frequently cited examples and the role discovery
played in the formation of his epistemological theory is in order.
Discovery and Tacit Knowledge
I have already cited a few examples utilized by Polanyi that indicate where
something that is known focally is not necessarily able to be explicated in its subsidiary
particulars, that is, the subsidiary particulars are not always able to be drawn into focal
awareness. In each of these cases, what is present in the focal awareness have subsidiary
elements that remain unspecifiable even when the knower tries to make them the object
of focal awareness. According to Polanyi, while one or more of the subsidiary elements
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of human knowing may remain beyond the knower’s ability to articulate them,
nonetheless those subsidiary aspects have been integrated by the knower and now bear
upon all of his explicit knowledge. On this point Grene writes:
Polanyi’s distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness permitted
the enunciation and elaboration of the thesis that all knowledge, however
precise and however impersonal in its formulation, is grounded in clues
that the knower must already have assimilated and of which he can be at
best only subsidiarily aware.
396
Polanyi admits the influence Gestalt psychology had on the development of his theory of
tacit knowing, specifically the phenomenological and semantic aspects.
Gestalt psychology has demonstrated that we may know a physiognomy
by integrating our awareness of its particulars without being able to
identify these particulars, and my analysis of knowledge is closely linked
to this discovery of Gestalt psychology. But I shall attend to aspects of 
Gestalt which have been hitherto neglected … I am looking at Gestalt, on 
the contrary, as the outcome of an active shaping of experience performed
in the pursuit of knowledge. This shaping or integrating I hold to be the
great and indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered
and, once discovered, is held to be true.
The structure of Gestalt is then recast into a logic of tacit thought,
and this changes the range and perspective of the whole subject. The
highest forms of integration loom largest now. These are manifested in
the tacit power of scientific and artistic genius.
397
The premise of Gestalt psychology, namely that “perception is a comprehension of clues
in terms of a whole”
398
 which we naturally integrate in a meaningful way, does resemble
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing in that subsidiary elements of knowledge give meaning
to what we bring into our focal awareness.
399
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In this context one can more easily understand the transition in Polanyi’s thought
from the central notion of commitment in Personal Knowledge to tacit knowing in The
Tacit Dimension. In the former work Polanyi held that intellectual commitments directly
affect how we come to know a given entity. Hence one could say that our intellectual
commitments acted tacitly as part of and within our subsidiary awareness and
correspondingly determined the semantic and ontological aspects of our focal awareness.
In the later work, there is a marked shift in Polanyi’s thought. He suggests that it is more
our tacit awareness of things that we have interiorized that determines the semantic and
ontological aspects of our focal awareness. When we incorporate some aspect of 
knowledge, because we hold it to be true, Polanyi would say that we have integrated
something real within ourselves and now dwell with it, what he calls indwelling.
400
Therefore, any given entity we had once attended to focally or some entity tacitly
acquired now becomes an integrated aspect of our knowledge base and correspondingly
becomes another subsidiary aspect in relation to any other thing which comes into our 
focal awareness. This shift in Polanyi’s thought seems to have occurred as he attempted
to move away from a more subjective approach to knowledge based on commitment to
one which more fully integrated his belief that all knowledge is rooted in tacitly held
beliefs. We indwell those things that we hold to be true because we believe in the truth
400
 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 16-18. Likewise, Polanyi likens the act of indwelling
to the moral principle of interiorization. Once we interiorize the maxim of charity, for example,
we act charitably to others because we have integrated the teaching of love of neighbor. Thus we
no longer focally say, “I should be kind to my neighbor,” but instead are kind to our neighbor
because of our subsidiary understanding of charity (17). Of indwelling in Polanyi’s theory
Gelwick writes, “That our knowledge is always a form of indwelling is one of the revolutionary
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of the meaning they reveal to us as real entities (the semantic and the ontological aspects
of tacit knowing).
While in Polanyi’s earlier writings on epistemology he puts a greater emphasis on 
the act of personal commitment, in his later works he puts a greater emphasis on that fact
that what we have already accepted as true now comes to bear on all our knowledge in a 
tacit manner. At this point Polanyi makes the bold assertion that “strictly detached,
objective knowledge” is a fallacy because all explicit knowledge involves, to lesser or 
greater degrees, some element of tacitly held knowledge. In regard to this aspect of 
Polanyi’s theory, Gelwick writes, “… it is the very process of tacit knowing that
functions to guide us to any knowledge at all. Tacit knowing is not just a psychological
precondition or background, but it is an integral part of the logic of knowing.”
401
In order to demonstrate this point Polanyi focuses on scientific discovery. In
defending the freedom of science from state control, one aspect of Polanyi’s argument is
that scientific research and discovery largely depend on the interests and talents of the
individual scientist working within the greater body of science. By the time he wrote The
Tacit Dimension, Polanyi had had almost twenty years to grapple with the very problem
of discovery in science and to explicate an epistemological basis for it. While in his early
writings he understood that the freedom of inquiry was fundamental to scientific
discovery, working out his theory of tacit knowing helped him to articulate two things
simultaneously about his philosophy of science and his epistemology. First, the process
by which discovery occurs, and secondly, that all knowledge builds upon tacitly held
presuppositions. Let us examine these points more fully.
401
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Polanyi indicates the basis of scientific discovery lies in the ability of a scientist to
recognize a good problem.
402
  How does one recognize a good problem?  Polanyi points
out that to see a problem is to see something that lies hidden, something that has yet to be
discovered. “To see a problem that will lead to a great discovery is not just to see
something hidden, but to see something of which the rest of humanity cannot have even
an inkling.”
403
  Polanyi indicates that while this seems to be a contradiction, that
something unknown is in fact known, Plato had already wrestled with this very problem
in the Meno. “He [Plato] says that to search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity;
for either you know what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not 
know what you are looking for, and then cannot expect to find anything.”
404
  Plato’s
solution to this problem is that discovery is merely the remembering of something from a 
past life. While Plato’s solution to this dilemma does not satisfy Polanyi, it does show
that “problems nevertheless exist, and discoveries can be made by solving them, we can
know things, and important things, that we cannot tell.”
405
  Polanyi believed that his
epistemological theory of tacit knowing solved the problem presented by Plato in the
Meno. To demonstrate this point Polanyi uses the example of a scientist’s seeking a good
problem in order to discover something previously unknown. Polanyi discusses the
process as follows.
A scientist is formed and trained through years of careful study and is then
apprenticed to a well respected and successful scientist. Throughout these long years of 
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study and learning, a wealth of scientific information has been explicitly learned, tested,
and accepted as true (i.e., it has been indwelt by the knower). At this point Polanyi holds
that the role of authority and the necessity of docility in the student are fundamental to
the learning process.
We have seen that tacit knowledge dwells in our awareness of 
particulars while bearing on an entity which the particulars jointly
constitute. In order to share this indwelling, the pupil must presume that a 
teaching which appears meaningless to start with has in fact a meaning
which can be discovered by hitting on the same kind of indwelling as the
teacher is practicing. Such an effort is based on accepting the teacher’s
authority.
406
At some point the wealth of past knowledge and experimentation leads the young
scientist to begin postulating his own potential research paths. Thus, from some intuition
or intimation that springs forth from some aspect of his previously learned scientific
knowledge, the young scientist will come to pursue some unknown question that interests
him. What is focally present to the scientist (in various levels of clarity) is substantiated
by subsidiary clues that remain unspecifiable. So, while a scientist may have a “hunch”
about a given scientific problem, he may not be able to fully articulate the subsidiary
aspects of that hunch. According to Polanyi, in committing himself to the solution of a 
question that he tacitly holds to be true, a scientist also knows that he is seeking some
unknown, hidden truth. “The creative thrust of the imagination is fed by various sources.
The beauty of the anticipated discovery and the excitement of its solitary achievement
contribute to it in the first place.”
407
  Polanyi adds:
My account of scientific discovery describes an existential choice.
We start the pursuit of discovery by pouring ourselves into the subsidiary
406
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elements of a problem and we continue to spill ourselves into further clues
as we advance further, so that we arrive at discovery fully committed to it
as an aspect of reality.
408
What makes this pathway to discovery unique is that one scientist may not “see” the
same problem his colleague sees, because they both may not be approaching the question
with the same tacit knowledge from which the intuitive question has arisen.
409
  What is
also interesting is that the solution itself may be tacitly known and surmised to be true
until it is explicitly discovered. Polanyi writes:
The pursuit of discovery is conducted from the start in these terms; all the
time we are guided by sensing the presence of a hidden reality toward
which our clues are pointing; and the discovery which terminates and
satisfies this pursuit is still sustained by the same vision. It claims to have
made contact with reality: a reality which, being real, may yet reveal itself
to future eyes in an indefinite range of unexpected manifestations.
410
When a scientist grasps some hidden problem and is guided towards a possible discovery,
he has integrated various tacitly held clues in a comprehensive manner. This then
emanates from the scientist in the form of a good question. The question becomes the
object of the scientist’s focal awareness along with the knowledge that a solution lies just
beyond the horizon of the scientist’s awareness. One can see how tacit knowledge is
revealed in two aspects of the articulation of a problem and the possibility of a discovery.
On the one hand, tacitly held knowledge comes into focus as the intuition that there is
some real entity that lies behind some unknown aspect of reality. On the other hand, the
408
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presentation of the problem which springs out of an intuition is itself tacitly held, i.e., it
remains an unspecifiable aspect except in the articulation of the problem which may lead
to its discovery.
The role that Polanyi believes tacit knowledge plays in the process of a discovery
also reveals his belief that tacitly held knowledge is involved in all human knowing. In
the recognition of a problem and the development of some hypothesis that may solve the
problem, there is already an acceptance and a commitment to numerous other tacitly held
things. Even something as simple as the language utilized in the formulation of a 
problem reveals a tacitly held belief that what is being investigated can in fact be known
and communicated to others and that it is worthy of their belief too.
Polanyi indicates that scientific research (and all knowledge) is thus personal, i.e.,
it is “neither subjective nor objective.”  Polanyi explains, “In so far as the personal
submits to requirements acknowledged by itself as independent of itself, it is not 
subjective; but in so far as it is an action guided by individual passions, it is not objective
either. It transcends the disjunction between subjective and objective.”
411
  While an
individual scientist may articulate and pursue a particular problem that he believes will
expose some unseen aspect of reality, he does so with the intention of discovering
something that anyone and everyone can enjoy as well.
To hold such knowledge is an act deeply committed to the
conviction that there is something there to be discovered. It is personal, in
the sense of involving the personality of him who holds it, and also in the
sense of being, as a rule, solitary; but there is no trace in it of self-
indulgence. The discoverer is filled with a compelling sense of 
responsibility for the pursuit of a hidden truth, which demands his services
for revealing it. His act of knowing exercises a personal judgment in
411
 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 300. 
147
relating evidence to an external reality, an aspect of which he is seeking to
apprehend.
412
In seeking to discover something, a scientist always does so by inserting his personal
convictions and beliefs into his work, especially his perception that there is a problem to
be known and solved.
413
  Therefore, Polanyi is able to affirm the conviction of positivist
science that reality can really be known. Unlike the positivists, however, Polanyi holds
that in coming to know something there is always some personal element of the
discoverer in the discovery process.
414
  Once a thing has been discovered, the subsequent
affirmation by other scientists confirms the validity of that particular thing and the
possibility that other undisclosed aspects of the discovered reality remains to be revealed
in the future. What was once the intuitive and tacitly held belief of a single scientist
becomes, when validated and accepted by others, one small part of accepted scientific
truth and may now become some tacitly held aspect of another scientist’s future
discovery. For this reason Polanyi’s epistemological theory opens new grounds for
understanding how we know and how we discover new things in the world. While
Polanyi’s epistemological theory of tacit knowing springs from his profession as a 
scientist, the nature of his theory lends itself to being applied to other academic
412
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disciplines as well, including theological studies.
D. Synthesis
This chapter has shown that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing centers around his
affirmation that “we can know more than we can tell.”
415
In order to explain this,
Polanyi’s epistemological theory distinguishes between two kinds of awareness—focal
awareness and subsidiary awareness. In being focally aware of some thing we are, at the
same moment, subsidiarily aware of numerous other elements that we are not explicitly
aware of but nonetheless give meaning to our focal awareness—i.e., we are tacitly aware
of them. In many cases, the subsidiary aspects of our focal awareness are able to be 
brought into focal awareness and be known explicitly by us. The example of telling time
used earlier in this chapter clearly demonstrated this point.
416
There are instances, however, where the subsidiary particulars that make up our 
focal awareness are not able to be brought into our focal awareness. In other words, there
are times when the subsidiary aspects of our focal knowledge are not able to be drawn
into our focal awareness and known explicitly by us. We can easily recognize the face of
a friend because we have integrated the subsidiary elements of his facial features into a 
meaningful whole. And yet, according to Polanyi “we usually cannot tell how we
recognize a face we know.”
417
  Although we are focally aware that this face is the face of 
our friend we would be hard pressed to explain the subsidiary facial features from which
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our focal knowledge is derived. Riding a bike, kicking a soccer ball and medical
diagnosis are all further examples where the subsidiary components of something focally
known are not able to be made explicit. Such knowledge is real knowledge although it is
not able to be fully described or explained.
The process of discovery highlights both of these aspects of tacit knowing, the
focal and the subsidiary.  On the one hand, a discovery may come about as the result of a 
knower beginning to see the connection of numerous subsidiary clues pointing to
something as yet unknown (the beginning of a good question). On the other hand,
something might be known focally without all of its subsidiary elements being accounted
for or explained (as was the case with Polanyi’s doctoral dissertation). In both of these
cases Polanyi would insist that what the knower is focally aware of is real knowledge,
even if it is not able to be fully explained or known. That certain elements of our 
knowledge and awareness remain beyond our ability to explain them does not invalidate
that knowledge. Rather, it demonstrates that we know more than we can tell. It is this
aspect of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing that will prove most useful when placed in
dialogue with Maritain’s theory of the divinized supraconsciousness of Christ.
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Chapter 4
A Confluence of Thought
Introduction
Now that we have examined in preceding chapters Maritain’s theory of the
consciousness of Christ and Polanyi’s epistemological theory of tacit knowing, this
chapter will show that although they developed their epistemological theories within very
different fields, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing affirms important aspects of Maritain’s
Christological epistemology. Specifically, both theories hold that anyone’s real
knowledge of anything is made possible by other knowledge of which the knower may
not be explicitly aware.
The first section of this chapter will clarify the aspects of Maritain’s theory of the
consciousness of Christ that will and will not be examined further in light of Polanyi’s
tacit theory. Following this will be a brief discussion of the different backgrounds within
which each developed his theory. Finally, Maritain’s Christology, specifically the
conscious self-awareness of Jesus Christ will be examined further in light of Polanyi’s
epistemological theory of tacit knowing. After that, a critique of one aspect of Maritain’s
theory will be followed by a brief conclusion.
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A. Clarification
It is important to clarify which aspects of Maritain’s theory of the consciousness
and knowledge of Jesus Christ we will be examining further along with Polanyi’s
epistemological theory of tacit knowing. Recall that Maritain discusses Jesus’ soul as
existing simultaneously under the dual states of viator and comprehensor. It is in the
state of comprehensor that Jesus beholds the beatific vision which illuminates his
supraconsciousness, i.e., “divinizes” his supraconsciousness.
418
  Hence it is in the
divinized supraconsciousness that Maritain affirms that Jesus’ knowledge “embraced all
things absolutely.”
419
  Recall also that Maritain indicates that the divinized
supraconsciousness and consciousness of Jesus are separated by a partition which renders
the “sphere of the divinized supraconsciousness, under the state of final consummation
… strictly incommunicable” to Jesus’ consciousness.
420
  However, the divinization of 
Jesus’ supraconsciousness does directly impact his consciousness as viator “by mode of 
general influx, and of comforting, and of participated light.”
421
When Maritain refers to Jesus-viator, then, he is referring to the state that Jesus
holds in common with all humanity. It is the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus-
viator that Maritain is referring to when he discusses the intellectual and conscious
growth of Jesus. In other words, it is in the state of viator that Jesus gains and acquires
knowledge, both of himself and of the world around him. Maritain indicates two notable
differences between Jesus’ knowledge and consciousness as viator and that of the rest of 
humanity, however. First, Jesus’ consciousness does not suffer the ill effects of personal
418
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  Second, as noted above, the supraconsciousness of Jesus is divinized
and affects his consciousness through a “general influx, and of comforting, and of 
participated light” stemming from the beatific vision.
423
  This is the direct result of Jesus’
human nature being hypostatically united to the eternal Word, something proper to Jesus
alone.
424
For the purpose of this study, however, what we are interested in exploring further
is Maritain’s theory of the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus-viator. It is clear,
however, that any discussion between Maritain and Polanyi would not include the
enlightened state of Jesus-comprehensor and the divinized supraconsciousness. Because
Jesus-comprehensor sees the beatific vision, that vision would not include any “tacit” or 
unspecifiable aspects within it. Rather, it is an explicit and direct knowledge known in
the intellect of Jesus. Therefore, it offers no common ground with Polanyi’s
epistemological theory. However, the manner in which Maritain understands the
knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator can be further substantiated and understood
when viewed in light of Polanyi’s epistemological theory of tacit knowing.
B. Divergence
The fruit of Maritain’s epistemological thought present in his Christological
theory in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus is best viewed along with his earlier work,
Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, where he outlines the psychological foundations of 
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his epistemological theory.
There are two kinds of unconscious … screened from the grasp of 
consciousness: the preconscious of the spirit in its living springs, and the
unconscious of blood and flesh … I would like to designate the first kind
of unconscious by the name of spiritual … and the second by the name of 
automatic unconscious or deaf unconscious—deaf to the intellect, and
structured into a world of its own apart from the intellect.
425
In this brief quote Maritain indicates the three degrees of consciousness present in a 
person and the particular effect each has on a person’s ability to know this or that thing.
Since I have already discussed these in greater detail in Chapter 2, I will only mention a 
few of the more important points here. By the time Maritain writes On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus, he has slightly altered his terminology. Consequently “the
preconscious of the spirit in its living springs” he now calls “supraconsciousness,” and
the “automatic consciousness” he now calls “infraconsciousness.”  This change in
terminology more aptly designates Maritain’s belief that there are aspects of 
consciousness which remain below (“infra”) and above (“supra”) our conscious
awareness. Maritain’s description of the infraconscious as “the vast psycho-somatic
unconscious of tendencies and of instincts, of sensations not yet elaborated in
perceptions, of latent memories” is an accepted notion today and does not require further
explanation.
426
In Creative Intuition in Poetry, Maritain compares this aspect of his
theory of the unconscious to the Freudian unconscious.
427
  However, the manner in which
Maritain understands supraconsciousness and its role in human knowing is unique. What
is important in Maritain’s theory to this study is the influence and affect the divinized
425
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supraconsciousness has on Jesus’ conscious awareness.
Even apart from Maritain’s particular theory of Jesus’ divinized
supraconsciousness for a moment, he indicates that every person has a supraconscious,
that it remains above conscious awareness and “escape[s], by the very reason of its
superiority, from the consciousness of self, in the ordinary sense of this word, which is
characteristic of the homo viator.”
428
  Although the supraconscious remains above
conscious and infraconscious awareness, all of these various degrees of consciousness
intermingle with the others.
429
It is in the supraconsciousness, however, that Maritain
believes every aspect of human life—the intellect, imagination, and sensitive powers—
comes together to make poetic intuition (i.e., an intellectual grasp of some deeper aspect
of reality) possible.
430
  Recall that in Maritain’s thought the “spark” of poetic intuition in
the supraconsciousness grants a knower a glimpse into the deeper reality and connection
of things in this world. As a result, poetic intuition “tends and extends to the infinite.”
431
In other words, when an instance of poetic intuition occurs in a person’s
supraconsciousness, that person not only grasps the deeper meaning and reality of this or 
that thing but also the Creator—God.
432
Hence it is in the supraconsciousness that God is present to and known by the
human person. What appears on the surface to be a psychological epistemology is also a 
metaphysical one, too. It is apparent that Maritain’s epistemological theory is not just
trying to explain that the poet, Jesus, you or I know these deeper realities of human life,
428
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but how we come to know such things. What it is that we are able to know consciously is
deeply indebted to what is processed, synthesized and known by the supraconsciousness.
Thus Maritain’s “philosophical psychology”
433
 is intended to clarify how we come to
know things in light of and including metaphysical beliefs. With this in mind, I would
summarize the methodology behind Maritain’s epistemology in On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus as utilizing a philosophical psychology to explain the relationship
between epistemology and metaphysics. What is relevant to this study is that Maritain’s
methodological approach in both Poetic Intuition in Art and Poetry and On the Grace
and Humanity of Jesus makes it possible for him to affirm the reality of knowledge
originating in the supraconsciousness of the knower (i.e., the poet or Jesus) without that
knowledge being wholly explicit in the knower’s conscious awareness. Nonetheless,
what is known in the supraconsciousness affects and influences what is consciously
known.
It is interesting that Polanyi, although writing from within the philosophy of
science, comes to a very similar conclusion as Maritain. Polanyi’s epistemological
method differs from Maritain’s in two distinct ways. The first is that Polanyi’s
epistemological theory is worked out primarily within the philosophy of science. Second,
whereas in Maritain one must understand his philosophical psychology in order to more
fully understand his epistemology, in Polanyi one must grasp the relationship between
knowledge, discovery and the knower’s “fiduciary framework.”  A closer examination of 
433
 Maritain is not alone in attempting to integrate modern psychology with Thomas’
philosophy and anthropology. A good example of a standard philosophical textbook from the
early 1960s that attempts to integrate the insights of modern psychology within a Thomistic
anthropology is J.F. Donceel, S.J., Philosophical Anthropology (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1967).
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these points will show that, although Polanyi is addressing epistemological questions
from a different perspective than Maritain, his theory of tacit knowing comes to a very
similar conclusion.
When examining Polanyi’s epistemological theory it is important to keep in mind
the methodological background from which it emerged. Recall that Polanyi was initially
a scientist by training and profession, first as a medical doctor and later as a chemist, not 
a philosopher. Had Polanyi been schooled in academic philosophy, he may well have
articulated his theory of tacit knowing in relation to or within some already existing
philosophical school and method. However, Polanyi’s theory originated in response to
scientific questions and not within a particular academic philosophy as such. Thus it
developed outside a specific philosophical genre and without the use of technical
philosophical language.
434
  Concerning this point, Richard Gelwick writes:
The presentation of Polanyi’s philosophy is in itself a major task. Since it
is independent of any single philosophical school and arose from his own
reflections, this philosophy has to be approached as distinctive and
unique…To be sure, the philosophy has affinities and continuities with
previous philosophies. Yet it is new and should not be prematurely
classified.
435
Marjorie Grene agrees with this assessment.
436
Indeed, although Polanyi initially began
addressing epistemological questions within the philosophy of science, it was in
434
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philosophical language. Throughout this editing process Grene became “the dominant figure in
the development of Polanyi’s philosophical skills.”  See Michael Polanyi, 220.
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preparing the Gifford Lectures that Polanyi began to articulate his epistemological theory
more clearly. As I indicated in Chapter 3, the initial catalyst of Polanyi’s thought was in
reaction to the objectivist view of science as well as to counter the growing trend of 
planned scientific inquiry.
437
  However, by the time Polanyi published the Gifford
lectures as Personal Knowledge, he gave it the sub-title Towards a Post-Critical
Philosophy, seemingly aligning himself with a distinct school of philosophy.
438
  Gelwick
believes that Polanyi’s epistemology “is more constructive than the negative contrast
with the period of critical philosophy” and thus cannot really be called “post-critical” at
all.
439
In either case, Gelwick and Grene’s assessment that Polanyi’s epistemology does
not fall into any pre-established category of academic philosophy seems correct.
Although in the years following Personal Knowledge Polanyi dedicated himself primarily
to philosophical writing, it is clear that scientific questions remained at the forefront of 
his philosophical thinking. This leads us to a discussion of the second disparity between
437
 Grene concurs with this evaluation in the Introduction to Knowing and Being: Essays
by Michael Polanyi, ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), xiii.
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Polanyi and Maritain’s epistemological theories.
In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi states that all knowledge is predicated upon a 
particular belief system held by the knower, i.e., a “fiduciary framework.” In maintaining
that all knowledge is built upon a particular belief system, Polanyi specifically mentions
his agreement with St. Augustine’s maxim “nisi credideritis non intelligitis.”
440
Although St. Augustine was specifically referring to the Christian faith, Polanyi adopts
the adage and applies it to all human knowing. He writes:
We must now recognize belief once more as the source of all
knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the sharing of an idiom
and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like-minded community: such are
the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of things on which we
rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence, however critical or 
original, can operate outside such a fiduciary framework.
441
Consequently, we can say that a scientist who adheres to a strict positivistic model
of science has committed himself to that particular belief system—thus it is a tacit
component of all his subsequent knowledge. In summarizing this point, Moleski writes,
“We always approach reality through our own view of reality—we can never use anyone
else’s mind to think for ourselves—and yet reality is able to challenge the assumptions
we have brought to bear on it.”
442
  Thus Polanyi holds that all knowledge, both tacit and
explicit, is always predicated upon the particular belief system to which a knower has
committed himself. Indeed, Polanyi himself adheres to this principle in Personal
Knowledge.  “The principle purpose of this book is to achieve a frame of mind in which I
may hold firmly what I believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably
440
 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 267.
441
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442




  Polanyi recognizes that the particular belief system to which he adheres, i.e.,
a tacit framework for all knowledge, is one to which he has both committed himself and
also the one from which he encounters all of reality.
Polanyi’s fiduciary framework, however, is not simply meant to justify his theory
of tacit knowledge, but rather it helps to clarify what Gelwick calls Polanyi’s “heuristic
philosophy.”  As discussed in Chapter 3, the process of scientific discovery acted as the
catalyst to Polanyi’s epistemological thinking, primarily because it is with discovery in
mind that he began to formulate his tacit theory of knowledge. For Polanyi, the
possibility of discovering something new is directly related to the fiduciary framework of 
the knower and serves as an example of the personal element inherent in all human
knowing. How is this so?  A particular fiduciary framework establishes the mental
parameters from which the knower is able to “reach out” into uncharted aspects of the
world and know it. Also, it is from within these parameters that discovery occurs, i.e., a
knower begins to grasp in a non-specific, non-explicit manner some unknown thing.
What we see in Polanyi’s appropriation of St. Augustine’s maxim, “Unless you
believe, you shall not understand,”
444
  is that he directly relates it to his understanding of 
the process of discovery.  At the heart of discovery and all human knowing, according to
Polanyi, lies the fundamental aspect of his epistemological theory—tacit knowledge.
According to his theory, what is explicitly known is built upon tacitly held knowledge
that oftentimes remains hidden to the knower. Nonetheless, what is tacitly known is real
knowledge that may lead to the discovery of something that is initially unable to be 
specified by the knower. In other words, according to Polanyi there are things that we
443
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really know even though we are unable to fully articulate them and draw them into our 
focal, explicit awareness.  The process of discovery, i.e., asking the question that will
eventually bring into focal awareness something that is tacitly known, highlights
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Thus we can see that although Polanyi is
approaching epistemological questions from the perspective of a philosophy of science
and not a philosophical psychology like Maritain, he reaches a similar epistemological
conclusion, namely, that we know more than we are necessarily able to say, as the
process of discovery highlights.
C. Convergence
This final section will return to the question of the consciousness of Christ in
Maritain’s thought as understood with the help of Polanyi and will be divided into two
parts. The first part will explore the implications of Maritain’s theory of the divinized
supraconsciousness of Jesus and its affect on the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-
viator. Specifically, I will show how Maritain’s theory of poetic intuition further clarifies
the manner in which knowledge in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus effects and
is known, albeit in a limited, non-thematic manner, in his conscious awareness. This will
be followed by an examination of the knowledge that Jesus has of himself and his divine
identity. Lastly, I will briefly critique Maritain’s application and inclusion of infused
knowledge in light of his overall theory of the divinized supraconsciousness and
consciousness of Jesus.
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The Knowledge of Jesus-viator
In order to more fully appreciate Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus
Christ in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus, it is important to keep in mind what he is
trying to accomplish. It is clear that Maritain tries to integrate the scholastic theory of the
threefold knowledge of Jesus in such a way that does not compromise Jesus’ genuine
humanity. However, Maritain did not consider his theory of Jesus’ consciousness as a 
wholly new endeavor. Rather, he considered his work as “extending his [St. Thomas’]
movement of thought” in light of modernity’s understanding of human nature, especially
consciousness.
445
  Thus we must view Maritain’s theory as an attempt to affirm two
simultaneous realities about Jesus at once. On the one hand, Maritain certainly maintains
the scholastic theory of Jesus having the beatific vision in his soul. On the other hand, he 
also maintains, based on his reading of St. Luke’s Gospel (2.52), Jesus’ having genuine
human and intellectual growth. It is in coming to understand these two seemingly
divergent theses, i.e., the presence of the beatific vision in Jesus’ soul while also
affirming genuine intellectual growth in light of the indispensable “philosophical
instrument”
446
 of consciousness that Maritain makes a real contribution to Christological
studies. This contribution can be seen most clearly in his understanding of the
knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator.
Maritain indicates that the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator functions
like that of any other man with the exception of his supraconsciousness being divinized
445
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 52. 
446
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by the beatific vision.
447
  Recall that for Maritain, supraconsciousness “functions in us 
only in the zone of ‘the spirit in its living springs,’ where the world of conscious activity
has its hidden source.”
448
  Thus in you or me, supraconsciousness is above our conscious
awareness but is the source of our conscious activity. Jesus’ supraconsciousness acts in
the same manner, but his also has the unique benefit of being divinized by the beatific
vision.
449
  Thus the intellectual synthesis that takes place in Jesus’ divinized
supraconsciousness, particularly concerning matters related to his mission as redeemer
and the knowledge he has of himself, includes the added benefit of beatific certainty.
Recall also that Maritain posits the presence of a partition separating the divinized
supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor from the consciousness of Jesus-viator.
However, Maritain reminds his reader that the two states and consciousnesses share the
same human nature and the same faculties.
450
  Because they share the same nature and the
same faculties, Maritain can affirm, “I think there was clearly a certain communication
between these two states and these two worlds.”
451
  Thus when Maritain indicates that
knowledge originating in Jesus’ divinized supraconsciousness crosses the partition into
the consciousness of Jesus-viator, the knowledge is doing so within the same nature and
the same intellectual faculties. With this in mind, it is easier to understand that when
Maritain discusses the knowledge of Jesus-viator as originating in the divinized
supraconsciousness, he is not discussing something completely foreign or added to the
447
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intellect of Jesus. As I indicated earlier, there was in addition to infused intellectual
knowledge an influence of the beatific vision in Jesus’ divinized supraconsciousness on 
his human consciousness taken in a broader sense.
452
When we look to Maritain’s explanation of supraconsciousness in Creative
Intuition in Art and Poetry, we find an analogous relationship between poetic intuition in
the poet and the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator in On the Grace and 
Humanity of Jesus. It is in the poet’s supraconsciousness where images and concepts are
further illuminated and as a consequence reveal something more about reality. All of this
occurs, of course, above the poet’s conscious awareness.
453
  Nonetheless, although this
knowledge comes to be known in a non-thematic and non-explicit manner in the poet’s
consciousness, Maritain indicates that it is a real kind of knowledge which is eventually
externalized as a creative act of art or poetry. In Jesus Christ, however, because his
supraconsciousness is also divinized by the beatific vision, the knowledge present to him
in the divinized supraconsciousness is illuminated in a manner far greater than that of any
instance of poetic intuition. What is clearer in the divinized supraconsciousness will also
be clearer to the consciousness of Jesus, although what is externalized is but a fraction of 
what is present in the divinized supraconsciousness. Recall that in Maritain’s theory of 
poetic intuition, what is known by the poet in the supraconscious comes to expression
through the creative consciousness of the artist. However, although the expression seeks
to share the instance of creative intuition with another, “a great many things, and often
the most important, the dearest to the poet, are lost and wasted in the process.”
454
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Although some of what is “known” by the poet is lost, the conscious expression of an
instance of poetic intuition is still the real expression of the unthematic knowledge
originating in the supraconscious of the poet. As a result, a poet’s conscious awareness is
a true but limited expression of the knowledge he has in his supraconsciousness.
Thus the non-conceptual knowledge that descends from the divinized
supraconsciousness into the consciousness of Jesus would reflect the greater illumination
and synthesis afforded by him also having the beatific vision. However, the knowledge
that Jesus has in the state of viator would be far less explicit than the knowledge he has in
his divinized supraconsciousness. The same holds true for an instance of poetic intuition
in a poet. What the poet is conscious of is but a small part of the totality of the synthesis
that has occurred in his supraconsciousness. Referring to Jesus’ divinized
supraconsciousness, Maritain writes, “… the content of the supraconscious heaven of the
soul was retained, [and] could not pass into the world of consciousness … except … by
mode of general influx, and of comforting, and of participated light.”
455
In the same way
as the poet is unaware of the fullness of an instance of poetic intuition, so too would Jesus
be unaware of the fullness of an instance of “poetic intuition” in his divinized
supraconsciousness. In both cases, however, it does enter into and affect what is
consciously known and done by the person. Of course, one would say that the
knowledge that Jesus-viator has does not so much concern artistic or poetic creativity,
although it theoretically could, inasmuch as it is one of “divine” creativity.
Can we take seriously Maritain’s assertion that non-thematic, non-explicit
knowledge originating in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor, as
455
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well as explicit infused knowledge of divine mysteries, bears upon and is present in his
explicit knowledge and consciousness as viator? Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing helps
to answer this question.
Based on our study of Polanyi, the answer to the previous question is yes, we can
take seriously Maritain’s understanding that knowledge originating in the divinized
supraconsciousness of Jesus affects the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator.
Notwithstanding the different methodological approach previously noted between the two
epistemological theories, Polanyi’s understanding of tacit knowledge lends credence to
Maritain’s theory of supraconsciousness, especially as it relates to the knowledge and
consciousness of Jesus-viator. The main aspect of Polanyi’s theory that is relevant to
Maritain is his explanation of tacit knowledge as real yet non-explicit knowledge that
bears upon the focal knowledge of the knower. When Polanyi states that all focal or 
explicit knowledge is built upon tacitly held knowledge, he is indicating something
similar to Maritain’s epistemological theory about the role of the divinized consciousness
in the consciousness of Jesus-viator.
Polanyi’s assertion that all explicit knowledge is built upon tacitly held
knowledge is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of his tacit theory. Indeed, in the
introduction to The Tacit Dimension he writes,
This structure [tacit knowing] shows that all thought contains components
of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking,
and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were parts of our
body. Hence thinking is not only intentional … it is also necessarily
fraught with the roots that it embodies. It has a from-to structure.”
456
What Polanyi is indicating here is that focal, explicit awareness is built upon and relies on
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non-explicit, tacitly held knowledge (i.e., subsidiary particulars). By way of an analogy,
Polanyi’s view of knowledge is very much like an iceberg. What we are focally aware of 
is but a very small part of what we really know, much like the tip of an iceberg reveals
only a fraction of what lies below the surface of the water. Polanyi would add, of course,
that both the tip of the iceberg and our focal knowledge are only able to be known
because they are “supported” by knowledge that remains outside our focal awareness,
i.e., it remains tacitly known. Polanyi calls these underlying, tacitly held structures of our 
explicit knowledge subsidiary particulars. Depending on what we are explicitly aware of
we may be more or less able to bring into our focal awareness any one of the many
underlying, tacit structures of our explicit knowledge. Sometimes, however, these tacit
components of knowledge remain unspecifiable and are not able to be drawn into our 
focal awareness, i.e., in the medical diagnosis of a seizure. When a doctor identifies a 
patient as having a seizure (and not a stroke) there are numerous tacit elements of the
diagnosis that are not able to be attended to focally by the doctor. These unspecifiable,
tacit elements, however, bear upon the doctor’s diagnosis, and although they remain
beyond the doctor’s focal awareness, they remain real knowledge.
When examining Maritain’s Christology in light of Polanyi’s tacit theory, two
things become evident. First, if Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is correct, and I believe
that it is, it would apply as much to the human nature and consciousness of Jesus as it
does for you or me. Therefore, Jesus’ focal awareness of any given thing would also
include all the many underlying, subsidiary elements to that knowledge. In other words,
the foundation of all his explicit knowledge would be tacit knowledge. For example, the
common language that Jesus learned as a child was Aramaic. It is certain that when, as
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an adult, Jesus engaged in conversations and articulated his thoughts to others, he would
have spoken the same Aramaic language he learned as a child, but his focal awareness
would not have been on the Aramaic language he was speaking but on the ideas and
thoughts he was expressing. If he needed to, however, he could make this subsidiary
element explicit by searching for a particular word or utilizing a particular rhetorical style
(i.e., parables). In so doing, however, Jesus’ focal awareness would shift to what would
otherwise be a subsidiary aspect of knowledge. What was previously tacit would become
explicit and focal to him. In the first place then, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge
applies to Jesus’ natural, ordinary knowledge.
The second thing that becomes clear when looking at Maritain’s theory of the
consciousness of Jesus in light of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is closely related to
the first point. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing holds that in many instances what is
tacitly known as a subsidiary aspect of our focal awareness is able to be brought into our 
focal awareness. In other words, what is tacitly known is able to be explicitly known.
However, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing also holds that there are some instances
where what is tacitly known remains unspecifiable and is not able to be drawn into our 
focal awareness. Polanyi offers his reader the example of a scientist recognizing a good
problem that eventually leads to a discovery.
457
In this example Polanyi writes that the
scientist has “a tacit foreknowledge of yet undiscovered things” based on the totality of 
his scientific knowledge and training.
458
  The problem the scientist recognizes is tacitly
held knowledge—otherwise the question would concern something explicit and then
would not really amount to much of a question at all!  A good scientific question involves
457
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the articulation (though limited) of something tacitly known yet at the same time bears
itself upon and impacts what the scientist is explicitly aware of. The scientist knows there
is some thing to be discovered without being able to explicitly state the subsidiary, tacit
elements of that knowledge. This aspect of Polanyi’s theory is particularly important in
relation to Maritain’s theory of the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator. Recall
that Maritain understands the knowledge of Jesus-viator as originating in the divinized
supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor. Although the knowledge Jesus has in his
divinized supraconsciousness affects his conscious life and actions, the contents of that
divinized supraconsciousness are not explicitly known in Jesus’ conscious mind.
Consequently, he would not be able to state explicitly the grounds for all that he said and
did. There is a clear affinity between Maritain’s understanding of the knowledge and
consciousness of Jesus and Polanyi’s tacit knowledge.
If I put the problem of Jesus’ consciousness and knowledge in Polanyian
language, Maritain is stating that the knowledge present in the divinized
supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor bears upon his knowledge and consciousness
as viator, specifically his focal awareness, in a subsidiary, tacit manner. Such an
application of Polanyi’s tacit theory to Jesus is not intended as a Christianization of 
Polanyi’s thought. Rather, it shows that both authors agree that in the unconscious, tacit
elements of our explicit knowledge are the foundation of, and give full meaning to what
is explicitly known. A scientist may not be able to explicitly state why he thinks a 
particular question is worth investigating any more clearly than Jesus might be able to
explain how he knows with certainty such things as his divine identity. In both cases,
however, such knowledge is real knowledge founded on tacit elements that remain
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unspecifiable to the knower. Accordingly, what is known by Jesus in his conscious
awareness is not less real than what he knows in his divinized supraconsciousness, but it
is not able to be fully specified.
Returning to the aforementioned question of whether or not we can take seriously
Maritain’s understanding of the explicit knowledge of Jesus-viator being rooted in the
knowledge present in his divinized supraconsciousness, we come to the following
conclusion: Polanyi demonstrates that what we know in our focal awareness is founded
upon tacitly held, non-explicit knowledge. In many cases what we are tacitly aware of is
able to be drawn into our explicit, focal awareness. However, in some instances what is
tacitly known is not able to be drawn into our focal, explicit awareness and thus remains
tacit. If we consider Maritain’s theory of the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus in
light of Polanyi’s epistemological theory, we see a confirmation of Maritain’s thought
from a different philosophical perspective, that of the philosophy of science. Both
believe that we have real knowledge even if elements of that knowledge remain hidden to
us, i.e., tacit. Therefore, we conclude that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing enables us to
take seriously Maritain’s theory of the divinized supraconsciousness affecting Jesus’
consciousness and knowledge as viator. This brings us to a final examination of the
conscious self-awareness of Jesus Christ in Maritain’s On the Grace and Humanity of 
Jesus.
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Maritain on the Consciousness of Jesus-Viator
At this point in the discussion, one might ask why Maritain has gone through such
a complex matrix of clarifying various terms, states and consciousnesses in Jesus. The
question is not an irrelevant one but rather invites us into a deeper dialogue with Maritain
and his thought. In fact, the question poignantly brings us to the heart of Maritain’s book 
on the consciousness of Jesus Christ. In the Foreword to On the Grace and Humanity of 
Jesus, Maritain indicates that when he originally prepared the seminars that eventually
comprised the book, there were “those who claim to put everything in question of the
traditional teaching.”
459
It is not very clear who “those” people are since Maritain does
not directly reveal their identity. However, as I discussed in Chapter 2, Maritain was
certainly aware of the previous controversy concerning the consciousness of Christ and
did, in fact, go to great lengths to shield himself from the same problems previous
theologians had encountered.
460
Likewise, Maritain also indicates that the Christological
“reinterpretation” that he is proposing originated many years earlier when Raïssa was still
alive. In light of this, we are better able to understand why Maritain goes to such lengths
to explain the various terms, states and consciousnesses in Jesus with such precision. The
attention Maritain devoted to his book on the consciousness of Jesus Christ was to ensure
that his proposal did not meet the same fate as some of the authors discussed in Chapter 1 
to whom, I believe, Maritain is referring.
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On the other hand, there are indications in On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus
that Maritain is also entertaining the question of the consciousness of Christ because of
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what he refers to as the “poorly instructed Christian conscience,”
462
 which tends to
attribute to the human nature of Jesus prerogatives proper to his divine nature.
463
Maritain notes that this tendency misunderstands two important aspects of Jesus’
knowledge and consciousness. First, attributing to the human child Jesus divine
prerogatives (such as the governance of the world) fails to adequately distinguish the two
natures in Jesus. While it is true to say that the divine person of the Word creates,
governs and directs the world, he does not do so through his created human nature.
464
The second misunderstanding, according to Maritain, is that Jesus as viator consciously
possessed the beatific vision while also living a truly human existence with the
limitations attendant on being viator. Maritain attributes this view to a “poorly formed
and poorly instructed Christian psychology,”
465
 which his theory of the consciousness of 
Christ addresses.
With these two points in mind, I think we can better appreciate the depths to
which Maritain engages the question of the knowledge and consciousness of Jesus.
Although his examination of Jesus is detailed, I believe that Maritain is trying to
safeguard Jesus’ humanity from becoming, as he states, a “fairy-story marvel which is
unworthy of Christ and contrary to the verus homo.”
466
  Two further citations explain
Maritain’s thoughts on this point.
… being given the central importance of the humanity of Christ in
contemplation and the contemplative life, a new synthesis concerning this
humanity,—a Thomist synthesis in its principles and its spirit, but freed of 
accidental obstacles due to the mentality of an epoch, and recognizing that
movement of growth, not only as to the body but as to the things of the
462
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soul and of the spirit, is essential to every true man,—such a new
synthesis seems entirely necessary.
467
He undertakes to provide this new synthesis with the aid of a more sophisticated
psychology than the scholastics had.
Once we are in possession of this philosophical instrument, this explicit
and systematic notion of the divinized supraconsciousness of the spirit, it
seems to me, not, indeed, that the difficulties cease, but that they become
more approachable, that the image which we have of the humanity of
Christ becomes more really human, and that place is made in this image
(at the level below that of the divinized supraconscious) for the movement,
the development, the progress, without which man is not truly man. Christ
was not purus homo; but he was verus homo.
468
Thus it seems that Maritain is not simply engaging the highly volatile issue of the
consciousness of Christ in such a way as to protect himself from the possibility of 
censure, though that is certainly true. Rather, I think that Maritain was also genuinely
interested in providing a theological explanation of the consciousness of Christ that
integrates theological truths with common piety. His understanding of the consciousness
of Christ seems to do just that.
This brings us to the particular question of the conscious self-knowledge of Jesus-
viator in Maritain’s thought. While it is true that Maritain discusses other things that
Jesus-viator is consciously aware of with divine certainty (e.g., his mission to reveal the
truth of the Father’s love)
469
 and his role as savior and redeemer,
470
 both of these spring
from the central question of his consciousness and knowledge of himself. Indeed,
Maritain makes this point when he states that it is the person of the Word who reveals
divine truths in a human manner.
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It is absurd to imagine that Christ would have had like us theological faith.
He had come—He, the Incarnate Word, the God made man—in order to
reveal divinely the truths and the mysteries on which this faith lives, and to
which it adheres on the testimony and the teaching of God revealing, or of 
the subsisting Truth itself making itself known. Jesus did not believe,—
He knew. He did not have theological faith, He had knowledge to which
this faith is suspended.
471
So we must ask, where does Jesus’ awareness of divine things, including his divinity,
originate? In light of Maritain’s theory of the supraconsciousness the answer to this
question involves two closely related aspects of Jesus’ knowledge, which we might try to
describe in terms borrowed from Polanyi. First, there are aspects of Jesus’ knowledge in
which the various subsidiary particulars, tacitly held, are able to be drawn into his focal,
explicit awareness. However, there are also elements of Jesus’ knowledge and
consciousness that are tacit and remain unspecifiable to him. Although what is tacitly
known remains beyond Jesus’ focal, explicit awareness they still bear upon and affect his
knowledge and consciousness. To the extent that they derive from his unique, divinized
supraconsciousness, they make Jesus a truly human but special person.
Addressing the self-knowledge of Jesus in Maritain’s thought we must begin with
his statement, “Insofar as comprehensor, He [Jesus] knew Himself God through the
Vision, in seeing the divine essence and His own divine Person and the Father with
whom He is one.”
472
  Recall that in Maritain’s description of the threefold knowledge of 
Jesus and the dual states of his humanity, it is in the divinized supraconsciousness of his
soul that Jesus-comprehensor sees the beatific vision. This remains above the
consciousness of Jesus because of the partition that separates the divinized
supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor from the consciousness of Jesus-viator. For
471
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this reason it is true to say that in his divinized supraconsciousness, Jesus is explicitly
aware of himself as a divine person, one of the Trinity. This knowledge of himself is
divinely certain because what is being presented to the intellect of Jesus-comprehensor is
concurrently being seen in the beatific vision.
473
It is important to understand Maritain
on this point because the knowledge of Jesus-viator originates in and must correspond to
the knowledge present in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor.
Maritain indicates that although one of the modes through which Jesus-viator knows
himself is the non-conceptual knowledge originating in the divinized supraconsciousness,
this knowledge does not have the same degree of certainty as it does in the higher realm
of its origin. Nonetheless, “the consciousness that Jesus had of His own divinity …
developed very quickly in the course of His childhood.”
474
Maritain specifically addresses the knowledge and consciousness of the child
Jesus and the process through which his conscious development occurs. Maritain writes:
It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that the consciousness of His
own divinity should have surged up in Jesus from the instant that He
began to become conscious of Himself, and that there began to germinate
the idea of God in His acquired science as in His infused science at the
state of way; it is absolutely necessary also that it should have grown
progressively at the same time as developed his consciousness of Himself,
and that the idea of God took better and better shape in His mind, thanks
to the infused species meeting and illuminating from above the notions
communicated from here below through the blessed voice of His Mother
and the sacred rites of the Law. The wonder connatural to childhood gave
way to the supernatural wonder of the revelation of Himself to Himself. It
is without the least surprise, and in a manner altogether harmonious, fresh
and gracious, it is with all the naturalness, and the admirable simplicity,
and the admirable seriousness of the little child regarding being that the
Child Jesus knew that He was God, and that this consciousness of His
divinity underwent in Him its developments.
475
473
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 107.
474
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 119.
475
 Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity, 119.
175
Of particular importance is Maritain’s indication that the consciousness of Jesus-viator is
shaped by both his acquired knowledge and knowledge stemming from his divinized
supraconsciousness. In order to understand more clearly what Maritain means by this
affirmation, we must refer back to his application of the principle of the asymptote to
Jesus.
476
  Recall that the knowledge of Jesus-comprehensor stems from his intellect being
enlightened by the beatific vision and is thus the fullest knowledge possible to a created
intellect.
477
  However, according to the same principle, in the state of viator the
knowledge Jesus has at any particular age is the fullness of knowledge possible for that
age, influenced by the divinized supraconsciousness. What Maritain means by this is that
Jesus-viator’s knowledge increases in proportion with his life experiences, and along
with “divinized” knowledge originating in the supraconsciousness, grants him the
fullness of knowledge possible at that particular moment in his life.
Thus Maritain writes, “The consciousness that Jesus had of His divinity was to be 
much higher still at the time of the Last Supper and of the appearance before Caiphas.
What I mean is that at twelve years of age, before the Doctors, He had already, with the
full consciousness of His divinity, a science of the divine things more perfect and more
ample than that of any man here on earth.”
478
  Maritain indicates two key points here.
First, because his knowledge and consciousness are rooted in his divinized
supraconsciousness, Jesus is conscious of divine things, including his own divinity, in a 
more perfect manner than any other person. Second, this knowledge is not complete at
the age of twelve, but with the addition of more and more acquired knowledge
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throughout Jesus’ life, will be greater at the end of his ministry than it was when he was
found in the Temple at the age of twelve. As Jesus gains further acquired knowledge,
that knowledge will be processed and further enlightened in his divinized
supraconsciousness. Consequently, as Jesus learns more experientially, he also gains
more supraconscious knowledge of things that in turn further affects his conscious
awareness.
By way of a further clarification, I would point out that according to Maritain, it is
not only through the workings of his divinized supraconsciousness that Jesus is conscious
of his divinity by the age of twelve. Maritain indicates that, because Jesus’ humanity is
free from sin, his human faculties, i.e., his intellect and will, operate in a more perfect
manner than a fallen human nature would. “Finally, if it is a question of the world of 
consciousness, which Christ had in common with us,—well, whereas in us this world is
wounded by sin, on the contrary in Christ it was free not only of original sin but of all sin,
and immaculate, and incomparably holy from the beginning.”
479
  Because of his sinless
nature Jesus’ intellect is impeccable and is able to receive and process acquired
information in the light of the divinized supraconsciousness more perfectly.  Thus
because Jesus’ humanity is not divided by nor suffers from concupiscence, he is better
able to integrate and understand himself and the world around him. When Jesus-viator’s
knowledge increases, both acquired and through the divinized supraconsciousness, that
knowledge is more perfectly integrated within his intellect and consciousness because he
is free from sin. While Maritain attributes such intellectual and conscious clarity in
Jesus-viator to what he receives from his divinized supraconsciousness, it is also true that
479
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it is Jesus’ immaculate human nature that makes such heightened supernatural knowledge
possible. This would be especially true of the knowledge and consciousness that Jesus
had of himself and his divinity.
A final note on the infused knowledge of Jesus-viator and the knowledge he has
of himself and his divinity: Maritain insists that infused knowledge differs in Jesus
according to the state of comprehensor or viator.
480
  As comprehensor, that is, in his
divinized supraconsciousness infused knowledge would embrace “all things absolutely,”
and, like the beatific vision present in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus, it would
remain incommunicable to Jesus-viator.
481
In the consciousness of Jesus-viator, infused
knowledge would operate in proportion to his intellectual development and would only
reveal to him “all that Jesus had need to know at that moment.”
482
  Therefore, Maritain
indicates that infused knowledge in Jesus would operate in his two states and
consciousnesses in a way reflective of his explanation of Jesus’ knowledge.  Thus
Maritain affirms that in Jesus’ consciousness as viator, he has the added divine certainty
of his own divine identity and mission as well as the things he has come to reveal to
humanity through infused knowledge.
483
It seems that Maritain includes infused knowledge in his discussion of the
consciousness of Jesus as an addition to his theory of the divinized supraconsciousness of 
Jesus. Recall that the scholastic theory of the threefold knowledge of Jesus includes
beatific, infused and acquired knowledge. Maritain certainly holds that Jesus acquires
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knowledge, and that Jesus’ acquired knowledge reaches unsurpassable synthesis and
clarity in the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus. When Maritain includes a 
discussion of the infused knowledge of Jesus, however, it seems that he does so more as
an afterthought to his theory than as an integral part of it. His description of infused
knowledge does little to add to what he has already said concerning the consciousness of 
Jesus, with the exception of enabling Maritain to state directly that infused knowledge
gives Jesus “divinely sovereign certitude, that He was the Word Incarnate, essentially one
with the Father.”
484
  Why is it important for Maritain to state that Jesus has such explicit
consciousness and knowledge through infused knowledge when he has already
substantiated something very similar with his theory of the divinized supraconsciousness?
Without revisiting the earlier controversies surrounding the consciousness of
Christ that pre-date Maritain, I would point to them as influencing Maritain’s inclusion of 
infused knowledge in his theory of the consciousness of Jesus, specifically the knowledge
Jesus has of his own divine identity. Through the inclusion of infused knowledge,
Maritain is able preemptively to avoid the possibility of censure by: 1. Demonstrating
that he has remained faithful to the scholastic notion of the threefold knowledge of Jesus;
and 2. Including infused knowledge in his discussion of the consciousness of Jesus. This
provides Maritain a forum from which he is able to state unambiguously that Jesus has
explicit, certain knowledge of his own divine identity. Unfortunately, Maritain’s
inclusion of a discussion of infused knowledge does not add much to his theory of the
consciousness of Jesus Christ. In his theory of the divinized supraconsciousness,
Maritain has already accounted for Jesus’ supernatural knowledge and its effect on his
conscious awareness, especially of himself. A more detailed application of his theory of
484
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poetic intuition to his theory of the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus would have
served to make his theory much clearer and perhaps stronger. Although it is regrettable
that Maritain did not pursue this aspect of his theory more fully, his theory of the
divinized supraconsciousness and consciousness of Jesus Christ is a significant
contribution to the question of the consciousness of Christ.
D. Conclusion
Although Maritain’s On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus has gone largely
unnoticed by theologians, the addition of his psychological theory of supraconsciousness
to the scholastic understanding of the knowledge of Jesus Christ does offer a potential
advance in Christological studies. Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ
affirms the scholastic theory of the threefold knowledge of Jesus in its essentials while
carrying it further with the aid of his philosophical psychology. By applying his earlier
theory of supraconsciousness, and proposing that in Jesus his supraconsciousness was
divinized by the beatific vision, Maritain has found a means of expressing the reality of 
Jesus’ supernatural knowledge while simultaneously maintaining Jesus’ true humanity.
This is seen most clearly in Maritain’s disagreement with St. Thomas over the
interpretation of St. Luke’s Gospel (2.52). To grow in knowledge is a characteristic that
applies to everyone who is truly human. If this is a true statement, then it must also be 
true for Jesus’ humanity.  Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Jesus Christ enables
him to demonstrate true intellectual and personal growth in Jesus while also affirming his
having divinely certain knowledge, especially of his own divinity.
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Polanyi’s contribution to this work is his theory of tacit knowing. In showing that
we have real knowledge of things that are not always able to be articulated or
demonstrated, Polanyi has moved beyond the strict scientism of his day. Of particular
importance is Polanyi’s demonstration that what we are explicitly aware of, i.e., our focal
knowledge, is built upon and sustained by subsidiary elements that we know tacitly. In
some cases what is tacitly held is also able to be brought into our focal awareness.
However, there are many more cases where our tacit knowledge remains tacit, i.e., it
remains unable to be specified. Still what we are focally aware of is real knowledge even
though we are unable to specify one or more of the subsidiary, tacit aspects of that
knowledge; in fact, it is real knowledge only because of those subsidiary, tacit aspects.
When we examine Maritain’s theory of the consciousness of Christ in light of 
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, two things become clearer. First, we are able to
seriously consider Maritain’s hypothesis that the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus,
while not providing explicit knowledge to the intellect or consciousness of Jesus-viator,
nonetheless does affect and influence his consciousness and knowledge. In other words,
what is derived from the divinized supraconsciousness of Jesus-comprehensor affects and
influences the explicit knowledge and consciousness of Jesus-viator in a tacit manner,
similar to the way all human knowledge and skill is derived from subsidiary knowledge.
Second, Polanyi’s theory enables a greater understanding of genuine growth in Jesus’
knowledge, especially of himself. The degrees of Jesus’ awareness of himself as a divine
person rests without his necessarily being aware of them, or all the subsidiary, tacit
components of that knowledge. Every instance of self-reflection, every experience, every
moment of prayer would further expose some tacit, underlying aspect of his explicit
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awareness of himself to his explicit, conscious awareness. Jesus’ consciousness and
knowledge of himself as being divine would be real knowledge even if all the underlying
particulars of that knowledge are not explicitly known by him, specifically those
originating in his divinized supraconsciousness.
Maritain’s contribution to Christological studies, then, is his theory of the
divinized supraconsciousness and its interaction with the consciousness of Jesus. While
affirming an absolute and perfect knowledge in the former, the heart of Maritain’s theory
lies in the latter. That Jesus experiences authentic intellectual and conscious
development is fundamental to his being genuinely human. In his explanation of the
impact of the divinized supraconsciousness on the knowledge and consciousness of 
Jesus-viator, Maritain is able to affirm that Jesus’ knowledge of the world and of himself
is certain knowledge, though it is not absolute knowledge—meaning it is able to increase
and to grow. All this being true, Jesus’ knowledge of his divinity does not diminish his
humanity, but according to Maritain makes it possible for “the image we have of the
humanity of Christ” to become “more really human.”
485
  Polanyi’s theory helps to make
this position more credible by corroborating and filling out Maritain’s psychological
picture of Jesus as a deeply human one. Thus Maritain leaves us to contemplate a Jesus
who, “though he was in the form of God … emptied himself” (Phil. 2.6-7) and truly
entered into solidarity with our human condition.
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